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Abstract of Thesis
The thesis concentrates on two aspects of the relationship between
growth and profitability. Firstly it asks whether the supply of
internal finance acts as a constraint upon growth by new investment
on the one hand and growth by takeover on the other. Secondly it
traces the consequences for the amalgamation's profitability of
growth by takeover. It can, then, be seen as tracing some effects
of two of the major recent developments in the U.K. company sector:
the savings squeeze and the merger boom, both of which are documented
in the thesis. The analysis draws on the accounts of all but the
smallest U.K. quoted companies for the period 1948-1972. Its chief
conclusions are that new investment in fixed assets is likely to
have been restrained by the savings squeeze; that expansion by take¬
over appeared to be less sensitive than new investment to the avail¬
ability of internal finance; and that the rate of return on the
amalgamation's capital typically showed a decline after merger. On
the policy side it calls for a change in the basis of profit measure¬
ment; traces relations between the rate of inflation, the distribu¬
tion of income and the level of investment - which bear on fiscal
and incomes policies; and supports the demands of some economists
for a less permissive state policy towards merger.
CHAPTER 1.
Introduction
Cross-section analysis of company accounting data has
suggested a fairly strong positive association between the
rate of growth of companies' capital and the rate of profit
on capital.The thesis takes up this relationship,
asking whether it could mean firstly that a reduction in the
rate of profit achieved by a firm would cause its growth
rate to be reduced; and secondly, that a more rapid rate
of growth by the firm would yield a higher rate of profit
(2)
when that higher growth was achieved by takeover.
These questions are prompted by two striking features of the
U.K. company sector in the late sixties: a profit squeeze
and a takeover boom. According to some observers at least,
(3)
company profits were in steep decline in these years ;
while on the growth side investment has been sluggish in
(4)
most years since the late sixties. Although their rate
(1) See Singh and Y/hittiigton (1968) ; Whittington (1971)
and chapter 9 below.
(2) The earlier work (Footnote 1) has argued that the
direction of causation runs from profit to growth;
and this argument is developed below (chapters 3
and 9). Chapters 7 and 8 observe the effect of
growth on subsequent profitability.
(3) See chapter 2 and Appendix A on the debates which
have raged over this issue.
(4) See chapter 3 and National Institute Economic
Review (1974) (Summary Tables).
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of growth by new investment in fixed assets was unremarkable,
however, British companies were at this time indulging in an
. . (5)
unprecedentedly frenetic rate of takeover activity,
sanctioned if not positively encouraged by the government of
the day on the grounds that efficiency (and presumably
profitability) would thereby be enhanced.
Part 1 of the thesis concentrates on the one component of
growth, new investment in fixed assets, and is concerned
primarily with its dependence on profitability, It documents
the path of profit since the early sixties, discussing which
components of profit are available for investment under an
inflationary regime, and estimates a model of investment
incorporating measures of internal finance as explanatory
variables. Throughout this part of the thesis, it is assumed
that new investment in fixed assets ie a Good Thing, enhancing
the economy's productive capacity: the matter at issue is why
the U.K. has not achieved more. Some government spokesmen in
/ g \
this period^ would also have conferred this title on the
(5) See chapter 6 and Appendix C.




other major means of expanding the company's capital,
takeover. Having described the scale of takeover activity
in chapter 6, Fart 2 of the thesis puts to the test this
presumption that takeover typically results in enhanced
productive efficiency for the combine; it returns in the
final chapters to issues in the finance of growth - and in
particular to whether any finance control operates
differently for the two means of expansion, takeover and
new investment.
The theoretical framework of the thesis is close to that of
the managerial or growth theorists of the firm - especially
Fenrose (1959) and Marris (1964). It takes as a starting
point the divorce of ownership from control for many of the
larger U.K. companies and the enjoyment of some discretion
by managers in a world of imperfect product and factor markets.
(7) The residual of net asset growth after deducting
growth by takeover and net investment in new
fixed assets, is the accumulation of net current
assets. This component of growth is only dealt
v/ith incidentally in the thesis. It may often
.represent illusory growth (e.g. stock appreciation:
see chapter 2) or be the result of passive accum¬
ulation of undistributed profits (see chapter 4
on the negative relationship between investment
and liquidity balances). Attention is concen¬
trated on the two components of growth which
always involve managerial initiative.
1.4
In fact many of the issues considered in the thesis can be
summarised using the diagram of growth-profitability relation¬
ships devised by Marris and reproduced in figure l.A.
A finance constraint representing the maximum rate of. growth
which can be financed at a given rate of profit is central
to Part l's pre-occupation with the availability of internal
finance for investment; and to Part 2's attempt to
distinguish the constraint which operates if growth is
achieved by new investment from that when growth is attained
by takeover. The curve with the inverted U-shape represents
the dependence of profitability on the rate of growth.
Whether the relationship may be inverse in the upper range
(81
of the growth rate is the subject of some work in chapters
8 and 9. Why managers might choose a strategy which yielded
a higher growth rate but a lower profit rate than available
alternatives is taken up in chapter 10 and Appendix E; and
whether the attainment of a higher growth rate via takeover
might result in lower profitability on the amalgamation's
assets is the principal subject of Part 2.
The approach to this area of work could take one of several
forms. One might concentrate on relating conclusions for
company behaviour to broader existing theories - for instance
examining their implications for a neo-classical or Keynesian
macro theory of the whole economy. Alternatively, given its
(8) On account of 'Penrose Effects'.
FIGURE l.A. Profitability and Growth
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well-known but unresolved, identification problems and
ample scope for multi-equation models, it might be seen as
a potentially fruitful area for sophisticated econometric
analysis. In fact, neither of these tacks has been chosen;
while theoretical and econometric issues have not been
ignored, the principal aim has been to resolve issues for
public policy as directly as possible. The first part
focusses on the desire of successive post-war governments to
secure a higher rate of investment, or to prevent by fiscal,
monetary and incomes policies the demand for higher immediate
consumption from pre-empting the resources available for
investment. It examines the role of internal finance as a
device for rationing investment. Apart from considering the
effectiveness of this rationing mechanism, it traces some of
the consequences of inflation and of the company tax system
for the flow of internal finance; and is concerned, wherever
possible, to find implications for fiscal and incomes policies.
The second part contributes some answers to the question
whether government policy towards takeover should be less
permissive.
The treatment of these topics is empirical; and the strength
of the conclusions which do emerge derives to a large extent
from the mass of observations on which they are based.
For the data bank used in the analysis contains the published
accounts together with other financial information for all
(9) See Section 3.C and chapter 9, footnote 4.
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but the smallest U.K. quoted companies for the whole period
1948-1971. Its contents total five or six million
observations; a single chapter (for instance chapter 9) may
use some 2 million of them; and whereas earlier British
studies on the topics adopted in the thesis have typically
reported the experience of no more than 50 companies,
a thousand or more contribute to the analysis here.
Of course the preparation of this data bank has absorbed a
good deal of research effort - perhaps 18 months of the time
devoted to the thesis - apart from that of earlier research
workers at the National Institute of Economic and Social
Research and the Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge.
Some of the stages of the work are detailed in Appendix ?.
It is, however, already bearing fruit apart from the research
results of the project at Edinburgh. Parts of the data bank
together with the documentation developed at earlier stages of
the doctoral work^"^ have been supplied to Queens' College,
Cambridge and Nuffield College Oxford: and a complete copy
has been handed over to the London Business School who are
amalgamating it with their data bank on share prices as well as
(12}
providing further copies of the data to other academic uses. '
(10) See Section 4.C and Appendix H for a discussion of
earlier work. The joint and individual work of
Singh and Whittington is a notable exception to
this generalisation; but they were only
incidentally concerned with the special issues
selected here.
(11) See Department of Accounting and Business Method (1974).
(12) Members of the Universities of Exeter and of Ulster
have already taken advantage of this facility,
1.7
Some might admit that the quantity of accounting data used
was adequate, but question whether its quality passed muster.
At the very least one might retort that this data is very
carefully prepared. A vast army of clerical workers is
employed within companies to build up these accounts from
detailed and documented transactions; and a smaller army
of trained independent auditors is devoted to verifying the
accounts and ensuring their conformity with standard practice.
The accounting institutes aim to secure consistency of
treatment between companies by reviewing a large sample of
(13)
published company accounts every year, and by issuing
statements of standard accounting practice. The type of
information p>rovided, on the difference between revenue and
expenses, is central to the issues raised in the thesis, of the
internal finance available for investment, ana of firms'
productive efficiency. Moreover, this information is the
ultimate source of data on which company tax assessments and
much national income accounting are based, as well as often
being the best information on the firms' activities available
to shareholders, creditors and sometimes to managers too.
In addition, the data used here are in one respect superior
to those available in published accounts since they have passed
through a further stage of standardisation by the Department
of Industry (see Appendix F).
(13) See Chartered Accountants' Trust for Education
and Research (1972).
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Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the information is
imperfect. Inconsistencies of treatment do survive the
controls just detailed to produce data for particular
variables which are not strictly comparable between companies
(see Appendix F). However, unless an inconsistency is known
to systematically distort a particular variable which is
central to the analysis, it is assumed that it affects the
companies in the population randomly, and that while it may
affect the interval estimate of a mean or relationship
(producing dispersion about the average), it will not affect
the point estimate (i.e. produce a bias). Still there
remain clear cases of bias in the picture given by historic
cost accounting information of certain economic trends or
relationships. Indeed, much of the work in Part 1 of the
thesis was prompted by a recognition that conventional
accounting profit was not an adequate measure of the funds at
the disposal of managements for taxation, distribution and
new investment; and chapter 2 together with Appendices A and
B pursues this theme, arguing against proponents of the
conventional measures and for changes in the definition of
profit for analysis and for tax purposes. Again, parts of
the study in Part 2 were stimulated by the fact that the
literature on takeover's effect on profitability had generally
used a measure of profitability that was known to give biased
results because of accounting conventions, and that the
direction of the bias means that its removal would moderate
or reverse the conclusions reached in earlier works.
1.9
Accordingl}1", Appendix D is devoted to a discussion of takeover
accounting and to developing a method of removing the bias
(14)
which is then applied in chapters 7 and 8.
In general, then, the thesis shows a polite scepticism towards
the data; and the criticism has been repeatedly sought of
accountants hostile to present conventions and practice.
Some explanation is perhaps required of the fact that around
a half of tho volume of the thesis appears in Appendices.
The Appendices have two functions. From Appendix F onwards,
they incorporate tedious detailed material on which the
analysis is based: wherever possible, supplementary results,
detailed definitions and lengthy surveys of earlier work were
relegated from the main body of the thesis to leave the
(14) Sometimes biases are known to exist but cannot be
readily quantified and taken into account directly;
so the bias is noted and the conclusion qualified.
This happens especially in chapter 9 and Appendix C.
It may seem odd that chapter 2 is so sceptical of
conventional measures of profit and yet that Part 2
uses these measures as an index of efficiency. But
in the first place there is no reason to believe that
any of the alternative profit measures proposed would
yield a different picture in Part 2: the chief
causes of divergence between conventional and some
measure of 'real' profit (e.g. stock-profit ratios,
capital intensity), are not likely to be related
to takeover activity. In the second place,
chapters 7 and 8 compare the profitability of an
acquirer after merger with its own level prior to
merger: and since the same distortions are likely
to affect the measure throughout, the change in
this measure may yet approximate that of a
preferable measure. Of course, as Appendix 3 in
particular suggests, agreement is lacking on what
would constitute a preferable measure.
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principal arguments as little cluttered as possible. Thus
these six Appendices are included more for reference than
for sustained reading. The first five Appendices on the
other hand have a quite different role. These might all
have been included as chapters of the thesis: they each
pursue issues which have a part in the main argument. They
do, however, generally go into rather more detail on these
issues than is necessary to sustain the arguments of the
thesis, and their inclusion as chapters might sometimes have
produced divergences from the main themes.
Several of the Appendices have been, or will soon be, published
separately (sometimes in an earlier version): Appendix A in
the A.U.T.A. News Review (Spring 1975), C in The Economic
Journal (December 1975) ; B in the Journal of Industrial
(15)
Economics (August 1975) ; while part of B was submitted
as evidence to the Sandilands Committee on Inflation
Accounting in April 1974. Of the main body, only a version
of chapter 2 has been published (Bulletin of the Oxford
University Institute of Economics and Statistics,
November 1974).
(15) Appendices C and E were written jointly with
G. Whittington.
PART i
PROFITS, SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT
2.1.
Chapter 2. Profit Illusion: the relationship between profit and
the internal finance available for investment^-
Are profits being squeezed? Drawing data from the same basic
source, two sets of observers reach quite opposite conclusions.
On the one hand, Glyn and Sutcliffe (1971) and (1972) maintain that
the sixties witnessed a severe decline in profitability; whilst,
on the other, Panic and Close (1973) object that "after 1960 there
is simply no evidence of a significant decline in the pre-tax
profitability of U.K. industry'', and that "the inclusion of invest¬
ment grants would probably eliminate completely the downward trend
in post-tax profitability between 1961 and 1969." More recent
work shows that such contradictory opinions result from different
profit measures. It is the aim of this chapter to pursue this
theme, suggesting that different measures of profit may be approp¬
riate for different issues. It is argued that a single measure,
giving a clear answer, is appropriate for one of the issues with
which both sides were much concerned: whether companies' ability
to finance investment from internal sources has been curtailed.
a. The framework
To demonstrate the way in which the choice of measure can so drastic¬
ally affect the apparent record, and to argue for a measure approp¬
riate to questions of internal finance, requires some discussion of
accounting conventions. As a framework for this discussion, com¬
panies' gross income, the difference between their sales and all
1. An earlier version of this chapter was submitted to the Sandi-
lands Committee on Inflation Accounting in April 1974; and a
subsequent version was published in the Bulletin of the Oxford
University Institute of Economics and Statistics, November 1974.
2.2.
their purchases except fixed assets, may be analysed in terms of
the following components, each of which will subsequently be more
closely defined and evaluated:
D: companies' historic cost depreciation provisions
T: taxation payable on the year's perofits
C: dividends and interest
A: stock appreciation
Z: (K~D) where K is capital consumption, at current prices
R: net retentions, after deducting stock appreciation and capital
consumption
A+Z+R: conventional retentions as recorded by companies
P = T+C+A+Z+R; pre-tax profits, after deducting depreciation, as
conventionally recorded by companies
It is on the basis of movements in a net profit measure (R) that
Glyn and Sutcliffe argue the existence of a severe profits squeeze
2
in the sixties. By contrast, Panic and Close's contention that
profits have more or less been maintained rests cn the path of the
conventional measure (P). Two subsequent analyses (National
Institute Economic Review, 1973, p.20; Burgess and Webb, 1974)
have confirmed these relative movements in R and P. Clearly, the
divergence between them must be accounted for by an increase in
one or more of the other components of P. In order to identify
the main contributors to this divergence, the role of each compon¬
ent is examined in turn (sections b. to d.) before their jcint
2. In these conclusions profits appear variously as a proportion of
companies' capital, or as a share in national income.
2.3.
TABLE 2.A.
THE SHARE OF CONVENTIONAL PROFIT TRANSFERRED TO THE GOVERNMENT







1961 43.7 28.2 71.9
1962 43.5 30.6 74.1




1965 33.2 30.0 63.2
1966 48.4 31.9 80.3
1967 40.5 31.7 72.2
1968 43.3 29.1 72.4
1969 44.6 29.8 74.4
1970 33.6 31.4 71.0
1971 40.8 30.8 71.6
1972 37.6 26.2 63.8
Averages:
1961-66 42.4 30.0 72.4
1967-72 41.1 29.8 70.9
T *= taxes on profits + Schedule F income tax on dividends -
investment grants
C = dividends (net of income tax) + loan interest
the unusually low figure for 1965 and the high figure for 1966
are caused by the transition between tax systems, and tend to
offset one another.
Source: derived from aggregates for U.K. quoted companies (see
Department of Trade and Industry).
2.4.
effect on the company sector's internal finance is assessed
(section e.).
b. Transfers to the government and to shareholders
The shares of conventional profit (P) set aside for dividends
plus interest and for taxation are considered first, and it emerges
3
that neither rose over the period. Table 2.A. shows C and T as
percentages of P. The "dividend" figure represents loan interest
plus the net dividend receivable by the shareholder for the year:
under the corporation tax system, Schedule F income tax on dividends
4
has been included in taxation. Taxation then includes all the
3. The basic data used throughout this chapter are the aggregate
accounts of U.K. quoted companies engaged in manufacturing,
distribution, etc., compiled by the Department of Trade and
Industry. These figures suffer from two weaknesses. Firstly,
they exclude certain small quoted companies as well as all non-
quoted companies - and so account for only about three-quarters
of total company profits as recorded in the Blue Book.
Secondly, the population of companies changes in three years of
the period (1964, 1969, 1971) so, for these years, two values are
reported in the diagrams, one comparable with the previous year,
one with the subsequent year. These figures are preferred to
others available, for instance those in Financial Statistics,
since they include extra information which is necessary at sever¬
al stages in the argument below (such as companies' own deprecia¬
tion provisions, and analysis of the figures by industry). As
both Panic and Close and Glyn and Sutcliffe use the same data,
the results in this chapter may be directly compared with those
of the main protagonists in the debate.
4. This treatment of income tax on dividends is not crucial, since
an alternative treatment would leave unchanged the joint propor¬
tion of P accounted for by C and T: the main argument would be
unaffected. King (1S73) includes this income tax on dividends
in his post-tax measure of profit to which he appeals in support
of his contention that the effective tax rate has fallen and com¬
panies' liquidity has not been squeezed. This chapter disputes
not King's figures as such but his argument that such a measure
properly reflects companies' flow of internal finance. A subse¬
quent paper by King (1973) is more circumspect in discussing
whether there has been a profits squeeze. Its chief conclusion
is that taxation has been declining as a share of company income.
Again/
tax payable by the company on behalf of its shareholders (that is
income tax plus profits tax in the early sixties, and corporation
tax plus income tax under the later system); and it also takes
account of the variety cf investment incentives offered by the
government during the period. In the earlier years, investment
allowances and accelerated depreciation for tax purposes made the
effective average tax rate (shown here) lower than the nominal
rate; whilst from 1967 investment grants have (in my figures)
been offset against the companies' tax liability to leave the net
figure payable to the government. Comparing averages for the
second half of the period with those for the first half shews that,
with these definitions, the share of dividends and interest and
that of net taxation are both slightly lower in the later period.
Transfers to government and shareholders do not, then, appear to
contribute to the decline in net retentions (R) in relation to
conventional profit (P).
4. Contd.
Again, however, this conclusion relies on his exclusion of the
tax levied on dividends from his definition of companies' tax
liability. The amount of this tax on dividends has risen in
relation to other company taxation in the period King studied:
it represents less than 20% of the tax liability a King in the
early fifties, whereas, under the Corporation Tax System of the
late sixties, with its penal rate of tax on dividends, the per¬
centage exceeded 50%. It is hard to reconcile King's argument,
that the inclusion or exclusion of tax on dividends does not
affect the trends he reports, with the increasing importance of
taxation on dividends. (He contends (1975, p.37): ''If the tax
liability is defined to include the income tax cn dividends the
level of the share of [post-tax] profits would be lower than the
estimates given below, but the trend in the share would be unaffec¬
ted.") Adoption of the alternative tax definition (including
tax on dividends) would surely vitiate his argument that the
share of tax in profit has declined steeply.
2.6.
c. The impact of stock appreciation
By contrast with taxation and dividends, stock appreciation is not
a simple transfer of income, and is not recorded in companies'
conventional accounts. Accordingly, a mere detailed treatment is
required of the way it impinges on companies' ability to finance
investment.
The conventional accounting profit on a unit of output consists of
its sale price less the recorded costs of the actual inputs required
to produce that output. In the context of rising input prices,
it is convenient to separate out one component of profit from the
rest in the follox^ing way:
(a) the difference between the sale price of the output and the then
current price of the inputs necessary to produce the good (T+C+Z+R
per unit);
(b) the difference between the current price of these inputs and
the actual price paid for them earlier (A, stock appreciation, per
5
unit).
If the physical volume of stocks is to be maintained, part (b) of
profit will be absorbed immediately in the purchase of new inputs
(replacement stocks) at the new higher prices.^ A monetary gain
is realised, and recorded in conventional profit, but then pre¬
empted to maintain stocks: part (b), stock appreciation, does not
5. This is just a heuristic simplification; for instance, it
abstracts from problems involved in the depreciation of fixed
assets, which are considered below.
6. Speculative stockholding is left out of account.
2.7.
augment the funds available to the company for distribution, taxa¬
tion or investment. But this is not the end of the story, since
in the traditional system this "gain11 is liable to taxation along
with other profit.^ This means that stock appreciation exacts a
net cost in terms of funds available to the company. Moreover, a
proportion of the stock appreciation element in total recorded pro-
8
fit may well actually be distributed to shareholders. Thus the
. . 9
tax and dividends payable on part (b) pre-empt some of part (a).
Looking at the same process slightly differently, T and C are based
on P, even though only (P-A) is available for these transfers.
This argument may be restated and developed using these symbols:
P: conventional profits, as above
S: opening value of stocks
i: rate of inflation of stock values
t: rate of tax on profits (P)
c: proportion of profits (P) distributed to shareholders
Assuming that the physical volume of stocks is maintained, stock
appreciation (A) is:
7. The consequences for saving of the taxation of stock appreciation
were recognised long ago by Keeling and MacPherson (1952).
8. This approach to dividends stems from concern with the single
issue of managements' ability to finance investment: dividends
are considered a "cost" as in the managerial theories of the
firm (e.g. Penrose, 1959, p.28). Such treatment would be clearly
inappropriate to, say, a discussion of wealth holders' income
(see the discussion of stock appreciation and incomes policies
below).
9. A comparison may be made with the situation affecting a house-
owner when the nominal value of his house rises with inflation.
If he moves to a similar house the holding gain resulting from
inflation is realised, but immediately pre-empted; in contrast
with the firm, however, he does not have to record the apparent
gain as income, and consequently does not pay tax on it.
2.8.
i.S (2.i)
This represents the conventional profit which to be paid out
simply to maintain the physical volume of stocks. But tax and
dividends are paid on the stock appreciation included in convention¬
al profit: this additional burden equals:
(t+c).i.S (2.ii)
Combining (2.i) and (2.ii) gives M, the total cash pre-empted from
conventional profit, which may be attributed to the traditional
inclusion of stock appreciation in profit:
M - (1+t+c).i.S (2.iii)
The proportion of conventional profit pre-empted by this mechanism
is shown by dividing by P:
| = (1+t+c).i.| (2.iv)
This gives a multiplier, (1+t+c).(S/P), relating the proportion of
profit pre-empted to the rate of inflation. A typical value for
this multiplier for the quoted company sector is obtained by insert¬




Thus, (M/P) = (1+0.4+0.3) x 2.5 x i
i.e. just 1% inflation in stock values would pre-empt 4.25% of con¬
ventional profit.^
10. In contrast with the earlier discussion, which emphasised the ex
post shares of income transferred to government and to share¬
holders, here, and in subsequent calculations, I use the nominal
corporation tax rate and the average dividend payout rate gross
of income tax; interest is excluded because it does not vary
with profit. These definitions of c and t seem appropriate
because different degrees of certainty attach to these charges
on income here: companies may take stock appreciation into
account/
2.9.
The value of this multiplier highlights a problem for incomes
policies in times of accelerating inflation. In seeking the com¬
pliance of both wage and profit recipients, such policies often
make their target the maintenance of the shares of profit and of
wages in national income. If the measure of profit for this pur¬
pose is to exclude stock appreciation (as does the C.S.O.'s) then
each 1% increase in the rate of inflation has typically to be matched
by a 3 or 4 percent increase in conventional profit for profit after
stock appreciation to be maintained even in money terms. (For the
purpose of incomes policy it would probably be appropriate to inc¬
lude dividends in disposable income, in which case the lower value
of the multiplier (3.5) proposed in footnote 10 would be relevant).
In other words, constant shares would imply that, increases in con¬
ventional profit dramatically outpace increases in money wages.
Since the negotiator at the level of the individual firm is likely
to be well aware of changes in the company's conventional profit,
but only remotely aware of the C.S.O.'s adjusted version for the
whole economy, he is likely to be perplexed by this situation; and
perhaps to be mildly sceptical of calls for restraint on the wages
side. The need for reporting of inflation-adjusted profit by
companies as a basis for an incomes policy has been neglected both
by those who argue that income measurement is irrelevant to macro-
10. Contd.
account in their dividend decision (and thus also reduce their
income tax liability) while they cannot avoid corporation tax on
stock appreciation. It might be questioned whether this aver¬
age value for c is appropriate: some lower marginal payout rate
might be preferable in years of rising profits (see the discuss¬
ion of observed dividend behaviour in Lintner (1956)). But,
using a marginal rate would not substantially alter the orders
of magnitude: even if c were equal to zero, the tax rate, com¬
bined with the ratio of stock to profit, would still ensure a
multiplier of 3.5 here.
2.10.
economic behaviour (see Appendix A), and by those who are actively
developing new measures of profit (see Appendix B).
This analysis of the relationship between inflation and stock app¬
reciation is supported by Table 2.B. which presents estimates of
actual (M/P) for 1961-72, dropping the assumption introduced for
simplicity above, that physical stocks are always maintained.**
There is an enormous range in the share of profit pre-empted by
stock appreciation; taking the extreme values, it is over a third
in 1970 compared with less than 5% in 1962. The rise in the rate
of price increase during the period has caused a striking increase
in the absolute value of M (documented in section e); and the
average value of (M/P) is over 10 percentage points higher in the
12
second half than in the first half of the period. Inflation,
via the stock appreciation mechanism, clearly made a major contribu-
11. The method of the Central Statistical Office (1963) was used,
except that a single general price index (the consumer price
index) was applied to stocks, whereas the C.S.O. use specific
price indices for individual industries, and for each component
of stock. The information necessary to emulate the C.S.O. in
these respects is not available for this population of compan¬
ies (different from the C.S.O.'s). However, I did try to com¬
pare my estimates with those of the C.S.O. Unfortunately, the
data are not readily comparable for individual years, but a
comparison is possible for the whole 12 year period; and
scaled down appropriately, the C.S.O.'s total estimate of stock
appreciation for 1961-72 was within 1% of my total estimate.
So I doubt whether my crude use of the single index significant¬
ly distorts the general picture for the aggregates.
12. The relationship between (M/P) and i does change between years,
so that for instance, a rise in i in 1972 is accompanied by a
fall in (M/P). The absolute value of M has varied closely
with i, but changes in P (particularly in response to changes
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Rate of price increase = percentage rise in consumer price index
from average date of purchase of opening stocks to average date of
closing stocks (Central Statistical Office).
M = (1+t+c) x estimate of A (direct effect of stock appreciation)
t = nominal tax rate on company profit
c = average dividend payout rate gross of Schedule F income tax
Source and coverage: as Table 2.A.
2.12.
tion to the divergence of p and R.^
d. Depreciation provisions and replacement costs
On the face of it, fixed asset replacement poses a problem similar
to that for stock appreciation. It might be supposed that because
of rising fixed asset prices, depreciation provisions based on
historic cost would be inadequate to finance fixed asset replacement;
part of conventional profit would then be pre-empted for asset
replacement; and this pre-empted profit would nonetheless incur
tax and dividends. So "disposable" profit would again be eroded.
The C.S.O.'s response to this problem is, in effect, to re-express
companies' depreciation provisions in terms of current prices
(giving capital consumption). Hie procedure is illustrated in
case A of Table 2.C. There it is assumed, for simplicity, that a
company's assets yield a constant flow of services for five years,
and then die; that real investment is constant; that fixed asset
prices are rising at 5% p.a.; and that depreciation is provided
on a straight line basis. Because investment is constant, the sum
of capital consumption in year 5 precisely equals the cost of replac¬
ing, at year 5 prices, those assets purchased in year 0 which now
expire. But the sum of year 5's depreciation provisions, the
figure set aside in companies' accounts, is inadequate to finance
these replacement assets: the purchase of replacement assets pre-
13. M here includes part of T and C considered in section b, to
illustrate the interaction of inflation and the conventions used
in assessing tax liabilities and setting dividend payments.
While section b concluded that T and C had not risen as a pro¬
portion of P, since, however, A has risen as a proportion of P,
T and C have accounted for a larger share of (P-A) in the later
part of the period.
2.13.
empts 17.12 units of year 5's conventional profit. In such a case
the. argument is indeed analogous with that for stock appreciation.
However, this result can change crucially if real investment is
growing. This is illustrated in case 3 of Table 2.C., which is in
all respects similar to case A, except that real investment is grow¬
ing at 8% p.a. The cost, in year 5, of replacing year O's invest¬
ment is the same (127.63); the excess of capital consumptiorvover
companies* depreciation is slightly greater than in case A of Table
2.C.; but year 5®s total historic cost depreciation provision is
now more than enough to finance the replacement of year O's invest¬
ment: in fact 1.98 units of depreciation are left over.
More generally, if investment is on the increase, the cost of
replacing those assets which expire in the current period will dif¬
fer not only from the current year's depreciation provisions, but
also from the year's capital consumption in current prices.
Moreover, total current depreciation provisions can be more than
adequate to finance current replacement investment, even though the
depreciation provisions made over any asset's lifetime may never
14
be adequate to replace that particular asset when it dies.
Despite inflation, no profit need be pre-empted.
14. Depreciation may be even greater in relation to immediate
replacement costs to the extent that companies adopt a reducing
balance method of depreciating assets, which gives greater
weight to recent purchases. This practice is not uncommon




THE RELATION BETWEEN REPLACEMENT COSTS, COMPANIES'
HISTORIC COST DEPRECIATION PROVISIONS, AND CAPITAL
CONSUMPTION
Year Frice index at end
of year
■






grows at 8% p.a.
t N G.
t t t
0 100.00 100.00 100.00
1 105.00 105.00 113.00
2 110.25 110.25 127.69
3 115.76 115.76 144.29
4 121.55 121.55 163.05
5 127.63
Historic cost depreciation









for year 5 (= capital consumption, K)
4
0
where Y' = 0.2 x G x Nc/Nt tot
Renlacement cost
..... . .... . .. ...
in year 5 of fixed assets purchased





G0 x N5/Nq 127.63 127.63
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A paper by Domar (1953) specifies this relationship between replace-
15
ment investment and depreciation provisions algebraically. Doroar
obtains the general formula:
I






replacement cost of those assets now due for retirement
depreciation provisions (historic cost)
lifetime of fixed assets
annual rate of growth of real gross fixed investment
expenditure
annual rate of increase of fixed asset prices
15. An earlier version of this chapter relied upon specific examples
to support the argument that follows. I am grateful to
Mr. E. F. Jackson for referring me to Domar's more general work.
The relationship is derived as follows:
r = u + i (2.vi)
The capital stock (valued at historic cost) grows at a rate r,
from an initial value, m years ago, of 1.
Its current total value (at historic cost) is the sum of the
geometric progression:
1, (1+r), (1+r)2, ... (l+r)m 2, (l+r)m 1
i.e. (l+r)m - 1 (2.vii)
Depreciation in the current year, provided on historic cost, on
a straight line basis, is 1/mth of the capital stock:
D , - 1
rm
(2.viii)
The cost of replacing the assets bought m years ago is:
(2.ix)I - (l+i)m








This expresses the ratio of replacement costs to depreciation as a
function of the lifetime of fixed assets, the rate of growth of
investment and the rate of price increase,^ with (I/D) varying
inversely with u, but directly with i. This is exactly the rela¬
tionship illustrated with the numerical example in Table 2.C., and
it yields the same specific results as Table 2.C. The formula can
be used to estimate on the one hand the level and, on the other,
the trend in (I/D) for the U.K. quoted company sector.
Substitution in (2.v) of typical values for m, u, and i shows the
order of magnitude of (I/D) for the sector. A value of 30 years
for m was suggested by Domar, and more recent work does not make
this appear unreasonable (see Dean, 1964, p.330).^ The average
rate of growth of real investment (gross domestic fixed capital
formation at constant prices) between 1948 and 1972 was in the
region of 4.5% p.a.; whilst the C.S.O.'s fixed asset price index
18
has on average risen by roughly 4% p.a. during the period.
Substituting these estimates in Domar's formula (2.v) yields a
value of somewhat below 80% for (I/D): the rate of growth of real
16. The principal assumptions on which the formula rests are para¬
llel with Table 2.C.: straight line depreciation; constant
asset lifetime (m); and smooth and steady rates of growth of
real investment (u) and of price increase (i).
17. Even were the shorter lifetimes reported by Shonfield (1965,
p.42) for I.C.I, more common than this estimate of m assumes,
the chief conclusion of this section would still hold. With
m halved to 15 years, replacement still typically falls short
of depreciation.
18. These approximations of i and u were derived from Table 16 and
55 respectively of Central Statistical Office (1972, and earlier
years).
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investment has in the event been sufficient to raise depreciation
above replacement costs. According to these estimates, then, fixed
asset replacement has not functioned in the same way as stock app¬
reciation: far from pre-empting part of conventional profit, asset
replacement costs have typically fallen short of companies' (hist¬
oric cost) depreciation provisions, and part of depreciation has in
19fact been available for net investment.
However, though historic cost depreciation provisions have typically
augmented disposable profit during the period, rising asset prices
will have contributed, along with the stock appreciation mechanism,
to the downward trend in the ratio of disposable to conventional
profit. Because of the positive relation between (I/D) and i, with
the acceleration in the rate of fixed asset price increase from
around 1969, (I/D) will, other things equal, have been rising, and
the surplus of depreciation provisions declining. It seems unlikely
that the increase in i has in fact been offset by changes in u and
m: the growth of real investment (u) has actually slackened recen¬
tly (see chapter 3). To some extent, changes in i and u may be
19. With depreciation equivalent to about 35% of conventional pre-tax
profits at this time, that fifth of depreciation left over after
replacement corresponds to about 7% of profit. Merrett and
Sykes' (1974) advocacy of current cost depreciation (capital
consumption) in arriving at a profit measure appropriate for
analysis and as a tax base entirely ignores the fact that his¬
toric cost depreciation probably still comfortably exceeds
replacement costs; and that the "free" depreciation currently
allowed for tax purposes will typically exceed replacement
costs by an even greater margin (see Appendix A below).
Glyn and Sutcliffe (1971) and (1972) also deducted capital con¬
sumption from profit; again, the figures they report (R) under¬
state the level of effective savings available to companies for
immediate investment.
2.18.
expected to reinforce each other: a vicious circle can be envisaged
whereby a rise in i increases (I/D) and the consequent squeeze on
internal finance depresses u - a process which itself further raises
(I/D). Even were u to remain stable at past levels, however, if
the rate of inflation continues at the present double figure levels,
20 21(I/D) can be expected to rise above unity.
It would be interesting to go beyond estimates of the order of magni¬
tude and direction of change of (I/D) for the period by providing
estimates for individual years. However, there would be problems
in doing so; for the considerable fluctuations in gross investment
which have actually occurred in the post-war period complicate the
estimate of (I/D) for individual years. (I/D) becomes particularly
sensitive to the choice of m, as the fluctuations in gross invest¬
ment are echoed by replacement fluctuations m years later. Yet m
itself is hard to estimate satisfactorily: separate estimates would
be required for individual years, since the age structure of the
assets to be replaced will vary from year to year simply in response
to investment fluctuations in the past. These estimation diffi¬
culties could only be overcome if very detailed data on lifetimes
and fluctuations were available. In any case, even the estimates
20. Domar (1953, p.11) shows that where m is 30 and u is 4.5% p.a.
a value for i of less than 10% p.a. (over the asset's whole life¬
time of course) is necessary to equalise replacement costs and
depreciation.
21. This whole treatment, in line with the paper's central concern
with disposable funds, concentrates on the cost of replacing
the year's retirements, emphasising companies' actual cash flox^s,
whereas the standard approach (capital consumption) estimates the
part of assets of all vintages consumed during the year. This
is not to say that capital consumption may not be the appropriate
concept for some issues, such as, for instance, the estimation of
wealth holders' income after capital has been kept intact.
2.19.
of replacement costs already presented are subject to a major quali¬
fication. They rely on the assumption, as do the G.S.O.'s estimates
of capital consumption, that fixed assets will be replaced with tech¬
nically similar assets. By contrast, many treatments of asset
replacement emphasise the role of technical progress (e.g. Salter,
1969, p.72; Shonfield, 1965, p.42); the incentive to replace comes
not from the physical decay of old equipment, but from the superior
efficiency of new; and consequently the distinction between new and
replacement investment is blurred. Because of these objections to
estimating replacement costs, the subsequent discussion of the level
of companies' disposable income focusses on the funds available for
22
new and replacement investment taken together,
e. Quoted companies' aggregate saving
The foregoing discussion in terms of profit shares has identified
inflation, operating through stock appreciation and rising fixed
asset replacement costs, as the cause of the increasing difference
between conventional and disposable profit. Now, in figure 2 .A,
the courses of the various components of profit are charted in abso¬
lute terms.
From the first part of the diagram it can be seen that pre-tax con¬
ventional profits in money terms (?) have risen in most years of the
22. In Coddington's (1970) terms, such annual figures as could be
provided here would be very "soft" numbers: derived from
unreliable data and hazy concepts, they could be very mislead¬
ing.
FIGURE 2.A. The components of profit:quoted companies,1961-72
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period, though they suffered slight setbacks in 1962, 1966 and 1970.
However, with the acceleration of inflation in the late sixties,
profits adjusted for the full effects of stock appreciation (P-M)
show a rather different picture. For instance, between 1967 and
1968, a rise in P of over £400 million was accompanied by a rise of
only £6 million in (P-M), thanks largely to an increase in the infla-
23
tion rate. Again, a rise in the inflation rate in 1970 aggra¬
vated the fall in profit: a £70 million decline in P was converted
into a £400 million decline in (P-M).
The second part of the diagram shows the impact of "other tax"
(T') and "other dividends- (C') on (P-M). These items are defined
as in section b, except that they exclude the tax and dividends
already counted as indirect costs of stock appreciation and included
in M (see section c). The resultant retentions figure (R+Z) fluc¬
tuates somewhat, especially on the change in the tax system in 1965-
66; but, even in current prices, it is typically lower in the sec¬
ond half of the period than in the first half. In view of the
argument in section b that the shares of tax and dividends did not
rise over the period, it might seem odd that a slight upward move¬
ment in (P-M) is associated with a downward movement in (P-M-T'-C').
This is explained by the facts that loan interest accounted for an
increasing proportion of C over the period, and that since interest
does not vary with profit, it was not included in M as a secondary
23. Of course, (P-M) is only an approximate estimate and the fig
ures mentioned should not be interpreted too precisely: but
they do illustrate orders of magnitude.
2.21.
effect of stock appreciation. So the "dividend" component of M
falls and "other dividends" (C')} which include interest, rise over
the period.
In the third part of the diagram, companies' depreciation provisions
(D) are added back to (R+Z), to give a figure for gross savings at
current prices available for new and replacement investment. In
\
contrast with (R.+Z) D rose in every year of the period. Indeed,
because of the general rise in real investment expenditure (see
section d), even at 1963 prices (not shown) depreciation provisions
increased in every year but two of the period, and by 1971 were more
than 50% higher than in 1961. However, because of the decline in
(R+Z) (accentuated in 1S63 prices), when the joint total (R+Z+D) is
*
,
expressed in 1963 prices ((R+Z+D) in part 4 of the diagram), such
buoyancy is no longer apparent. The total for 1371 is only 20%
higher than that for 1961, and is lower than the typical figure for
the mid-sixties. Finally, the full impact of inflation becomes
*
evident if this real gross savings figure, (R+Z+D) , i3 compared
with nominal conventional profit (P) in part 1 of the diagram: the
*
increases in P in 1967-69 are converted into decreases in (R+Z+D)
(which represents the inflation-adjusted inflow of internal funds
available for the replacement of fixed assets and for expansion);
while the considerable rise in P in 1971 and 1972 is accompanied by
*
...
relatively tiny increases in (R+Z+D) . Moreover, it is likely
that an even sharper contrast would result if only net savings were
considered (although, for the reasons given above, a precise estimate
is elusive), for it has been argued in section d that, because of
the general expansion of investment in the post-war period, the real
costs of replacing fixed assets will surely have been rising; and
2.22.
so the squeeze on net savings will have been even more severe than
that demonstrated for gross.
Evidently, the contention that the late sixties did not witness a
serious decline in companies' internal funds available for invest¬
ment does not hold; and if Panic and Close or King maintain the
opposite they are suffering from profit illusion. The seeming buoy¬
ancy of conventional profit was illusory; the savings squeeze was
a reality in the late sixties, and in assessments of any recovery in
savings in the early seventies, the upturn of conventional profit
should be heavily discounted.
As to why profits were such that net savings did decline as infla¬
tion rose, a tentative suggestion might be made here. When increa¬
ses in the general level of activity are only sluggish, there is
evidence that conventionally-measured profit margins stagnate or
fall as managers maintain prices in the face of rising unit costs
(Neild, 1963). Again, in times of inflation, if managers are sus¬
ceptible to profit illusion, as some observers seem to have been,
then they may fail to recoup the rising replacement costs of inputs
through pricing policies, because conventionally recorded profit
(based on the historic cost of inputs) appears satisfactory. These
two influences, acting together in the "stagflation" years at the
end of the sixties, may be sufficient to explain the aggregate sav¬
ing squeeze, presenting a challenge (or perhaps a complement) to
other accounts, which, for instance, emphasise the l'oie of increased
international competition (Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1971 and 1972). But
2.23.
this is only speculation."^
f. The uneven impact of inflation on different industries' dispos¬
able profits
So far, attention has been focused, as has the debate in the litera¬
ture, on the aggregate record of the company sector. However,
particularly striking results emerge from an extension of the ana¬
lysis to compare the experience of different industries.
To consider first the impact of stock appreciation across industries:
equation (2.iv) of section c above provided a multiplier relating the
proportion of conventional profit pre-empted by stock appreciation
to the rate of inflation:
(1 + t + c).J.i
(M/P) has been calculated for each of the 22 broad industrial groups
represented in the aggregates for 1970, the most recent year for
which suitable data were available; as well as one which experienced
an inflation rate typical of the early seventies. A single price
index for stocks was used for want of specific indexes for indivi¬
dual industries. The estimates thus isolate influences on (M/P)
25
other than different industry rates of stock price inflation.
24. If managers do indeed suffer from profit illusion, this would, of
course, influence their incentive, as opposed to ability, to
invest.
25. It seems unlikely that different rates of inflation would system¬
atically compensate for variation in multiplier values, and so
significantly alter the range of the results; though individual
industries may well have experienced rather different rates from
the average used, so no great reliance should be placed on
individual values. The aim is, again, simply to suggest likely
orders of magnitude.
2.24.
Otherwise actual values were used. On this basis, the variation
in the multiplier across industries arose chiefly from different
ratios of stock to profit, rather than from different tax or divi¬
dend payment rates. The term (1 + t + c) exhibited relatively
little variation across industries: t is uniform, and c, the aver¬
age payout rate varied only between .28 and .40 for 20 of the indus-
26
tires: for these industries the lowest value for (1 + t + c) was
93% of the highest. However, for the same 20 industries, (S/P)
varied between 0.5 and 4.8: here the lowest value was only 10% of
the highest.
Section c above showed the typical order of magnitude of the stock
appreciation multiplier and its impact on aggregate effective pro¬
fits. Figure 2.B illustrates the effects of the considerable vari¬
ety in the multiplier's value between industries: it shows (M/P),
the proportion of conventional profit pre-empted by the stock app¬
reciation mechanism. The range is huge: from 5% to 72% (ignor¬
ing ship-building and vehicles for which M exceeded P - see above).
In addition, for 12 of the 22 industries the "cost" appears as 40%
or more of P. In a sense, the stock appreciation mechanism amounts
to a "levy" on stockholdings which reduces liquidity, discriminating
severely against those industries which carry large stocks in rela¬
tion to their profits.
Of course, this is not the whole picture. In particular, in view
of the discussion of aggregate experience, one naturally asks how
the relationship between replacement costs and depreciation will
26. The remaining two industries, shipbuilding and vehicles, aber¬
rated on account of negative and tiny profits, respectively.
FIGURE 2.B. Stock appreciation plus tax and dividends payable
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have varied between industries. However, it does not seein feas¬
ible to present even suggestive estimates in this case, because of
the lack of detailed information. For the relationship will depend
here on industry rates of growth of annual investment, rates of price
increase, and lifetimes of fixed assets: but whilst industry rates
of price increase are not available - the problem already encount¬
ered for stock appreciation - neither in this case are the lifetimes
of fixed assets for different industries. Moreover, the general
problem with such estimates, of distinguishing new and replacement
investment, will surely be acute in comparisons of different indus¬
tries with different rates of technical progress. Hence any esti¬
mates might be grossly misleading, and this question remains unans¬
wered.
h. Summary ana conclusions
Are profits being squeezed? No, on one measure, conventional
accounting profit; yes, on another, the funds retained by the firm
and available for investment.
This chapter shows how, in times of inflation, conventionally
measured profit will belie companies' ability to invest from inter¬
nal funds: inflation, working through stock appreciation and rising
fixed asset replacement costs, rather than increasing shares of tax
27 ... .
and dividends in conventional profit, is identified as the main
contributor to the divergence between conventional and disposable
profit in recent years.
27. Though of course, as a share of profit less stock appreciation,
tax and dividends rose over the period.
2.26.
The effect of stock appreciation is dramatic. If managements
wish to maintain their companies' purchasing power, it is not enough
that nominal earnings keep pace with the rise in prices, as it is
for wage or dividend recipients. In addition, increases in con¬
ventional profits have to match increases in stock appreciation;
and since stocks are, on average, two or three times earnings,
earnings must also rise by a multiple of any increase in the infla¬
tion rate, if disposable profits are to be maintained. Moreover,
paradoxically, continued use of the inflated conventional profit
measure that includes stock appreciation actually itself reduces
the ratio of effective to conventional profit: for so long as
conventional profit is still used as a tax base and, one presumes,
in the determination of dividends, the effect of the stock apprecia¬
tion mechanism on the internal funds available for investment is
aggravated.
What is more, in recent years the impact of stock appreciation has
not only been drastic for aggregate disposable profits but has also
discriminated severely between industries. This means that the
effective tax on profits after stock appreciation varies a good
deal from one industry to another. If it is believed that this
discrimination restrains the investment of certain industries in an
undesirable way, there is perhaps a case for reducing the tax bill
of industries with much stock appreciation at the expense of those
with low stocks in relation to profits; that is, for relieving
stock appreciation of tax and (assuming that aggregate tax revenue
2.27.
28is to be unchanged) raising the standard rate.
Returning to the aggregate picture, the downward trend in real dis¬
posable funds already brought about by stock appreciation was almost
certainly reinforced because, during the period, historic cost
depreciation provisions probably declined in relation to the cost of
replacing current retirements. However, these replacement costs
probably never exceeded depreciation provisions and actually pre¬
empted conventional profit.
Thus, in spite of an apparently satisfactory record in the late
sixties in terms of traditional profit, the real saving of the quo¬
ted company sector declined from 1967 to 1970; and the recovery
in real saving in the early seventies is much less vigorous than the
movement of conventional profit might suggest.
28. Whether conventional profit is a desirable tax base is one of the
topics to be investigated by the Sandilands Committee on Infla¬
tion Accounting (I.A.C.). Against the objection that this
would imply a radical change in the tax system, I would cite the
argument of Parker and Harcourt (1969, p.27) that the change
would only restore the basis which obtained in times of mild
inflation.
The accounting institutes are of course well aware of the need
to adjust accounts for inflation, and have developed proposed
adjustments (see Appendix B); though they have not recommended
that their suggested alternative measure of inflation-adjusted
profit be adopted for tax assessment. However, not only has
the I.A.C. to consider the implications of inflation for com¬
pany taxation, but also the Budgets of November 1974 and April
1975 granted temporary tax relief to companies on all but
a small part of any stock appreciation (see section a. of
Appendix B): this relief will be reviewed when the I.A.C. has
reported to the government.
CHAPTER 3
Savings and Investment 1 * Background to a Model
(a.) Introduction^^
In a world of perfect foresight and perfect capital markets,
there would he no special reason for the investment decisions
of the firm to be sensitive to the internal finance currently
generated by its own operations. The profit-maximising
company would undertake any investment yielding a return which
exceeded the market rate of interest. The influence of
internal finance intrudes both as a result of market
imperfections (such as transactions costs which make external
finance more costly than retentions) and in a world of
t
uncertainty where there exists the possibility that an
investment project might fail. In a large manager controlled
company where the directors have little equity interest in the
firm, the gains to the directors from a large successful
(2)
expansion are limited ' ; at the same time the threat to the
manager's security from losses on a new investment project is
greater if investment is extended to the point where external
funds are needed to supplement retentions. If the external
(1) At several stages in the next two chapters references
are made to the work of SJeyer and Kuh (1959). In
fact the whole approach as well as some of the
detailed arguments owes a good deal to their -work.
(2) True, they may expect salary gains as a result of
expansion (see Appendix E); but as Chapter 10
argues, salary increases are perhaps more readily
and safely realised by growth by merger than by new
investment.
In smaller, owner-controlled companies, the directors
may themselves realise larger gains from major
expansion; but new issues are a relatively costly
form of finance for such companies (see Davis and
Yeomans (1975)).
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finance comes from debt issues, the company commits itself to
future interest payments on the additional capital; and the
failure of this additional capital to realise a rate of profit
at least equal to the rate of interest implies a fall in share¬
holder earnings^' and possible loss of office for directors.
Similar consequences will also arise where new equity finance
is used, the project fails, and the expectation of increases
in aggregate earnings prompted by the new issue is unfulfilled.
Again, if the director has little equity interest, he will not
be reluctant to forgo dividends in favour of retentions.
Thus, for the manager, retention finance is in a sense costless,
involves little outside of his plans and activities,
and is relatively risk-free.
According to this account then, the manager wishing to avoid
the opprobrium attaching to a decline in shareholder income,
will only resort to external finance when he is specially
confident of the returns offered by the new project; and, in
Galbraith's words, "to minimise dependence on (the capital)
market is a universal planning strategy",
Table 3.A illustrates the average contribution of internal and
long-term external sources of finance to company expansion in
(3) See lintner's (1956) study of dividends for a
discussion of managers' reluctance to report a
decline in shareholder income.
(4) For fuller arguments on the importance of retentions,
see for example, Baumol (1965), Galbraith (1972),
Kaldor (1971) , Harris (1964) , as well as Meyer and
Kuh (1959).
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the period 1964-71. Expansion by takeover financed through
share for share exchange is left out of account in the table:
part 2 of the thesis suggests that special considerations may
(5)
affect the financing of that component of growth. Total
expenditure on the other components, namely gross new
investment in fixed assets, purchases of new subsidiaries for
cash, and the accumulation of net current assets^^ represented
13% of opening net assets in the typical company-year; and
of this the vast majority (10.7%) came from internal sources.
Thus the relatively weak reliance of the average company on
external finance is consistent with the argument that managers
have a strong reluctance to expand using external finance.
An alternative situation would, however, be consistent with the
picture given in Table 3.A. The major role of internal
sources in relation to investment on average may conceal a
very different situation for individual companies. For some,
saving may greatly exceed investment, while for others the
reverse would hold. Investment could then be determined
almost entirely by factors on the incentive side, with firms
indifferent between internal and external sources of finance.
(5) See especially Chapters 9 and 10.
(6) This heading on the uses of funds side, and




Internal Finance and Expansion (1964-1971)
% p.a.
Form of Expansion (Uses)
Growth of net assets other than by takeovers
which were externally financed (a) 7.5
Expenditure on "replacement" investment
(^depreciation) 5.5
Total gross investment in new fixed assets,
purchases of subsidiaries for cash, and
accumulation of net current assets: 13.0
Method of Finance (Sources)
Depreciation provisions 5.5
Retentions 5.2
Total Internal Sources: 10.7
Long-term external finance 2.3
Total: 13.0
Number of companies 966
Notes:
Figures represent flows for each company-year expressed
as a percentage of the company's opening net assets,
and averaged across all companies in the population
and all years in the period (the averages are
unweighted).
(a) This comprises the rate of growth of net assets
(11.8) minus takeovers financed with new issues (3.2)
minus the portion of new subsidiaries represented by
minority interests and long-term liabilities (1.1).
See Appendix F for fuller definitions.
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Thus a more satisfactory account of the influence of saving on
investment, and hence of the role of the savings squeeze
documented in chapter 2 in restraining investment, requires a
model which incorporates both candidate sets of determinants,
representing the incentive and the ability to invest, and
which can be estimated to provide some basis for discriminating
between the alternative accounts. The rest of this chapter
and chapter 4 are devoted to estimating such a model in cross-
(7)
section for U.K. companies in the period 1967-71.
(b) The Choice of Variables to Represent the
Incentive and the Ability to InvesT CsJ
Chapter 2 emphasised the difficulty of distinguishing between
new and replacement investment, and so the model used below
(9)
has gross investment as its dependent variable. The first
Time series analysis of company accounts along
those lines is not possible because a crucial
variable on the incentive side, sales, only
became universally available in company accounts
after the 1967 Companies Act.
Most of these correspond to the variables chosen
by Meyer and Kuh for intensive analysis after
they had examined v/ith correlation analysis the
influence on investment of a much larger number
of potential explanatory variables. See Meyer
and Kuh (p.64) for further discussion of the
properties of variables common to both studies.
Fixed assets purchased in the course of takeover
are excluded (see Appendix D). Investment
grants netted out of fixed asset purchases in
company accounts are added back by the D.I.





explanatory variable on the incentive side focusses on the
replacement element in gross investment: it is an indicator
of the age of the company's capital stock, namely the ratio
of its total depreciation reserve to its gross fixed assets.
The rationale for including such a variable is that replace¬
ment investment will be prompted by the decay of the stock
of capital equipment as the average age of assets rises.
Thus, of tv/o otherwise similar companies, the one with the
older capital stock might be expected to undertake more
replacement investment. This particular measure is clearly
imperfect, given variations between companies in accounting
policies with respect to depreciation rates, in the proportion
of undepreciated land and buildings in total fixed assets, etc.
But it is the best available at the company level.
Secondly, a measure of capacity utilisation was developed for
each firm, using an invention of Meyer and Kuh. The peak
output - capital ratio (sales: Gross fixed assets) of each
firm during the five years studied was obtained; and the
current year's output - capital ratio was expressed as a
proportion of this yardstick. According to simple
accelerator type theories of investment, technical conditions
will favour some fairly stable output - capital ratio, and a
rise in output from a level where the ratio was considered
satisfactory will prompt a demand for more capital. In cross-
section, the company producing at or near capacity is more
likely to expand capacity in response to an increase in
demand (also represented in the model: see below) than one
with substantial unused capital equipment.
3.7
The remaining two variables on the incentive side are the sales
level and the increase in sales from the previous year. Not
only do these represent the influence of the accelerator
effects embodied principally in the capacity utilisation
measure, but they are likely also to mould expectations of
sales as well as of profit, given the positive relation
between the level of output and that of profits.
Three variables are used to represent the influence of internal
finance on the investment decision - two liquidity flows and a
liquidity stock. The first is the net disposable retentions
measure developed in chapter 2 (R + Z): profit after
depreciation, tax, dividends, interest and stock appreciation.
This is, of course, the variable which has suffered so
severely on account of the failure of conventional profit to
keep pace with stock appreciation. The problem discussed in
(10) See section 2.E above on the relation between the
level of activity and the level of profits.
Conventional profits were not themselves incorpor¬
ated in the model because they are relatively
highly correlated with sales on the incentive side
and disposable retentions on the finance side:
it is likely that their inclusion in the same
model as these two would have led to problems
of multicollinearity; and anyhow it would have
been difficult to distinguish its influence as
an incentive factor (reckoned here to be
represented by sales) or as an ability factor
(better represented by disposable retentions,
according to the argument of chapter 2).
Sales and disposable retentions do not display
a very high correlation (see Appendix G,
Table G.I).
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chapter 2, of finding an appropriate price index to compute
the value of stock appreciation, is acute at the individual
firm level. Paute de mieux a general (consumer) price
index has been used; but to avoid serious error the value
of stock appreciation is constrained to be less than or equal
to the increase in the nominal value of stocks (i.e. the
(11)
actual cash spent on increasing stocks). To the extent
that managers make allowance for inflation in assessing their
(12)
current profit or else that this net savxng measure is
closely correlated with profit on the historic cost basis,
this variable may also have an incentive element.
The second variable on the ability side is relatively free
of the incentive component: this is current depreciation
provisions, the other element of gross savings, apart from
(R +Z), in Table 2.A. It is a pure liquidity flow variable,
being a function only of the capital stock and of the write¬
off policy. And as Figure 2.A and Table 3.A show, it has
contributed a major proportion of gross savings.
(11) This constraint is consistent with the central
concern here with cash flow and its effect on
investment. It would not necessarily be
desirable if some measure of real profit was
wanted to represent the incentive to invest
(see chapter 2 above on this distinction).
(12) Panic and Close (1973) suggest that firms
typically based their investment decisions on




Finally, a liquidity stock variable, 7 bank balances plus
neat" cash, minus bank borrowing, etc. is incorporated on the
grounds that large stocks of liquidity will relax any
constraint upon investment that is imposed by any
curtailment of liquidity flows.
(°) The Model
(14)
Thus the basic model may be summarised:
Iij Kij-1' hj ^ Ki3-1, ^ij f^Sij ' * Dij f
where :
I = Gross investment in fixed assets.
A Accumulated depreciation (indicator of average
age of capital stock when divided by K).
U Sales times minimum capital-output ratio for
period (indicator of level of capacity
utilisation when divided by K).
S Sales
R Disposable retentions ((R+ Z) in the terms of
chapter 2).
D Depreciation provisions.
C Net liquidity stock.
K Gross fixed assets.
e Error term
i i th company
j Current year.
Because of the enormous range of company-size in the population
studied (the largest is of the order of 1000 times the size of
(13) This comprises cash and bank balances plus tax
reserve certificates and marketable securities,
minus bank overdrafts and loans, dividend,
interest and current taxation liabilities.
(14) See Appendix F for detailed definitions of variables.
Current values of the variables are used in all
cases except the age indicator and liquidity stocks
where the opening balances are used. These exceptions
are made because in both cases investment may be
expected to affect directly the closing balances of
the respective variables (assuming other things equal).
See the discussion below of alternative results when
the flows were lagged one year.
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the smallest) the problem of heteroscedasticity arises when
such a model is estimated for cross-section data. Accordingly
the actual version used deflates all the variables except those
already so deflated (A, U) with the size measure, gross fixed
assets (K):
ll. .» f(A. . . U. . .g, • AS. . R. . D. . C. . _ e- J 1 (3.ii)
i 1D i3-lt 13. 1J» 13. a-3-1.e3.j
"
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This formulation of the model presumes that causation runs from
the independent variables selected above to investment. Where
both variables relate to the same period, however, the reverse
could sometimes be true. A more efficient replacement machine
or factory could raise profitability (and hence savings), in
the year it was brought into service; and even where it was
no more efficient than existing equipment, additional capacity
could raise sales and profits in conditions where production
(13)
had fallen short of demand at the prevailing prices.
(15) Of course the other famous argument for the reverse
causation comes in Kaldor's (1955) macro model of
income distribution. There, given stable savings
propensities for capitalists and workers, and the
capitalists' propensity greater than the workers',
the share of profit in national income is positively
related to the share of investment in national
income. If this relationship holds it should neverthe¬
less not affect these micro results which are concerned
with explaining the deviations of observations from
the mean. In a year of high average profits and
investment, there is nothing in Kaldor's account to
ensure that particular companies with high investment
will have specially high profits as a result. He
is concerned, rather, with balancing conditions for
the whole economy: for full employment equilibrium
higher investment means that consumption must be
lower, and in the absence of other equilibrating
conditions, the average price-wage ratio and hence
aggregate profits must be higher.
3.11
Here the presumption is justified on the grounds adduced by
Meyer and Kuh (p.82): regression analysis will uncover
investment as a function of, say, sales rather than vice
versa, since the former relationship is reckoned to be much
the more stable of the two. The volatile shifts in the
sales function are reckoned to trace out the more stable
investment function.
(d) The Data, the Population and the
Stratification of Observations
The data are those used throughout the thesis: the published
accounts of U.K. quoted companies, standardised by the
Department of Industry. Appendix F details the origins and
coverage of the data. Although the Data Bank contains such
accounts for every year from 1948 to 1971, and earlier years
are used in the analysis for other parts of the thesis, the
model is in this case estimated for only the last five of the
available years, 1967 to 1971. This is because the sales
data necessary for three of the explanatory variables on the
incentive side (U, S,4.S) were only disclosed by all companies
(171
after the 1967 Companies Act.
The model is estimated separately for eighteen individual
(16) See the parallel argument on the identification
problem in chapter 9, footnote 4.
(17) Thus for 1966, 48.5% of the population studied in
this and the next chapter published their sales
total; 83.8% in 1967; 99.7% in 1968 and 100%
subsequently. Where a company has no sales data
it is excluded from-the computations reported
below. This distorts certain comparisons between
years when different proportions of the population
are included.
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two-digit industries. Although this causes a proliferation
of results and increases the difficulties of presentation,
it was thought necessary because so many factors which affect
investment, but which cannot readily be measured and
incorporated explicitly into the model, are associated with
industry - e.g. the durability of capital equipment and
product, production and market structure, trade credit
practices, etc. These variables may well affect the extent
and speed of response of investment to the explanatory
variables actually included; and in fact considerable
differences do emerge in the performance of the model for
different industries within the same year. Thus 90 sets of
results are provided for the model (5 years x 18 industries):
the number of companies contributing to each industry-year
is recorded in Table 3.B.
Chapter 4 provides multiple linear regression estimates of
model 3(ii). This single and relatively simple specification
is relied upon for two reasons. Firstly, since the
stratification scheme yields 90 estimates of the model (and
hence with seven explanatory variables and a constant term,
720 coefficients per specification), more than a very few
specifications would present serious presentation problems.
Secondly, only a limited aim is being pursued here: to
judge whether investment was sensitive to savings in the late
sixties, and hence whether the savings squeeze documented
in chapter 2 mattered on this score. This limited exercise
is probably adequate for this task, whereas the development
3.13
of different specifications of the relationships would be
desirable were the aim an exhaustive test of alternative
theories or forecasting.
One very plausible alternative version of the model would
lag the independent variables; for some delay is clearly
inevitable between the stimuli to invest, the commissioning
of a project, and the purchase of equipment. Accordingly,
the model was estimated using all the independent variables
but A and C (which represent opening stocks anyway) in a
form where they were lagged one year. On an (admittedly
crude) comparison, however, this variant performed less well
2
than the 'current' model: R was higher for the current
version in 78^ of industry-years. In the interests of
simplicity, therefore, only the current version is reported
in subsequent sections.
(e) A Survey of the Data
Figures 3.A to 3.H summarise the average values of the
8 variables (7 explanatory plus investment) used in the model
(each variable is in its deflated form - i.e. as a proportion
of- gross fixed assets). The procedure adopted in each diagram
has been to provide five frequency distributions of the
eighteem industry means for the respective variable - one for
each year.^^ The main purpose of the diagrams is to provide
(18) Individual values for each industry-year are
reported in Appendix G, Tables G.A to G.H.
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TABLE 3.B
Industry Distribution of Companies included






31 Metal manufacture 43
33 IJon-electrical engineering 119
36 Electrical engineering 54
38 Vehicles 31
39 Metal goods, n.e.s. 70
41 Textiles 71
44 Clothing and Footwear 33
46 Bricks, pottery, etc. 40
47 Timber, etc, 32
48 Paper, printing, etc. 59
49 Other manufacturing 39
50 Construction 57
81 Wholesale distribution 78
82 Retail distribution 82
88 Miscellaneous services 49
Total: 985
Note: Pour industries (tobacco, shipbuilding, leather
and transport), which contain very few companies
were excluded from the analysis, since they
would have enjoyed few, if any, degrees of
freedom.
3.15
a comparison of the individual years being studied.
Of the four variables on the incentive side, it is the two
embodiments of the accelerator principle (capacity utilisation
and change in sales) which reveal the sharpest contrasts
between years (see Figures 3.3 and 3.D). 1967, the year of
(19)
balance of payments crisis and stagnant manufacturing output
contains the lowest values of all. After the devaluation at
the end of 1967 and with the improvement in world trade in
1968, however, aggregate manufacturing output, led by exports,
rose by some 6% in real terms in 1968 (CS'O (1972) Table 15).
The variables derived from companies' accounts and reported
in the diagrams fully reflect this: the averages for both
capacity utilisation and sales increase are typically at their
highest in 1968 of the whole five years. The subsequent two
years of Jenkins retrenchment and modest rises in aggregate
real output witnessed only middling levels of the two variables
reported in Figures 3.B and 3.D. And the final year, in
which aggregate output was again stagnant, produced typically
lov/er levels for the change in sales, and a broadening of the
distribution for the capacity utilisation indicator.
(19) Expressed in constant prices, manufacturing output
showed no increase at all in 1967 over 1966 : see
Central Statistical Office (1972), Table 15.
(20) The persistent inter-industry differences in the
dependent and the explanatory variables reported
in Appendix G vindicate the stratification by
industry - for instance the drink industry has
persistently low average values for sales and
investment, while construction and wholesaling have
values above the population average for both.
Inter-industry differences would doubtless merit
detailed study themselves: some account is taken
of them in the interpretation of regression results
in chapter 4.
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Figure 3.E reports the pattern between years for the first
variable on the finance side, disposable retentions. The
progress of this variable has, of course, already been
traced for the aggregates in Figure 2.A above: it suffered
a progressive decline from 1967 to 1970, with a very mild
recovery in 1971 to roughly the level of 1968. By contrast,
the second source of internal finance, depreciation, exhibited
great stability over the period (see Figure 3.P), as was
suggested by Figure 2.A above.
The picture for the final explanatory variable, the opening
liquidity stock, is presented in Figure 3.0, It was already
negative at the beginning of this period: the decline in
liquidity, from around 20% of net assets in 1948 was a
notable feature of the post-war period, and amounted to around
10% of total sources of funds for the typical continuing quoted
(21)
company. In four of the five years considered here, the
decline continued: the opening balance for 1968 showed an
increase over 1967, but the subsequent years' levels fell
progressively, echoing the decline in disposable retentions
in each preceding year.
(21) See Meeks and Whittington (1975), Tables
2 and 4.
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Finally, Figure 3.H depicts the pattern of investment.
1968 was again the peak year, as it v/as for capacity
utilisation and sales increase; and like disposable
retentions and liquidity stocks, it subsequently showed a
downward trend. Such associations would augur well for
the model's performance in time series, for which, of
course, the run of data is inadequate: the next chapter
considers its performance in cross-section.
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Chapter 4
Savings and Investment 2; Multiple Regression Results
(a) Introduction
Appendix G reports the estimates of model 3(ii) for each industry-year.
Since the model incorporates seven explanatory variables and is estimated
for 9 3 separate sets of data, the results are somewhat hard to digest when
presented in that conventional form. Accordingly, in this chapter attention is
focussed on one explanatory variable at a tine in order to assess the import¬
ance of the internal finance variables emphasised in Chapter 2 compared
with the factors on the incentive side which were embodied in the model in
Chapter 3.
Not only do the Tables included in this chapter report the size of the estimated
coefficient, but also an indicator of whether the coefficient was significantly
different from zero at the 5% level on a conventional statistical test. The
inclusion of such tests does not, however, mean that a positive and statist¬
ically significant coef^ent is used to support inferences about the universe of
all companies for all time, for the results relate to a narrowly specified
population: larger British quoted companies in the particular circumstances
of the late sixties and early seventies. Their objectives and their access to
external finance may well differ from those of smaller British companies or
of companies in foreign countries with less well developed capital markets.
Nor can their experience in these years readily be taken as a random sample
from the very large number of years experience of this defined set of
companies, for Chapter 2 has argued that variables which might be expected
to influence investment took on values outside the range of earlier experience
as unprecedentedly high rates of inflation ware associated with unprecedented!}'
low levels of disposable retentiovis. In addition, conditions were unusual in
other respects: the period was punctuated by a major devaluation, and
towards its end witnessed the most severe depression since the war.
Thus it is preferable to see the results as descriptions of average relation¬
ships for industry-years in this period, rather than as tests of long-run
theories with universal applicability. And the associated statistical tests can
be interpreted as a useful way of summarising the mass of results, with the
5% significance test a conventional but arbitrary cut-off point distinguishing
•higher' and 'lower' degress of association between a particular independent
and the dependent variable.^
(2)
(b) Regression resuits
As Table 4. A shows, depreciation, the 'purest' of the two internal finance
variables, was accorded a very powerful role by the regressions. The
regression coefficient relating investment to depreciation was positive in 84 of
the 90 industry-years included; and the coefficient was significantly greater
than zero at the 5% level, according to the conventional statistical test, in 61
of the industry-years. A strong positive relationship seemed to operate for
every industry and every year: in no industry did fewer than two of the five
1. See section 7.C below for a parallel discussion for the merger study.
2. Note that any company without sales data for the current or previous year
is excluded from the regression estimates for that year: see Chapter 3.
Thus only around a half of the full population contribute to the resulta
for 1967, and a small minority is excluded for 1968.
4.3
Table 4A
Partial Regression Coefficients; Investment on Depreciation





4.233* 2.513* 0.823 0.733 -1.738
3.909* 0.924 0.653 2.055* 4.375*
1.002* 2.272* 2.923* 0.617
31 Metal Manufacture 2.575* 0.501
39 Metal Goods, n.e.s.3.839* 1.937* 2.395* 0. 123
41 Textiles -0.348
44 Clothing & Footwear 2. 268
46 Bricks, etc. -0.379
47 Timber, etc. 1.631*
48 Paper, Printing, ^.-0.497




82 Retail Distn. 2.950* 2.303* 1.229* 0.355
1.789*
1.701* 1.205* 1.164
33 Non-elect. Eng. 1.857* 2.575* 0.309 1.044* 1.368*
36 Electrical Eng. 0.976* 1.851* 0.328 0.864* 0.886 *
38 Vehicles 1.557 -0.181 3.370* 1. 182 2.892*
2.739*
1.865* 2.745* 0.993* 1.061*
1.526*
1.60S* 2.159* 1.620* 0.585
2.395* 2.274* 2.941* 1.879
1.924* -3.117
-0.010 2.908* 1,471 1.639*
1.273* 1.642* 1.087* 1.253*
81 Wholesale Distn. 2.260* 2.013* 1. 538* 2.213* 1.449*
U .279
88 Miscellaneous &rvs, 1.333* 1.787* 1. 505* 1.349* 1.697*
* significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
For estimates of the full model for each industry-
year, see Appendix G.
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years reveal coefficients significantly greater than zero; and at least 11 of
the 18 industries in any year produced coefficients passing this test. In the
years identified in Chapter 2 as representing the most severe of the savings
squeeze, 1969 and 1970, every single industry revealed a positive coefficient.^
The second liquidity flow variable, disposable retentions, also performed
well in the regression analysis, as is shown in Table 4.B. The coefficient
relating investment to this variable was positive in 78 of the 90 industry-
(4)
years; and is significantly greater than zero in 39 of these cases. More¬
over, there was a tendency for the role of disposable retentions to be more
powerful in years when its typical level was low; in 1970 when the savings
squeeze was most severe (see Figures 2. A and 3E above), all 18 industries
displayed a positive relationship between the two variables, and in ten the
coefficient was significantly greater than zero on the criterion used here. By
contrast, in 1967, the year with the highest retention level of those reported
here, the number of positive coefficients (and of ones significantly greater
than zero) was at its lowest. An analogous result holds for inter-industry
comparisons. The four industries whose investment displayed the greatest
sensitivity to their disposable retentions (according to the rule of thumb
adopted here: most coefficients significantly greater than zero) were all
identified in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.B) as suffering more severely than average
3. See the discussion below (4.d) of why a strong association would be
expected when the average level of the independent variable is low.
4. Since considerable error may have been introduced by the use of a
general index when estimating this variable (see Chapter 3), its explana¬
tory power is all the more striking. Of course, the other variables
involve no estimation at this stage, but are derived directly from the
standardised accounts of companies.
4.5
Table 4, B




1967 1968 1S69 1970 1871
21 Food 0.321 0.595* 0.807 0.689* -0.044
23 Drink -0.421 -0.136 0.234 0.128 0.140
26 Chemicals 0.576* 0.121 -0.219 0.657* 0.311*
31 Metal Manufacture 0. 293 0.504* 0.211 0.175 0.267
33 Non-elect. Engineering 0.353* 0.365* 0.367* 0.211* 0. 116
36 Electrical Engineering 0. 009 0.246 0. 323 0.281* 0.254*
38 Vehicles 1.438* 0. 547 0.888* 0.387* 0.323*
39 Metal Goods, n.e.s. -0.338 0.499* 0.493* 0.318* 0.409*
41 Textiles 0.790* 0.197 0.462* 0.351* 0.270*
44 Clothing and Footwear 3.575 0.177 0.306 0. 180 0.139
46 Bricks, etc. 0.630* 0.828* 1.471* 0.213 0. 333
47 Timber, etc. o • CO CO o ■H- 1.402* 0.488* 0.344 0.284
48 Paper, Printing, etc. -0.559* 0.193 0.614* 0.457* 0.354*
49 Other Manufacturing 0.493* 0.445 0.193 0.187 0.310
50 Construction -0.095 0.597* u.369* 0.302* 0.107
81 Wholesale Distribution 0.369 0.307 0.122 0.272* 0.376*
82 Retail Distribution c-o•o1 -0.229 -0.181 0. 141 0.461*
88 Miscellaneous Services -0.155 1. 119 0.126 C. 299 0.223
* significantly different from zero at the 5% level.




from the stock appreciation mechanism: stock appreciation preempted a
larger share of their profit than it did for the aggregate quoted company
sector.'161
While both the liquidity flow variables were positively and strongly associated
with investment, as Chapters 2 and 3 suggested they would be, the performance
of the liquidy stock variable ran counter to expectations. The coefficient was
negative in practically half (44) of the 90 industry-years considered; and in
only 6 of the 90 cases did a coefficient emerge which was significantly greater
than zero at the 5% level (see Table 4.C). In other words there was little or
no suggestion that firms with more liquidity at the beginning of the year under¬
took more investment during the year: a feature which is at first sight sur¬
prising in view of the squeeze on liquidity flows documented above and
reflected in the importance of internal finance in the regression estimates.
One possible explanation of this lack of relationship would adduce the tendency
of firms undertaking above average investment to economise more severely
on cash balances and/or to finance a greater part of their expenditure through
(7)
bank credit (the liquidity stock measure used here is of course bank balances
etc. minus liabilities to banks). If above average investment persisted, then
low liquidity this year might be the result of high investment last year and yet
5. These results are consistent with the suggestion made below (4.d) that a
strong and positive relation between saving and investment will be detected
for years or industries where internal finance is in short supply and is
the operative constraint on investment.
6. The four industries were non-electrical engineering, vehicles, metal
goods (n.e.s.) and textiles.
7. See the sources and uses of funds analysed by rate of growth by gross
investment in fixed assets; Appendix J.
4.7
Table 4.C








39 Metal Goods, n.e.s.
41 Textiles
44 Clothing and footwear
46 Bricks, etc.
47 Timber, etc.







33 Non-elect. Engineering 0.028




































81 Wholesale Distribution -0.039 -0.021 -0.047
0.015 -0.049







































* significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
for estimates of the full model for each industry-year, see
Appendix G.
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be associated with above average investment this year. This tendency would
result in a negative association between liquidity stocks and investment -
possibly sufficient to offset any positive relationship which existed on account
of liquidity's permissive role in the investment decision, and to produce little
or no association overall.
Tables 4.D to 4.F report the coefficients relating investment to the three
variables apart from the age indicator which reflect incentives to invest:
increases in sales, capacity utilisation and the level of sales. As expected,
all were, by and large, positively related with investment, but, in comparison
with the liquidity flow variables, they performed rather weakly. The
influence of the increase in sales (reported in Table 4.D) appeared to be the
most powerful: positive coefficients emerged in 63 of the 90 industry-years,
and were significantly greater than zero in 20.For each of the other two
variables, roughly two-thirds of the coefficients were positive too, but only
10 or 11 passed the test of statistical significance. It certainly could not be
concluded from these results that investment was not positively related to
these variables; but nevertheless, individually they hardly match the liquidity
flow variables in explanatory power, and on these results primacy would be
(8)
accorded to the two measures of internal finance.
The final variable included in the regression model was a proxy for the
average age of the firm's capital stock. It seemed possible that the processes
of decay and obsolescence would stir companies whose capital stock was
relatively old to invest more heavily in replacement equipment. In fact, as
8. But see section 4.d on that joint effect.
4.9
Table 4.D




1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
21 Food -0.044 0.122* 0.089 0.132* 0.148
23 Drink -0.024 0.205 0.069 -0.021 -0.039
26 Chemicals -0.123 0.081 -0.064 -0.050 0.093
31 Metal Manufacture -0.058 -0.020 0.191* 0.049 0. 002
33 Non-elect. Engineering 0. 012 -0.018 0.103* -0.048 0.055
36 Electrical Engineering 0.094 0.085 -0.032 -0.085 0,087
38 Vehicles 0.004 0.286 0.230* 0.011 -0.Ill
39 Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0.206* 0.014 0.097* 0.198* -0.035
41 Textile s 0.022 -0.021 -0.072 0.036 0. 028
44 Clothing and Footwear -1.540 -0.007 0.102 0. 126 0.013
46 Bricks, etc. 0.134* -0.040 -0.092 0. 164 0. 127
47 Timber, etc. -0.057 0.198 0.021 0.076 0.246*
48 Paper, Printing, etc. 0.283* 0.064 0.236* 0.106 0.176*
49 Other Manufacturing 0.032 0.187* 0.192* 0.062 -0.036
50 Construction 0.149 0.090 -0.035 -0.003 0.143*
81 Wholesale Distribution 0.063 0.102 0.035 0.043 0. 022
82 Retail Distribution -0.014 0.172* 0.140* 0,140* 0.177*
88 Miscellaneous Services 0.088 0.023 0. 145 0.067 -0.055
* significantly different from zero at the 5% level.








1967 1968 1969 1970
21 Food 0.098 0.188* -0.014 -0.159
23 Drink 0.097 -0.034 0.091 0.037
26 Chemicals 0.282* 0.234* 0. 173 0. 151
31 Metal Manufacture 0.189 0. 158 -0.034 0.053
33 Non-elect. Engineering 0.002 0.117 -0.056 0.062
36 Electrical Engineering 0.018 0.245* 0.040 0.141*
38 Vehicles -0.286 -0.255 -0.197 0.063
39 Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0.077 0.078 0.133* 0.049
41 Textiles 0.038 -0.040 0.007 0.046
44 Clothing and Footwear -0.521 0.220* 0. 103 0.077
46 Bricks, etc. -0.031 0.004 -0.016 0.026
47 Timber, etc. 0.090 -0.121 0.019 0. 233
48 Paper, Printing, etc. 0.057 0.036 0.002 0.159*
49 Other Manufacturing -0.121 0. 186 0.006 0. 136
50 Construction 0. 265 0.158 0.030 0.112
81 Wholesale Distribution -0.008 0.016 -0.027 0.132
82 Retail Distribution 0. 043 0. 126 0. 070 -0.074
88 Miscellaneous Services 0.060 0.317* 0.056 0.047
* significantly different from zero at the 5% level.





















39 Metal Goods, n.e.s.
41 Textiles
44 Clothing and Footwear
46 Bricks, etc.
47 Timber, etc.







33 Non-elect. Engineering 0.003





























































* significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
for estimates of the full model for each industry-year, see
Appendix G.
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Table 4.G shows, the relationship between gross investment and the age
proxy was more often than not negative (in fifteen industry-years was the
coefficient significantly less than zero at the 5% level; and in only two cases
significantly greater). If the proxy is to be trusted, the results suggest that
(9)
companies with younger equipment typically invested more heavily.
One further feature of the regression results is reported in Table 4. II and
relates to the main issue. This Table details the coefficient of determina¬
tion for the regression for each industry for the first year of the period with
substantially complete data, 1968, and for the last, 1971. In a majority of
2
cases (11 of 18) R is lower in the later year; and the declines are often
' » r ■ ■' i •• <•*'. « > *
appreciable whereas the actual increases are frequently relatively slight.
Moreover, though not shown, the decline seemed to be progressive from year
to year: in 1969, 1970 and 1971 the number of industries reporting declines
2
in R J compared with the previous year was always more than half of the total.
One possible explanation of this feature is that uncertainties were increasing
over the period with the acceleration of inflation and the development of the
deepest recession since the war; and that conaequently animal spirits were
dampened and investment deferred even when, according to the traditional
indicators, the time was ripe for expansion.
This commentary has conceiSred itself with the statistical significance of the
explanatory variables, saying nothing about their significance in economic
9. On the self-reinforcing effect of rapid growth by new investment see
George (IS71) p. 64; also Chapter 2 above on the high proportion of
depreciation available for net investment to firms with faster rates of
growth by new investment; and Chapter 9 below on the higher rates of
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33 Non-elect. Engineering -0.101 -0.080 0.000 -0.160*
36 Electrical Engineering -0.088 -0.430* -0.100 0.014
38 Vehicles 0.457
39 Metal Goods, n.e.s.
41 Textiles
44 Clothing and Footwear -0.657
46 Bricks, etc.
47 Timber, etc.
48 Paper, Printing, etc. 0.018
49 Other Manufacturing 0.136
50 Construction 0.279
0.011 0.346 -0.066
-0.161 -0.197* 0.023 0. 109






81 Wholesale Distribution -0.299* -0.235
88 Miscellaneous Services -0.195 -0.139




















* significantly different from zero at the 5% level.









21 Food 0.817 0.408
23 Drink 0.490 0. 565
26 Chemicals 0. 594 0. 308
31 Metal Manufacture 0. 565 0. 263
33 Non-elect. Engineering 0.473 0. 255
36 ' Electrical Engineering 0. 616 0.368
38 Vehicles 0.418 C. 437
39 Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0. 659 0.484
41 Textiles 0. 606 0.421
44 Clothing and Footwear 0.739 0. 555
46 Bricks, etc. 0. 778 0.491
47 Timber, etc. 0. 775 0. 575
48 Paper, Printing, etc. 0. 269 0.394
49 Other Manufacturing 0. 577 0.500
50 Construction 0.442 0. 548
81 Wholesale Distribution 0.270 0. 547
82 Retail Distribution 0.404 0.437
88 Miscellaneous Services 0.426 0.435
For estimates of the full model for each industry-year, see
Appendix G.
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terms. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, all the coefficients vary a
good deal between industries and years, so that it is hard to summarise
typical experience. The second point is related: section 4.d below argues
that the specification of the relationships in. this model may be inadequate:
an alternative interpretation of the results brings the estimated regression
coefficients into question, and suggests reasons for the diversity of the
coefficients - especially between years for the same industry.
However, if, for the sake of argument, this veifion of the model is accepted,
what can be said of the economic significance of the coefficients? The
coefficients on the finance side are easy to interpret: a value of 1.0 means
that a difference of £1 in the respective component of finance is typically
associated with a difference of £1 in investment. The depreciation coefficient
is often above 1 : perhaps firms with above average internal finance this
year are more confident of above average income in future years and conse¬
quently not only commit all their current depreciation provisions to invest¬
ment but also raise and invest above average external finance this year? The
retentions coefficient is generally lower: perhaps firms are more ready to
commit their prospective depreciation provisions to investment for the current
year since these provisions will be forthcoming provided only that the firm
does not make a loss, while greater doubt might attach to successively higher
slices of retentions at the time when the current year's investment is
ordered; poor profit or high stock appreciation in the rest of the year might
put them at risk.
The coefficients on the incentive side can be interpreted less directly: on
4. 16
the assumptions made above, say, an extra pound of sales is likely to elicit
different quantities of investment in industries with different capital-output
ratios. Respective changes in the explanatory and dependent variables are
perhaps best related to their own intra-industry variation. Thus, to take one
or two specimen coefficients which have passed the statistical test of signifi¬
cance, for the food industry in 1973, a difference of one standard deviation in
the change in sales was associated with a difference in investment equal to
28% of the dependent variable's standard deviation. For electrical engineer¬
ing in 1970, the equivalent difference in the independent variable (one standard
deviation) was associated with a difference of 30% of the standard deviation
of investment when capacity utilisation was the explanatory variable, and 27%
when the exercise was repeated for the sales level instead. Of course these
specimens are not necessarily representative: but they do suggest that the
influence of these variables need not have been trifling.
Comparisons with the results of earlier work
There are many respects in which the analysis of this and the previous
chapter has been modelled on the work of Meyer and Kuh; and, although their
results related to another country (the U.S. ) and a different period (the late
forties), they are often similar to those reported here. They accord in
particular in finding a relatively weak association between investment and
liquidity stocks (albeit differently defined) and an often negative association
between investment and the indicator of the capital stock's age. However,
the most significant similarity for the special issue at stake here - the role of
the savings squeeze in restraining investment - was their general opinion
that the "conclusions . .. converge in their emphasis upon the importance of
4. 17
internal liquidity/flowgJu (p. 130). Moreover, they reached such conclusions
on the basis of less unanimous results than those presented here. Firstly,
the partial correlation coefficient between investment and depreciation was
statistically significantly greater than zero at the 5% level in 12 of 72 industry-
years in their study, whereas the parallel result in this analysis held for 61
(10)
of 90 industry-years . Secondly, their partial correlation between invest¬
ment and profits, which, in years of low inflation and stock appreciation and
of consequent close association between profits and retentions, corresponds
reasonably with the disposable retentions result provided here, passed the
same test in 17 of 75 industry-years compared with 39 out of 90 here. It is
very possible that U.K. experience in the- late forties was not greatly
dissimilar from that for the U.S. at the time but that the stagnation of dispos¬
able savings and declines in liquidity balances in the U.K. in recent years
have boosted the influence of current internal liquidity flows. Be that as it
may, if their results supported such emphasis upon the role of internal
finance, those presented here warrant conclusions in the same mould and at
least as confident.
Similar cross-section work for the U.K. has of course been inhibited until
recently by the lack of the crucial sales data. Nevertheless, two such
studies have appeared using U.K. data for the fifties and sixties. One, by
Dimsdale and Glyn (1971) used a small sample (generally below 50) which
10. They relied upon multiple correlation analysis for the most part. But
of course, with the same model and data the test for a partial correlation
coefficient significantly greater than zero is equivalent to that for a
partial regression coefficient significantly greater than zero. The
number of independent variables in their model, was the same; and their
definition broadly comparable.
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was not stratified by industry and of course included only those companies
which voluntarily disclosed their sales level (and which probably tended to be
the larger, more successful ones - which probably errpyed easier access to
external finance: see Meeks and Whittington (1975)). Moreover, their
estimation was to some extent bedevilled by their inclusion of two highly
correlated explanatory variables on the finance side, profits and an internal
finance measure incorporating retained profits. They did, however, find
(consistent with the results in this chapter) that investment was more often
positively and significantly (in the statistical sense) related to internal finance
towards the end of their period (1S68) - which was the time when the savings
squeeze was beginning to take effect, it has been argued above.
The second British study (Jack (1968)) is of relatively little help in distinguish¬
ing the influence of internal finance upon investment. Having derived a model
using sales as the chief exploratory variable, Jack substituted profit for
sales at the last moment before estimating the model - on the grounds that
the two are positively related and sales data were not available. Thus,
according to the assumptions adopted here, profit becomes a hybrid variable
representing the influence of both capacity utilisation and internal finance,
(d) The results in perspective
The results given in section 4.b are then favourable to the suggestion that
investment has been sensitive to the flow of internal finance in recent years
and support an affirmative answer to the question whether the savings squeeze
is likely to have restrained investment. It would be desirable to explore this
issue further, however, and to ask whether an increase in internal finance
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would elicit the sort of increase in investment represented in the regression
coefficient. In addition, although the factors on the incentive side in the
model were introduced primarily in order to hold other things equal when
assessing the impact of the ability to finance investment internally, and
although it is not a main aim of this analysis to discriminate between alterna¬
tive theories of inveetment, it would clearly be relevant to the main issue to
g
know whether a reduction in the variable' on the incentive side would often
leave investment unaffected - a conclusion which might be drawn on a strict
interpretation of the finding that regression coefficients relating investment
to incentives were often not significantly greater than zero on the standard
statistical tests.
To take first the second issue, of whether incentives matter, Table 4.1
presents an interesting complement to the results for individual coefficients
reported in section 4.b. It sums for two sets of independent variables the
2
improvement in R attributed to the addition of the individual variables to the
regression equation. The two sets of variables are on the one hand the four
which were classified as incentives (sales, sales increase, capacity utilisa¬
tion and age) and on the other the three finance variables (depreciation,
disposable retentions and liquidity stock). The comparison is made for 1970,
a year which was notable for the 'success' of the- individual finance variables
but not of the incentive variables. As the Table shows, however, the com¬
parison presented here is much more favourable to the collective success of
the incentive variables: in 9 of the eighteen industry-years they boast the
2
larger increase in R , and in one there is a tie. On this criterion, therefore,




The increase in R attributed to the incentive and
the finance variables collectively: 1970
Incentive Finance
INDUSTRY
21 Food 0.436 0.424
23 Drink 0.268 0. 265
26 Chemicals 0. 248 0. 2,49
31 Metal Manufacture 0.497 0. 093
33 Non-elect. Engineering 0.117 0.117
36 Electrical Engineering 0.115 0. 340
38 Vehicles 0.213 0. 196
39 Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0.345 0.136
41 Textiles 0. 175 0. 179
44 Clothing and Footwear 0.363 0.054
46 Bricks, etc. 0.243 0.276
47 Timber, etc. 0.433 0.162
48 Paper, Printing, etc. 0.162 0. 330
49 Other Manufacturing 0.459 0.086
50 Construction 0.176 0. 215
81 Wholesale Distribution 0.124 0. 272
82 Retail Distribution 0.346 0.029
83 Miscellaneous Services C. 124 0.370




An explanation of this comparison is available. It can be argued that three
of the incentive variables (sales, change in sales and capacity utilisation) are
vying to represent broadly the same stimulus to invest. A company with
buoyant demand is likely to record values above the industry average for all
three variables. Some independent influence still attaches to each, so that
their intercorrelation is not such as to pose severe problems of multicollin-
(11)
earity; but nevertheless positive correlations between thena are the rule.
Thus simple correlations between any of these incentive variables and invest¬
ment perform relatively well - as is shown in Figure 4A; while they steal one
another's thunder when incorporated in the same regression equation.
Following a paper by Gay Meeks (1974), a further objection might be raised
to any temptation to dismiss the influence of the incentive to invest; and this
also bears on the related issue of interpreting the respective regression
coefficients as estimates of the impact on investment of changes in the indi¬
vidual explanatory variables. It is common in intei'preting regression
coefficients to presume that each of the factors on the explanatory side
represents a sufficient condition for a change in the dependent variable, but
that neither is a necessary condition. Thus in the simplified model 4(i)
to 4(v), a unit increase in W is presumed to elicit a unit increase in I if F
remains unchanged; and the same holds for a unit increase in F with W
unchanged:
11 This is borne out by the actual intercorrelations (not reported here).
FIGURE 4.A. Frequency Distributions of Industry Correlation
Coefficients:1970
Frequency
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FIGURE 4*A.(cont.) Frequency Distributions of Industry
Correlation Coefficients:1970
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See Appendix G,Tables G.J. to G.P. for coefficients for
each industry for all 5 years.
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I-bjW+bgF 4 (i)
Assume for simplicity that:
bf = 1 ; bg = 1 4 (ii)
Then, A I = 4 W +Af 4 (iii)
'A I = A W where A F = 0 4 (iv)
A I = AF where Z>.W =0 4 (v)
where: I = actual investment undertaken
W = variable representing the incentive to invest
F = variable representing the ability (i.e. finance) to invest.
In the case of investment, however, it seems reasonable to question this
presumption. Faced with an increase in the demand for his product but
insufficient capacity to meet it, the manager may expand provided that he can
raise adequate finance. Finance is then a necessary condition for invest¬
ment (after all, 'the necessary' is a standard slang expression for finance).
Moreover, the argument may be extended. Faced with a sizeable inflow of
internal finance the manager may spend it on new capacity provided that the
incentive to invest exists (e. g. that he can expect to sell profitably the output
from that capacity): the incentive too might be a necessary condition for
(12)
investment. Together, but not alone, the two factors might well
represent the necessary and sufficient condition for investment to take place.
This situation can be represented using the sumbols provided above in a second
12. In that the right number of units of the incentive would be necessary for
a given level of investment, not just that the presence of some quality
called incentive was required. The more usual interpretation of a
necessary condition might be the latter.
model, 4(vi) to 4(xi):
Assuming again, for simplicity, a one to one relationship between either F
or W and I:
1 = W iff F > W 4(vi)^13)
I = F iff W ^ F 4(vii)
(W = value of investment justified by incentives; F = value of investment
permitted by finance).
Then, considering changes in investment, if the process starts with W and F
equal, then the condition for an increase in W to be associated with an equal
increase in I is that F must also rise by at least as much as W:
When W = F,
\
zh I = AW iff &F > jA w 4(viii)
and similarly,
A I = A. F iff h W ^ A F 4(ix)
If F already exceeds W then the condition becomes more complicated.
A I = /\ W iff AF + (F-W)^/\W 4(x)
and, similarly, if W already exceeds F :
il I = l\ F iff Aw + (W-F) .> dF 4(xi)
Figure 4.B attempts to illustrate how such a set of conditions might affect
the interpretation of correlation and regression estimates. Section 1 of
the diagram displays the values of F and W for four companies. F is
represented by crosses and W by noughts. In each case F W, and so
in every case I = F. The subsequent two sections of the diagram
13. Where iff means if and only if.
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represent the scatter of I on F and I on W. The correlation of I and
F naturally leads to a perfect result, and the regression of I on F would
yield a regression coefficient of unity. Yet for company 4, an increase in
F of one would on these assumptions lead to a zero increase in I if \V were
unchanged; for company 3 the same conditions would elicit an increase in I
of 0,5; for companies 1 and 2 an increase of one in F would yield a unit
increase in I if W were unchanged. But even for companies 1 and 2
an increase of 4 in F would not elicit a rise of 4 in I.
The coefficient of correlation or regression of I on W would however be zero
(see section 3 of the diagram) - even though we know on the assumptions
made above that the role of W in eliciting I is exactly parallel with that of F.
All that the summaries of statistical association appear to reflect is which
factor was the operative constraint on investment in the period of observa¬
tion. In an alternative period where W was the operative constraint and
was represented by the crosses in section 1 of the diagram (F by the noughts),
exactly the same underlying causal link would have produced the reverse
regression results.
This example provides a warning against too rigid an interpretation of
correlation and regression coefficients when the suggested causal link
operates. But does this mean that all the results provided above would be
invalid in such a regime? Perhaps the principal conclusion could yet be
salvaged. The extreme case of Figure 4.B suggested that the stronger
correlation was accorded to the variable which actually operated as the
constraint in the observation period. Figure 4.C supports this conclusion
FIGURE 4.C. The Relationship of I with F and W
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with a less extreme example. This time 10 companies are considered. In
3 cases W is the constraint, in 2 cases F and W are equal, and in 5 cases
F is the constraint. The scatters of I against F and W confirm a higher
correlation between I and F than between I and W. .It seems likely on
this interpretation that the strong statistical association reported above
between I and the internal finance variables, which was especially marked
in years and industries where the average level of internal finance was
relatively low, means that internal finance was for many companies the
(14)
operative constraint.
To summarise, this alternative interpretation of the causal link between the
desire and the ability to invest and actual investment yields two firm conclu-
(15)
sions and one tentative one. Firstly, even a zero statistical relationship
between investment and the incentive variables would not mean that the
incentive was unimportant or could be reduced without curtailing investment.
Secondly, the actual value of the positive regression coefficient relating
investment to internal finance would not adequately represent the relation of
an increase in investment to an increase in finance; not only would the
incentive have to be in abundant supply for this to operate, but also, if the
incentive sometimes intruded to restrain investment in the period of observa¬
tion, the estimated relationship is likely to misrepresent the underlying
14. This conclusion holds most clearly for simple correlations (such as are
provided in Figure 4. A), and might be obscured by interrelationships
with third variables in partial correlation or regression analysis.
15. Of course, if it is believed that the assumptions of the original model
are justified (both factors unnecessary but sufficient) then the conclusions
of section 4.b will be preferred.
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relationship of investment with finance which would have obtained had the
incentive never constrained investment. The final, tentative result is
that the relatively high correlation between internal finance and investment
may reflect the fact that internal finance was often the operative constraint
on investment in the period studied: thus an affirmative answer might still be
given to the question whether the savings squeeze restrained investment;
while quantification of its effect v/ould be elusive.




Conclusions of Part 1
Have profits been squeezed? A measure of profit appropriate for all
purposes is elusive, as appendices A and B suggest; and as Chapter 2 shows,
conventionally measured profit belies companies' ability to invest from
internal funds. It documents a widening gap between conventional and disposable
profit in recent years, attributing it to two vehicles of inflation: stock
appreciation and the increasing absorption of depreciation provisions by
fixed asset replacement costs. It argues that if managements wish to maintain
their companies' purchasing power, it is not enough that nominal earnings
keep pace with the rise in prices as it is for wage and dividend recipients.
In addition, increases in conventional profit have to match increases in stock
appreciation; and since stocks are on average two or three times earnings,
earnings must rise by a multiple of any increase in the inflation rate if dispos¬
able profits are to be maintained. In fact, earnings have failed to rise at
this extravagant rate as inflation has accelerated; and so, in spite of an
apparently satisfactory record in the late sixties in terms of traditional profit,
the real saving of the quoted company sector declined from 1967 to 1970 and
the recovery in real saving in the early seventies is much less vigorous than
the movement of conventional profit might suggest.
Has the saving squeeze restrained investment? .As Chapter 3 reports, a
large body of theoretical literature has argued that companies will be reluctant
to invest much more than they can finance from internal sources - especially
5. 2
when these companies are controlled by managers rather than owners. The
more common supporting arguments are that external finance is more costly
than internal when capital markets are imperfect; that the threat to the
manager's security is acute if a large externally financed project fails vrhereas
the gains to him from its success are limited when he has little or no equity
interest; and that raising external finance often involves unwelcome outside
scrutiny of the manager's plans and record, whereas provided that a middling
record has been achieved and existing shareholders are passive, the invest¬
ment of internal finance generally requires no external sanction.^
The average pattern of company financing is consistent with this view: if
growth by takeover financed through share for share exchange is excepted
a major proportion of the expansion of the typical company is financed from
internal sources. Yet this average pattern might not contradict an alterna¬
tive view: it could mask considerable diversity between companies in the
proportion of expansion financed by internal funds. Investment might still
be determined entirely by factors on the incentive side with companies
indifferent to the proportion which they financed from internal sources.
Further work to resolve this issue required a model relating investment to
saving but at the same time allowing for incentive factors on the explanatory
side. Such a model was developed in Chapter 3. The two sources of
internal finance emphasised in Chapter 2, depreciation provisions and
inflation - adjusted retentions, were included together with a liquidity stock
measure as finance variables; while variables representing replacement
needs, capacity utilisation and sales expectations were incorporated on the
1. The arguments against external finance raised by share for share exchange,
etc. during takeover are less strong: see Chapters 9 and 10.
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incentive side.
Chapter 4 reported estimates of this model using linear multiple regression.
A standard interpretation of the estimated model, where each explanatory
variable represents a sufficient but not necessary condition for investment to
take place, accorded a major role to the two components of disposable savings,
confirming prior expectations, and suggesting in answer to the principal
question in this part of thesis that the savings squeeze is likely to have
restrained investment. An alternative interpretation of the explanatory
variables* relationship with investment described the incentive and the ability
(finance) to invest as, together, the necessary and sufficient condition fox*
investment to take place. This interpretation would undermine standard
inferences from the actual associations observed between investment and the
ability or incentive to invest; and, in particular, create problems for
estimating the quantitative impact upon investment of, say, a £1 reduction
in internal finance. It seemed likely, however, on the basis of a casual
assessment, that the qualitative conclusion derived from the data on the
standard interpretation would survive in this scheme. It was suggested that
internal finance may well have been the chief operative constraint upon invest¬
ment in this period, and especially in years or industries where the savings
squeeze was making itself felt most severely.
The results of this part of the thesis are to some extent incomplete, lacking
quantitative estimates of the impact of saving on investment if it is assumed
that this alternative interpretation holds. An attempt to achieve such
estimates is tempting, but would require a major extension of the
5.4
(2)
work. It was thought preferable to devote the rest of the thesis to the
other major component of company growth, takeover, which has so far been
neglected. For although this part of the analysis has to be qualified and
produces incomplete results, yet several policy conclusions have e.mei'ged
which further work would only succeed in making more exact.
Firstly, Chapter 2 shows that, say, an incomes policy which succeeded in
reducing the rate of inflation would result in higher disposable saving for
companies if aggregate conventional profit were quite unchanged: the share
of stock appreciation in profit would be reduced, and the proportion of deprecia¬
tion available for net investment would be higher than it would otherwise have
(3)
been. Conversely, continued acceleration of inflation with conventional
profit unchanged would imply a decline in disposable saving.
Secondly, the conclusions of Chapter 2 and Appendices A and B suggest that
a successful prices and incomes policy urgently requires a new basis for
measuring profit in published accounts. The continuation of dividend
restraint together with controls over prices and wages mean that the volume
of internal funds available for investment is, broadly speaking, determined
(4)
by government policy. These funds are likely to exert a strong influence
2. Perhaps some technique might be found using prior information and
dummy variables. Future work is planned on this topic.
3. This argument is of course independent of the fact that unchanged money
income would buy a greater quantity of goods in future years if the rate
of inflation were reduced.
4. This can be seen in terms of the simplified income account introduced in
Chapter 2. The government determines gross income by controlling
prices in relation to costs; it sets constraints on dividends and decrees
the tax bill; stock appreciation is given b> the rate of inflation and the
stock level necessary to maintain the business. Disposable internal
funds represent the residual.
5. 5
over actual investment according to the argument of Chapters 3 and 4; so that
investment levels become to a large extent part of the prices and incomes
policy. If it is accepted that informed public discussion of different groups' .
income levels and of desired investment is a prerequisite of an effective
incomes policy, then the need for relevant accounting data on companies'
income is clear. Yet existing accounting information gives a very poor
guide to the funds available within the firm for investment, taxation and
distribution:. on the argument of Chapter 2, high conventional profits composed
largely of stock appreciation may leave a firm highly illiquid but leave the
unions and the public sceptical of the managers' pleas for higher earnings
in order to sustain investment.
i
On the arguments presented in earlier chapters, the government may still
have an instrument for raising the aggregate investment achieved even if the
level of aggregate savings is taken as fixed (as part of other policies). The
company tax system of the Labour Government of the late sixties involved
relatively high rates of taxation on dividends and low rates on retentions
together with subsidies on investment; in consequence, it redistributed the
(reduced) total of saving towards companies undertaking investment from
those distributing a high proportion of income. There may be political and
equity objections to such a system; and some would argue that it inhibits
the recycling of funds through the capital market via dividends and new
external finance, with consequent inefficiency in the allocation of financial
resources. But be that as it may, if a certain level of internal finance is
for the manager the sine qua non of a given level of investment and the
current level of savings is an operative constraint on investment, then such
5,6
a policy is likely to be successful in eliciting greater total investment from a
given aggregate of saving.
PART 2
PROFITS AND GR0I7TH BY MERGER
6.1.
Chapter 6. The Scale of Takeover Activity in Post-war Britain
a. Introduction
Part I has focussed on companies' expansion by new investment in
fixed assets; Part II considers one of the other major means of
growth, the purchase of new subsidiaries. Whereas, in the earlier
part, attention was concentrated on the determinants of investment in
the light of the savings squeeze, this part is initially concerned
with the consequences of takeover for the internal efficiency of
companies: the final two chapters return to the subject of financ¬
ing growth, contrasting the means of financing takeover with the
methods of financing new investment in fixed assets. This chapter
forms a background to the work, documenting the scale of takeover
activity in the post-war period.
b. The record in the post-war period
Table 6.A. provides an annual series of expenditure on new subsid¬
iaries and trade investments by the 893 companies which continued in
independent existence within the Department of Industry (D.I.) quoted
company population for the period 1948-69.^ In money terms the
1. 1969 was chosen as the closing date because many companies were
excluded from the D.I. population thereafter: in particular a new
higher minimum size criterion was applied for the inclusion of a
company in the population. This limits the number of companies
surviving from 1948 until after 1959. Some changes in the defini¬
tion of the D.I. population also took place prior to 1969 (see
appendix F.), so that only by focussing on the experience of a
continuing set of companies can changes in company behaviour be.
distinguished from changes in the membership of the population.
Some data on the takeover record of all quoted companies for years
prior to 1967 are provided in Rose and Newbould (1967). Data
for years after 1969 are provided below (footnote 3).
level of this expenditure has risen steeply over the period; and the
rise must have been considerable in real terns too, since inflation
2
alone would have produced only a doubling within this period.
Indeed, as the rest of Table 6.A. shows, the growth of expenditure
on takeovers has outpaced that on gross new investment in fixed ass¬
ets: whereas in the early part of the period purchases of new subsid¬
iaries represented only a very minor percentage of new investment, the
later years saw this expenditure equal to around a half of new invest-
3
ment, and in one year, (1S&8) actually exceed it.
One reservation attaches to the picture given here for the increase
in these forms of expenditure: the purchases of new fixed assets
and of subsidiaries by victims which were acquired after the beginning
of the period are included in the continuing parent's expenditure in
later years, but not in earlier ones. Thus rising expenditure by
continuing companies could be consistent with stable expenditure by
companies in aggregate: the continuing companies would simply be
extending their share of total activity. However, while this quali¬
fication does affect comparisons between years of the level of either
form of expenditure, it does not alter the comparison between the
2. See Central Statistical Office (1372) Table 16. The upward trend
is somewhat exaggerated, however, as the D.I. changed to a less
conservative basis for valuing takeovers from 1964 (see appendix D).
3. Expenditure on acquisitions has not tended to decline since the
end of the period studied. Indices for this expenditure (1964 =
100) for all industrial and commercial companies show the following
picture:
1964 '65 '66 '67 '63 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73
100 102 99 163 385 185 195 158 439 226
(derived from Department of Industry (1974), Table 8).
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two forms of growth in any particular period: purchases of subsid¬
iaries were increasing at a considerably faster rate than purchases
of new fixed assets.
This broad picture for the aggregates is confirmed by the results in
Table 6.B., which analyses the growth of the typical quoted company
into its various components, including growth by takeover. These
components of growth are expressed as a percentage of opening net
assets for each company-year and the results averaged across all
company-years within each period, for two populations, those which
continued in independent existence within the D.I. population from
1948 to 1964, and those which continued from 1964-71. A comparison
of the two periods shows that the typical overall growth rate of net
assets in the later period was considerably higher than that for the
earlier years (11.8% p.a. as against 9.0% p.a.)/f However, the
rate of growth by means other than takeover (net new investment in
fixed assets, and in net current assets) was actually slightly lower
in the second period."* The increase in the rate of net asset
growth may be wholly attributed to the increased expenditure on new
subsidiaries. Moreover, in the second period this external component
4. This assumes that the change of population between the two periods
does not distort the comparison. The change in the basis for
valuing takeovers in 1964 (see footnote 2 above) does exaggerate
the increase both in the rate of growth of net assets and in the
rate of growth by takeover.
5. See the discussion in chapter 2 of the arbitrariness of the dis¬
tinction between net and replacement investment; and on the
typical shortfall of replacement investment below depreciation.
6 a At
of growth exceeded the internal components:^ it alone contributed
6% p.a. to the growth rate of the typical company.
In fact this analysis of the growth pattern of the typical company
may be said to understate the importance of takeover to the company
sector; for it gives equal weight to the experience of each indivi¬
dual company, irrespective of its size, whereas, as appendix C shows
(and the aggregates in Table 6.A, reflect), takeover is relatively
more important than average to the small number of giant companies
which dominate the company sector.
c. Summary
Expenditure on new subsidiaries has been rising dramatically over the
post-war period, until in the years 1964-71 it accounted for slightly
over half of the net asset growth of the typical company, exceeding
even net investment in fixed assets. Moreover, the relatively great
reliance on takeover by giant companies, documented in appendix C«,
means that averages of the growth variables weighted by size would
reveal an even greater role for growth by takeover than appears in
the unweighted averages given here.
6. This only applies when the internal components are measured net
of depreciation. As the aggregates in Table 6.A. show, gross
new investment typically exceeded expenditure on takeovers.
7. The largest 100 companies accounted for roughly two-thirds of




AGGREGATE EXPENDITURE ON NEW SUBSIDIARIES AND ON GROSS NEW INVESTMENT
IN FIXED ASSETS: THE 893 COMPANIES WHICH CONTINUED IN INDEPENDENT
EXISTENCE WITHIN THE D.I. QUOTED CJ:1?ANY POPULATION FROM 1949 TO 1969.
Year Expenditure on New Expenditure on Gross I as a percentage
subsidiaries new investment of II
I II
£ million £ million
1949 13 176 7
50 11 187 6
51 -25 213 -12
52 11 222 5
53 36 238 15
54 72 304 24
55 60 382 16
56 76 509 15
57 86 529 16
58 83 502 17
59 201 454 43
60 202 570 35
61 243 725 34
62 344 707 49
63 251 746 34
64 341 869 39
65 328 1075 31
66 228 996 23
67 482 1061 45
68 1295 1244 104







Derived from own computations using Edinburgh Data Bank (no consis¬
tent series is available giving this information in published
government statistics).
The basis of valuation of expenditure on new subsidiaries changes to
a less conservative method in 1964: see appendix D.
Expenditure on gross investment includes investment financed with
investment grants: companies often net these grants out of invest¬




THE CONTRIBUTION OF TAKEOVER AND NET NEW INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS
TO THE GROWTH OF THE TYPICAL COMPANY, 194S-64 AID 1964-71.
1948-64 1964-71
Rate of growth:
by net new investment in fixed assets





together = by internal means 6.1 5.8
by acquisition of subsidiaries:
1. for cash and by share for share
exchange
2. by taking on minority interests






together = by external means 2.9 6.0
of total net assets 9.0 11.8
Depreciation (identical with
replacement investment) 3.8 4.5
Number of companies 1250 966
Notes:
All variables are simple averages across all company-years.
All variables are expressed as a percentage of opening net assets
before averaging.
Table 6.A. reported gross new investment in fixed assets (net new
investment plus depreciation as given here); and excluded minority
interests and long term liabilities acquired with new subsidiaries
from expenditure on takeovers.
The acquisition of subsidiaries is valued on a more conservative
basis prior to 1964: see appendix D.
For fuller definitions see appendix F.
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Chapter 7. The Consequences of Merger for Company Performance, 1:
profitability after merger
a. Introduction
The last chapter illustrated the importance in recent years of take¬
over as a means of growth for the typical U.K. quoted company, and
especially for the biggest U.K. companies. This and the next two
chapters examine some consequences of takeover: they concentrate in
particular on its impact on productive efficiency.
Takeover has been cited as an important disciplinary force by those'*'
who have acknowledged the failure of the traditionally-invoked con¬
trol mechanisms which would operate were product, input and capital
markets perfect. It could work in two ways. On the one hand, the
threat of takeover (and loss of office or power for directors) if
profit were to fall could constrain directors from indulging in the
discretion allowed them by imperfect product and capital markets,
to the detriment of profitability. On the other hand, the actual
takeover of new subsidiaries by very profitable firms, which elicited
greater profits from the assets of their victims than the victims'
own directors would have achieved, could also act as a control on
the decline of profitability.
Singh's (1971) study of takeovers in the U.K. in the fifties provides
evidence on the first mechanism. He found that in the years prior
to their acquisition, a majority of takeover victims performed less
well than the industry average in terms of profitability. However,
1. E.g. Marris (1964).
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the majority was typically rather small; and he concluded that only
a weak tendency existed for firms with below average profitability
to be taken over.
The second mechanism, whereby the victim's profits were higher after
takeover than they would otherwise have been, could operate in a
number of ways. On the production side, scale economies in produc¬
tion and administration might become available to the combine. A
reduction in market uncertainty might stimulate decisions to invest
in new cost-reducing capacity. Where excess capacity existed in
an industry, unit costs might fall as output was concentrated in
existing least-cost plants. Or more able managements might just
use existing assets more efficiently. Benefits could also accrue
to the new combine as a result of its increased weight in the market,
both in relation to its customers and its suppliers: sales and pur¬
chases might be conducted on more favourable terms.
As against this, the actual process of integrating two companies
2
might exact a resource cost. Or administrative slack might develop
3 . .
because the merger had caused competitive pressures to be relaxed.
2. Such problems of expanding the management team are emphasised by
Penrose (1959) in her account of the limits c-n a company's rate
of growth.
3. "Takeover" and "merger" are used here interchangeably as in much
of the literature, simply to relieve monotony. In fact all the
amalgamations considered here would fall under the strict defini¬
tion of takeover (acquisition by one existing company of
another).
If firms' internal efficiency were unchanged as the result of a
takeover, then, since their market position is prima facie improved
by the merger, their profitability would more likely than not (and
ceteris paribus) improve.^ If the typical amalgamation were also
able to reduce the resource costs of its output, its relative profit¬
ability would have further reason to improve. On these grounds, we
might expect profitability, a joint function of internal efficiency
and market power, to improve following most mergers. If, however,
5
profitability typically declined after merger, then it might reason¬
ably be inferred that the negative effects on the production side had
the upper hand; whilst unchanged profitability would leave the con¬
clusion indeterminate (with a suspicion of decreased efficiency, since
market power would typically be enhanced), and so even would increased
profitability. The study reported below is devoted to charting the
post-merger profitability of amalgamations effected in recent years;
and to providing tentative conclusions on whether gains or losses in
productive efficiency have more often resulted from merger.^
4. Chapter 8 below distinguishes between the likely effects of differ¬
ent types of merger (e.g. diversified as opposed to same industry)
and provides evidence on the success of different types.
5. Other things equal, of course.
6. Other consequences of takeover, apart from those for productive
efficiency, are considered in chapters 9 and 10. Pride of place
is given to the efficiency consequences because government policy
has carried such a strong presumption that they would be favourable
(see section 7.b. below); as chapter 10 argues, many of the other
consequences are probably unfavourable, and have been tolerated
by the state because they were believed to be mitigated by effi¬
ciency gains.
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b. Government policy on mergers
Such conclusions could be of considerable help in the formulation of
government policy towards mergers - especially in creating a presump¬
tion either for or against takeover. If the presumption is in fav¬
our, then only the minority which pose marked difficulties for the
public interest need be investigated thoroughly; if it is against,
then only companies which believe they can demonstrate social bene¬
fits to be derived from the merger will present themselves for
detailed examination. It might be argued that each case should be
thoroughly investigated by public scrutineers and decided on its
merits; but the resource cost of such an examination in every case,
and of the subsequent monitoring necessary to see promises and
commitments carried out, would be disproportionate given the merger
rate. For instance, in 1958, a peak year for takeover activity,
over 100 companies with a value over £500,000 were taken over (D.T.I.
(1970)).
At the tine of most of the mergers studied below, government policy
harboured a presumption in favour of merger activity: this can be
seen both in its preaching and in its practice. 'In general, mergers
are desirable if they lead to better management or genuine economies
of scale without eliminating workable competition. In my view more
often than not in Britain mergers will fulfil this condition,' main¬
tained the President of the Board of Trade in 1969.^ And in that
government's lifetime prospective mergers were referred to the Mono¬
polies Commission at the rate of only two a year (a minority of these
7. Cited in George (1971), p.155.
g
being ultimately found to be against the public interest). Alarmed
at the permissiveness of government policy, some economists argued
9
that the presumption should be reversed; and that, following the
precedent of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, companies be
required to demonstrate mitigating factors in their proposal, if not
positive benefits. There is some evidence of a hardening of govern¬
ment attitudes recently, though not to the extent prescribed by some
industrial economists. In 1973 the Minister for Trade and Consumer
Affairs expressed scepticism over the alleged benefits from merger
activity; and in 1973/4 the annual rate cf reference of mergers to
the Monopolies Commission reached 5.^
c. The hypotheses
The ideal would be to compare the profitability achieved by a company
after takeover with the weighted average profitability that would
have been achieved by the participant companies had the takeover not
taken place. The approximation to this ideal which has been attemp¬
ted here consists of comparing the profitability achieved by the
amalgamation after takeover with the weighted average of the partici¬
pants' profitability prior to merger. Two complementary null hypo¬
theses are tested:
I. that, other things equal, the average profitability of the amal¬
gamation is no different from the pre-merger level of the participants
II. that, other things equal, half of amalgamations experience an
improvement in profitability, and half a decline after merger.
8. See Office of Fair Trading (1974), paragraph 45.
9. E.g. Sutherland (1971).
10. See Office of Fair Trading (1974), paragraph 45.
Two types of adjustment have been made to the conventional measure
of the firm's profitability in order to allow for systematic influ¬
ences on profit other than merger, and hence to hold other things as
near equal as possible. Firstly, allowance has been made for changes
in the companies' environment during the period when profitability is
measured. This is because the average level of profitability is
known to vary with the trade cycle;and some industries are known
to be more sensitive than others to these cyclical fluctuations. At
the same time, the level of merger activity has displayed a marked
unevenness between years and between industries; so that, for reasons
not directly associated with merger, years of numerous mergers may
have been followed by years of above or below average profitability;
and even if this has not been the pattern for the whole company sec¬
tor, it could still have operated for some individual industries.
A simple expedient has been adopted to 'remove' the external influ¬
ence of the macro-economic and industry environment: expressing
conventional profitability as a proportion of the current year's
12
profitability of the industry in aggregate. Where a company in
one industry acquires a subsidiary from another, the yardstick
adopted is a weighted average of the two industries' profitability,
11. See, for example, Nield (1963).
12. The aggregate rate of profit for the industry was obtained from
Department of Industry (1971-5). The industry figure includes
the companies under observation, so that differences between
the companies studied and their industry figure will be smaller
than those between the companies studied and the rest in their
industry (see appendix K for industry profit rates).
the weights being the proportionate contributions of each of the
merging companies' net assets to the amalgamation'o net assets. The
second step taken to hold other things equal has been to remove an
accounting bias which frequently arises after takeover in the conven¬
tional measure of profitability. This occurs because acquirers often
pay more for victims, and record the subsidiary's assets in their own
books at a higher valuation, than that at which they appeared prior
to takeover. This inflates the net assets of the amalgamation com¬
pared with the joint total of victim's and acquirer's net assets
prior to merger (and had the merger not occurred), and deflates the
profitability measure which has net assets as its denominator.
Appendix B. deals with this problem in greater detail, outlining the
adjustment adopted below to yield an alternative profitability mea¬
sure which should be largely free of this accounting bias.
Thus the actual null hypotheses being tested can be summarised;
I. E = 0; H = 0
(i.e. profitability did not change from its pre-merger level).
II. P = 0.5; Q « 0.5








Rmj = 2Uaj (7.iv)J D . , + D .mj-1 mj
and:
U = pre-tax profit, after depreciation
D = net assets
z = amalgamation, as proportion of industry-year
j = a post-merger year (including the year of merger)
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1. H is defined in the same way as E, except that R_^ is adjusted
for the accounting bias: see appendix D.
2. P is the proportion of observations for which E<0.
3. Q is the proportion of observations for which H<C0.
4. The pre-merger reference period is set at three years in order to
summarise average performance over a run of years prior to the mer¬
ger.
It seems unlikely in fact that the results would be very sensitive
to the choice of reference period: for instance, if the single pre¬
merger year were adopted instead, R ^ would be similar to that actu-
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ally used, since the victim's profitability in that year is slightly
below its 3 year average, while the acquirer's is slightly above (see
13section e. below).
The hypotheses have been presented in this formal way for clarity.
The presentation follows a pattern which is common in statistical
testing of theories, and conventional tests for statistically signi¬
ficant changes in profitability are reported below. However, a
caveat is required on the interpretation that may be given to these
tests and on the population to which any results may be applied.
The chapter does not consider a representative sample of all com¬
panies (or even of all British companies) for this period. They are
the larger British companies; and many theories (especially the
managerial ones) would suggest that their objectives and behaviour
might differ in important respects from smaller companies: in
particular, they are all quoted companies and might well find the
financing of takeover much easier than non-quoted companies (see
chapter 9 on the role of share for share exchange). Given the evi¬
dence of chapter o it is difficult to argue even that this study uses
13. Table K.A. in appendix E. shows that the "amalgamation's" profit¬
ability in the year preceding merger was the highest of the three
pre-merger years.
The choice of a three-year period is somewhat arbitrary. The
longer the period the weaker the impact of temporary distur¬
bances to profitability, but the more companies are excluded on
account of having had mergers in the reference period; three
years was a pragmatic compromise.
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a (not untypical) sample of the infinite number of years' experience
for larger quoted British companiess this period witnessed unpreced-
entedly frenetic levels of takeover activity, and it is possible that
the causes and consequences of most takeovers in this period differed
from those of other periods.
The results are perhaps best seen as descriptions of the specific
universe of larger British quoted companies in the late sixties and
early seventies (the question of whether the selection criteria
detailed below produce an atypical subset of even these mergers is
taken up later); and strictly, probability statements will then be
inappropriate. Statistical tests are nevertheless reported below
as useful adjuncts of the description. For they provide a conven¬
tional account of the relative dispersion of the observations; and
this can be a useful control on the interpretation of the averages
reported below. For instance, the relatively high dispersion of
observations discovered below for the full set of observations, and
reflected in the failure of differences in profitability to pass
conventional tests of significance, acted as a useful alert that the
means were unduly influenced by extreme observations.
The results are therefore all reported in the past tense, as a
description of a specific universe. In the absence of contrary evi¬
dence it is perhaps not unreasonable to presume that this description
may also apply to subsequent mergers among similar companies. Cer¬
tainly the fact that Singh (1971) reported similar results for the
fifties for British quoted companies will encourage this presumption.
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d. The takeovers selected for study
All the takeovers studied satisfy the following conditiono:
1. The acquirer and victim both belong to the population whose
accounts are included in the Edinburgh Data Bank (see appendix F. for
14details of the population).
2. The takeover took place between 1964 and 1972 (fuller details of
takeovers were provided by the Department of Trade and Industry from
1964).
3. Both acquirer and victim had at least three years' data available
prior to the merger year (so that the reference level of profitability
could be computed).
4. Neither victim nor acquirer took over any other quoted company in
either the pre-merger reference period or (in the acquirer's case)
in the post-merger study period (changes in performance can then more
readily be attributed to the single merger event). VThere the acqui¬
rer took over another quoted victim after the first merger, the study
period for that acquirer is terminated in the year before the second
merger; otherwise the acquirer's record is traced for every year
until its death or the end of its record in the data bank.^""*
233 acquisitions qualified for study on these criteria. They repre-
14. Typically only one victim was taken over; but when two or more
victims from the same industry were taken over in the sane year,
their records were amalgamated, and they were treated as a single
victim: there were five such cases.
15. Chapter 9 abandons this (statistically convenient) restriction,
and examines the record of all continuing acquiring companies.
7.12.
sent roughly one-third of the cases of takeover by one quoted company
3 6of other quoted companies during this period." The length of the
acquirer's record after merger clearly varies from case to case;












Number of acquirers' records























The number of acquirers surviving to successive post-merger years
falls quite steeply. This is chiefly because no data are available
in the Data Bank for any year after 1972 (and the data for 1972 are
incomplete: see appendix F.), so that fewer than eight years post-
merger data are available for any merger which took place after 1954
(and, of course, the later the merger, the fewer post-merger years
are available). 68% of the records are terminated for this reason;
15% because the acquirer took over another company in a subsequent
year; and 13% because the acquirer was itself taken over; 3% were
excluded from the population on the D.I.'s redefinition of membership
criteria in 1969 (see appendix F.); and the remaining 1% (Rolls
16. Between 1964 and 1971 there were 596 company-years in which
quoted companies acquired other quoted companies. 223 of the
takeovers studied fell within this period: the remaining 10
cases studied fell in 1972 when data for the full population are
incomplete.
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Royce and Lines Bros.) on the appointment of a receiver. Thus the
decline in the number of records available in successive years does
not reflect any disastrous death rate among acquirers - a result
which would itself be very relevant to the issues considered here.
e. Trie pre-merger characteristics of victims and acquirers^'
Table 7.A,a expresses the average size of victims and acquirers in
18
the pre-merger year as a percentage of the population average ' for
that year. In every year the victims studied were a good deal
smaller than the population average - typically less than half the
size of the average member of the population. Tire acquirers on the
19
other hand were bigger than average in every year. These results
are consistent with Singh's (1971) findings on the relative size of
merger participants in the fifties.
For each of the acquisitions studied, the net assets of the victim
in the year preceding takeover were expressed as a percentage of the
sum of the victim's and the acquirer's net assets in that year.
The average value of this percentage for all the takeovers studied
was 25%: in other words the merger typically represented growth of
17. This description applies not to the entire 233 cases selected
above, but to a subset of 213, to which most of the subsequent
analysis is confined: 20 cases with extreme observations were
excluded at an early stage of the analysis (see below, section f).
18. The averages were computed from Department of Industry (1971-5).
Since these population averages include the sample companies, the
differences between these companies' records and the rest's will
be greater still than the differences recorded here.
19. Hie percentages are lower for both groups after 1969 than before.
This is probably due not to a fall in the size of participants,
but to the sharp rise in the average size of the D.T.I, popula¬
tion after the I96S rebasing (see appendix F).
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around a third for the acquirer. This compares with a net asset
growth rate of around 12% p.a. in this period for a typical member
20of the quoted company population.
Table 7.A.b. expresses the participants' profitability prior to the
merger as a percentage of the profitability of their industry-year.
The pooled average for the victims for the three pre-merger years is
slightly greater than 100%: in other words the typical victim per¬
formed slightly better than the industry according to this criterion.
The level in the year immediately prior to merger is slightly below
average, on the other hand. However, the levels in all three years
are very close to 100%: in no year is a difference recorded which is
statistically significant at the 5% level. The typical victim may
be characterised as an average performer in terms of profitability.
This description could not be applied to the typical acquirer, which
outperformed its industry by a clear margin: its profitability was
in the region of a quarter higher than average. Moreover, the
dispersion of observations does not call into question this average
result: in each year the acquirer's average profitability was signi-
21
ficantly different from 100% at the 1% level.
20. The net assets of the 966 continuing members of the population in
the period 1964-71 grew by an average of 11.8% p.a.
21. These conclusions may not be taken as generalisations for the
whole populations of victims and acquirers if the criteria on
which this subset has been selected (see above) have produced




The average size of victins and acquirers as a percentage of the
average for the Department of Trade and Industry quoted company"
population.











Note: net assets is used as the size measure.
The pre-merger profitability of victims and acquirers as a
percentage of the profitability of the company's industry in





















a. significanctly different from 100% at the 1% level. The
standard deviation appears in brackets beneath the mean.
y <= year of merger
average profitability for the three years pooled:
Victim Acquirer
101.4 123.1
See appendix H for the weighted average of both participants'
profitability in the years before merger.
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f. Post-merger performance
Section I of Table 7.B. reports the typical change in the unadjusted
profitability of the whole sample of selected amalgamations after
merger. In the year of merger a slight improvement in profitability
is typically recorded, with less than 40% of the sample recording a
22
decline m the profitability measure used here. In all subsequent
years, however, an average decline is reported. The scale of the
decline is considerable, amounting in some years to more than half
the level of profitability achieved by the industry. However, the
dispersion of values for the change in profitability, reflected in
the standard deviation of E, is enormous; and consequently the change
23
is in no year significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
Given the large standard deviation of E, it seemed possible that
the estimate of E's average was heavily influenced by a small number
of extreme observations. If this were so, and if these extreme
24
values were due to special factors unconnected \;ith merger, then
the averages reported could be seriously misleading indicators of
the effect cf merger on profitability. Ideally, outliers would be
22. But see section g. on the measurement problems which affect
results for the year of merger.
23. Nevertheless, the nonparametric statistic P, the proportion of
amalgamations showing a decline in profitability, which is not
sensitive to outlying observations, confirms that a majority
did display a decline; and this majority is in some years
significantly different from 0.5 at the 5% level.
24. The potential significance cf such outliers is illustrated in
another context by Rowthorn (1975). A central objection in
his critique cf Kaldor's Law is Kaldor's inclusion of a single
atypical and outlying observation in his sample.
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excluded where prior knowledge was available thr.t their extreme
value reflected special circumstances. Such detailed knowledge of
the characteristics of members of this sample was not available,
however; and an expedient was adopted here of excluding cases where
any individual observation of E exceeded a predetermined, but arbi¬
trary limit. This was set at a change in profitability greater
than 200% of the level recorded by the industry; and it involved the
25exclusion of 20 of the original 233 cases.
As section II of Table 7.B. shows, the results with the outliers
removed are much weaker in terms of economic significance (the mean
decline is much smaller), but much stronger in terms of statistical
significance (the dispersion of observations is much smaller and
the null hypothesis of no change in profitability is rejected at the
1% level in five years, and at the 5% level in a further year).
25. In fact the plea of special case can be sustained with prior
evidence for a sizeable minority of the companies excluded: 5
belonged to the shipbuilding industry whose average profitability
was so low in some years of the period (see appendix H.) that
quite small absolute changes in R^. (see 7,ii) would result in
very big changes in ^, and hence in E^. The experience of
these companies would then be magnified to have a quite dispro¬
portionate effect on the mean of E.
The proportion of 'failures' among these extreme cases is similar
to that for the set of mergers with outliers omitted:
Year y y + i y + 2 y + 3
Percentage recording
decline in profitability AO 58 76 73
y + A y + 5 y + 5 y + 7
80 ICO 100 50
Thus these extreme cases do not display records qualitatively
different from those of the rest, but simply magnify the change




THE CHANGE IN UNADJUSTED PROFITABILITY AFTER MERGER; ALL SELEC-
TED COMPANIES: WITH AND WITHOUT OUTLIERS.
I II
All cases Outliers omitted
E S P n E S P n
z ez z z ez z
y 0.038 3.179 0.378C 233 0.114a 0.105 0.371° 213
y+i -0.168 2.158 0.582c 211 -0.053? 0.169 0.573C 192
y+2 -0.503 13.603 0.571 191 -0.035^ 0.138 0.546 174
y+3 -0.369 4.942 0.565 161 -0.069a 0.236 0.541 146
y+4 -0.197 7.995 0.681 113 -0.099a 0.237 0.670° 103
y+5 -0.567 10.590 0.653C 73 -0.109a 0.220 0.627° 67
y+6 -0.659 10.642 0.600 50 ~0.06 8 0.236 0.545 44
y+7 -0.082 0.359 0.609 23 -0.073 0.316 0.619 21
Notes:
industry and
E = unadjusted profitability of the amalgamation (standardised for(
year) - pre-merger profitability of the amalgamation (similarly
standardised) (see definitions 7.i above).
S = standard deviation of E across cases surviving to that year.
ez z
c proportion of cases for which £<"0.
n - number of cases qualifying for inclusion in that year,
y = year of merger.
a. significantly different from 0 at the 1% level (using a t test).
b. significantly different from 0 at the 5% level.
c. significantl;/ different from 0.5 at the 5% level.
The average values of R for the two sets of amalgamations for each
year are given in appendix E.
The results are not reported for the eighth year after merger, for
which only three observations were available.
7.19.
The proportions experiencing declines in profitability are little
affected by the exclusion of outliers (see footnote 23 above): in
all years but the actual year of merger, the majority experience a
decline, and this majority is statistically significant in 4 years.
In subsequent comparisons it is assumed that the exclusion of out¬
liers is justified, and attention is confined to the reduced set of
213 amalgamations.
Section II of Table 7.C. reports the results of the same tests when
profitability is adjusted for the accounting bias (see above, section
7.c.); section I is a duplicate of section II of Table 7.B., which
gives the corresponding results for unadjusted or "raw" profitability.
Appendix D fosters the expectation that adjusted post-merger profit¬
ability will be higher than the raw version, and hence that, on the
adjusted basis, improvements in profitability will be all the greater,
with apparent declines reversed or at least mitigated. In the
event, the improvement formerly recorded in the year of merger is
enhanced; and while the subsequent declines are in no year reversed,
they are in several years smaller." Consequently, the null hypo¬
thesis of no difference is no longer rejected in years y+1 and y+2
as it was when the unadjusted measure was used. By and large, then,
26. y+5 and y+6 actually show a slightly larger decline. This can
arise under the estimation procedure detailed in appendix D
when the acquiring company writes off goodwill already existing
in the victim's balance sheet. This reversal of the usual bias
is, however, likely to be of minor proportions and relatively
infrequent (see Lee (1974)).
7.20.
TABLE 7.C.
THE CHANGE IN PROFITABILITY; BEFORE AND AFTER ADJUSTMENT FOR THE
ACCOUNTING BIAS. "
I II
Raw profitability Adjusted profitability
E S P 11 H S P n
z ez z z h z
y 0.114° 0.105 0.371° 213 0.148a 0.106 0.338° 213
y+l -0.053° 0.169 0.578° 192 -0.015 0.172 0.536 192
y+2 -0.035 0.188 0.546 174 -0.010 0.192 0.517 174
y+3 -0.069a 0.236 0.541 146 -0.058° 0.237 0.527 146
y+4 -0.099° 0.237 0.670° 103 -0.098° 0.234 0.660° 103
y+5 -0.109a 0.220 0.627° 67 -0.110° 0.220 0.642° 67
y+6 -0.068 0.236 0.545 44 -C.067 0.235 0.523 44
y+7 -0.073 0.316 0.619 21 -0.073 0.316 0.619 21
The notes to Table 7.B. all apply here too; but in addition Hz
is the counterpart of E when adjusted profitability (F ) is used in
z z
place of raw profitability (&z)» The actual values of F^ are also
given in appendix E.
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the alternative results for the change in profitability modify, but
do not seriously alter, the picture yielded by Table 7.B.; and this
conclusion is confirmed by the proportions of companies suffering
declines after merger.
It was shown above how drastically the mean change in profitability
was altered when a few extreme observations were excluded from the
average; moreover, it was pointed out that the procedure for omitting
outliers was somewhat arbitrary. It remains possible that the aver¬
age changes recorded in Table 7.C. are unduly influenced by a small
number of observations at one or other extreme of the (albeit now
truncated) range. For instance, the average decline in profitability
recorded in all but the merger year might have resulted from a com¬
bination of unchanged profitability by the vast majority of the
observed amalgamations and drastic declines by a tiny minority. The
implications for, say, government policy might be different in such
circumstances from the implications if a moderate decline were typi¬
cally experienced by a majority of companies. The latter situation
might support a mild presumption against merger in general; whereas
the former might support a strong presumption against merger in the
particular circumstances of those experiencing a steep decline
(assuming that these special circumstances were identifiable), but
leave the verdict open in the general case.
There is then an argument for examining the distributions which
yielded the average changes reported in the tables. One feature of
these distributions has of course already been reported: the propor¬
tion of observed changes below zero. This statistic does not
7.22.
suggest that (for the restricted sample) the average change in
profitability was unduly influenced by outliers: a sizeable decline
in average profitability was generally accompanied by a sizeable
majority experiencing a decline (and vice versa). Figure 7,A.,
which gives a fuller picture of the distribution of H, reinforces
this impression. There appears to be no tendency for observations
to cluster at either the positive or the negative end of the range:
the impression gained is of a fairly symmetric distribution centred
at a value somewhat below zero in all but the year of merger (when it
is centred rather above zero).
8* C°nclusions
The description of the participants' pre-merger records showed that
the typical victim was unremarkable in terms of profitability: on
average its profitability was little different from that of its
industry. The typical acquirer on the other hand achieved profit¬
ability substantially higher than the industry norm in the three pre¬
merger years. The fact that the acquirer was relatively successful,
and that the weighted average of the acquirer's and victim's profit¬
ability (standardised for industry and year, as always) was typically
27
displaying a slight upward trend' gave grounds for optimism that the
post-merger performance of the amalgamation might typically excel
that achieved by its elements prior to the merger.
In the event, the year of merger witnessed a marked improvement in
profitability for the average amalgamation studied; and this improve¬
ment was all the greater when the accounting bias was removed which
, , r. ■ . ■ ..* ■ —i-i „ ..., .... , ■
27. See appendix H.






often afflicts the profitability measure after a merger. There are,
however, grounds for distrusting these results. It is argued in
appendix D (footnote 1) that, in the year of merger, the rate of
profit which is obtained on the usual definition (profit r average
net assets) can take on strange and unrepresentative values. This
is because the numerator of the profit rate for the amalgamation
typically contains a year's profit for the acquirer and a number of
months' profit for the victim - the number of months depending on
when, in the parent's financial year, the subsidiary was acquired.
The denominator, on the other hand, will be an average of the acqui¬
rer's opening net assets and the consolidated (acquirer plus victim)
closing net assets. Were the two companies not merged, however,
the weighted average profit rate for the two companies would have a
full year's profit for the victim in the numerator and the average
of the victim's closing and opening net assets in the denominator.
As is shown in appendix D, the profitability of the amalgamation may
roughly equal the average of the rates that would have been achieved
by the participants had they not merged if the acquisition takes
place half-way through the parent's financial year. If the majority
of acquisitions took place early in the parent's financial year,
however, the profitability of the amalgamation which is used in the
23
tables above would be unduly inflated. The clerical effort of
28. A further possibility is that acquiring companies indulge heavily
in "window dressing" in the year of merger to reassure sharehold¬
ers of the fruits of the merger. This would involve using any
discretion enjoyed by the management in assessing profit to over
rather than understate earnings (e.g. in the valuation of stocks
and in the selection of bad and doubtful debts).
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adjusting each amalgamation's record for this factor would be enor¬
mous , involving detailed study of each amalgamation's published
accounts: and it has not been attempted here. However, the possi¬
bility remains that it night cause the improvement in the year of
merger to be eliminated.
It is also possible that the adjustment might work the other way, of
course, and that the improvement for this year would be enhanced
thereby. However, the subsequent record of the amalgamations makes
this seen unlikely; for, in every subsequent year the typical amal¬
gamation experienced a decline in its standardised profitability.
It would seem odd if gains in productive efficiency or market power
which boosted profitability in the year of purchase were typically
not only eliminated but actually reversed at the end of the financial
29
year.
For in all the seven subsequent years that were observed, profitability
typically declined. This result held whether or not outlying obser¬
vations were included; and before and after adjustment of profit¬
ability for the known accounting bias. In many of these cases the
decline was statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels.
Admittedly, the typical decline was not enormous (for adjusted profit¬
ability it was only once over 10% of the industry level) and reserva¬
tions must remain over experience in the year of merger; but given
that profitability probably receives a fillip through merger from
29. It is possible, but again unlikely, that it was the companies
which did not survive to y+1 which were outstandingly successful
in y, and tipped the balance, to yield an average improvement for
all cases.
7.25.
enhanced market power, there is quite strong evidence here to support
a presumption that a limited loss of efficiency followed the typical
merger.
One quite strong objection to the universality of this conclusion
lies in the special nature of the mergers studied here, given the
criteria used in their selection (see section d. above). These cri¬
teria were adopted for statistical convenience, and, for instance,
exclude companies making very frequent takeovers: consequently it
could be argued that those studied here may exclude the firms which
were most successful at takeover. This objection is taken up below
(chapter 10), after an examination of further aspects of takeover in
the next two chapters.
h. Comparisons of the results with earlier work
Of three recent studies reviewed in appendix H which relate some
measure of profitability to takeover activity, none finds that merger
has a favourable effect on profitability. The tests were for two
countries, for different periods, and were carried out in very differ¬
ent ways; moreover, they all suffer from drawbacks, which in most
cases cast some doubt on the individual conclusions reached in the
studies; nevertheless, their unanimity lends some support to the
scepticism expressed here over the success of takeover in eliciting
efficiency gains.
A recent survey by Utton (1974) also cites studies of merger success
which have appeared in the American finance literature: the appendix
argues (against Utton) that these are not by themselves very helpful
7.26.
on the central issue being studied here - of whether merger results
in gains or losses in efficiency. The chief objection to relating
them to this issue is that they fail to distinguish between general
gains or losses in efficiency on the one hand, and, on the other,
gains or losses in share values due to share exchange terms upon mer¬
ger, They are more relevant to a discussion of distributional asp¬
ects of merger: in particular of which groups gain or lose (e.g.
acquirers' shareholders, victim's shareholders, and either management).
The appendix also cites diverse other (non-financial) evidence of the
effect of merger on efficiency, such as information from interviews:
it is mostly unfavourable.
8.1.
Chapter 8. The Consequences of Merger for Company Performance 2:
the impact of diversification; Penrose effects.
Chapter 7 described the typical pattern of profitability after merger
for all the companies studied. This chapter asks whether the pattern
varies between particular subsets of these companies. If so,detailed
government scrutiny could perhaps be directed at limited subsets of
mergers whose performance has typically been poor in the past. On
the basis of theoretical arguments two criteria are adopted here for
distinguishing between sets of mergers: whether the victim is from
the same, an allied, or an entirely different industry; and the
size of the victim in relation to that of the acquirer.
a* Di-versification and post-merger performance
(i) Introduction
The diversified merger prompts conflicting considerations for govern¬
ment policy. On the one hand it does not pose so serious a threat
for market structure, since the combine's share of any one market is
less likely to be enhanced than in the case of a merger of two former
competitors;^ indeed the victim may be better able to challenge
existing dominant firms in its own industry as a result of the take-
1, The impact of a merger upon market structure has been a dominating
concern of monopoly and merger policy. The criteria for referring
mergers to the Monopolies Commission under the 1965 Monopoly and
Mergers Act were that the merger would produce or enhance a mono¬
poly, or that the victim exceeded a certain size. The direct
impact of merger upon productive efficiency (less readily measur¬
able or verifiable of course) has generally been considered only as
a mitigating factor x/nen dealing xd.th actual references. Of course,
the presumption has until recently been that efficiency gains would
generally be available and realised (see section 7.b. above).
8.2.
over. On the other hand, where there are few overlapping activities
the scope for some forms of economies will be limited; and the scope
for an acquirer to apply superior expertise to raising the victim's
profitability will be limited where this expertise is specific to the
2
technology or markets of the acquirer's industry. And consequently,
in terms of the determinants of profitability discussed in the last
chapter, there will typically be fewer gains to be had by diversified
merger from increased market power, and fewer by increased efficiency.
The definition of a diversified merger is not free of problems. The
expedient adopted here has been to use the Department of Industry's
(D.I.) allocation of companies to Standard Industrial Classifications,
and to call diversified the acquisition of a victim in one classifica¬
tion by an acquirer in another. Of course, the D.I. can only allo¬
cate a company to a classification on the basis of the majority of
the firm's activities; and often one or both of the merger partici¬
pants will already be diversified, with both of them sometimes active
3
in the same industry. However, no better information was available
on which to classify the mergers; and so three groups were formed,
2. It might be questioned why companies should be induced to under¬
take such mergers if the potential gains are so doubtful.
Firstly, the special managerial skills of the acquirer may be in
non specific areas - such as finance or labour relations - and
could be readily applied to the victim's activities. Secondly,
diversification might be a means of stabilising the profitability
performance of the amalgamation through time, if the two indus-
tires' fortunes do not move in harmony over the trade cycle. A
third, more sceptical account might stress the incentives to mana'
gers to achieve growth, even at the expense of profitability (see
chapter 10 for a discussion of these incentives).
3. See the evidence for 1951 on diversification in National Institute
of Economic and Social Research (1956); and some suggestive evi¬
dence that diversification has since proceeded apace in appendix C.
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comprising mergers within the same 3 digit industry (102 of the 213
cases studied in chapter 7), those in the same 2 digit, but a differ¬
ent 3 digit industry (30), and those in other 2 digit industries (81).
The hypotheses developed above (section 7.c.) are again used; and
the results are presented in a very similar form to those given in
chapter 7. The change in profitability is reported using both the
unadjusted and the adjusted measures described above, on the grounds
that, while the adjusted measure is considered preferable, the adjust¬
ment procedure is unconventional, and parallel comparisons using the
more usual (unadjusted) measure would act as a control on the conclu¬
sions, suggesting any oddities in the adjustment procedure,
(ii) The pre-merger characteristics of victims and acquirers
Table 8.A. details certain characteristics of victims and acquirers
in each of the three groups as did Table 7.A. for all cases. Again
the participants' size is expressed as a percentage of the average
for the population in the same year. ' For each of the three groups,
as for the whole set of mergers, the acquirer is always bigger on
average than the victim; and again, the average victim is in almost
every year smaller than the population average, and the acquirer big¬
ger. A comparison of the results for the three groups also suggests
a weak tendency for the diversified acquirers to be biggest of the
4. The population (rather than industry) average provides a common
yardstick when victim and acquirer belong to different industries:
the size of the victim relative to that of the acquirer is not
then obscured by differences in the industry averages of size.
8-4*
three groups gtj average."* Moreover, as section b. of the Table
shows, the ratio of victim's to acquirer's size is scaliest for the
'other 2 digit' group and largest for the 'same 3 digit' group.^
The participants' profitability record is detailed in section c. of
the Table, and two conclusions reached for the whole set of mergers
apply to each of the three individual groups. Firstly, the acquirer
was typically more profitable than the victim prior to merger; and
secondly, the acquirer was on average more profitable than the average
for its industry-year. Again the victim was not greatly different
from average in its profitability performance^ (in none of the three
pre-merger years, and in none of the three groups was the recorded
difference from the industry reference level significant at the 1%
level); although the 'same 3 digit' group performed rather less well
and the 'other 3 digit' group better than average. Somewhat clearer
distinctions emerged between the acquirers' records for the three
groups: the 'other 2 digit' group clearly outpaced their industry,
with profitability around a third higher than the industry (and levels
5. Such a tendency would be the analogue of the tendency of larger
companies to undertake more direct investment overseas - i.e. to
diversify in terms of country - documented by kowthorn (1971) p.66.
6. See below, section 8.b.(ii) for discussion of this association.
7. Though the 'other 3 digit' victims' average profitability was some
16% above average. However, individual observations were widely
dispersed about the average, and the averages did not survive the




THE CHARACTERISTICS CF MERGERS RELATED TO THE DEGREE OF DIVERSIFICATION
a. The average size of victims and acquirers as a percentage of the
average for the Department of Trade and Industry quoted company
population.
Same 3 digit Other 3 digit Other 2 digit
Victim Acquirer Victim Acquirer Victim Acquirer
Year % % % % % %
1964 13 141 16 143 56 191
1965 33 386 7 82 59 407
1966 107 375 11 109 27 487
1967 44 214 30 275 8 107
1968 38 99 120 431 37 245
1969 31 76 61 237 51 332
1.970 27 256 15 710 33 127
1971 13 30 15 360 27 346
1972 21 37 9 78 42 746
Note: net assets is used as the size measure.
b. Victim's net assets as a percentage of joint net assets in the
year preceding takeover.
All cases 30 23 20
Number of 102 30 81
cases
c. The pre-merger profitability cf victims and acquirers as a percent¬
age of the profitability of the company's industry in aggregate for
that year.
y - 3 97.4 107.4 121.2 122.7 104.4 130.4a
(35.9) (48.1) (52.5) (47.1) (50.1) (44.0)
y - 2 98.3 115.9a 115.4 122.9 107.0 137.0a
(39.8) (51.0) (48.7) (49.2) (76.0) (37.0)
y - 1 89.6 120.6a 112.3 126.7a 99.9 131.la
(47.2) (34.2) (72.6) (28.0) (89.7) (75.2)
a. significantly different from 100% at the 1% level,
y. year of merger.
The standard deviation appears in brackets beneath the mean.
Average profitability for the three years pooled:
3 years 95.1 114.G 116.3 124.1 103.8 133.5
See appendix I for the weighted average of both participants'
profitability in the years before merger.
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significantly different from the 100% yardstick at the 1% level in
all three years); while the 'same 3 digit' acquirer typically per¬
formed least well prior to merger.
(iii) Post-merger performance
The change in profitabilit}' after merger for the three groups is
presented in Table 8.B. (unadjusted basis) and Table 8.C. (adjusted
basis). In fact no clear relationship emerges between post-merger
performance and the degree of diversification. The worst record is
that of the middling group, 'other 3 digit', which achieved both the
smallest improvement in the year of merger (see section 7.g. above on
the unreliability of results for this year) and reported the worst
decline in each subsequent year reported (significantly different
from zero at the 1% level in four of the five years reported for both
unadjusted and adjusted profitability).
The comparison of the polar groups, 'sane 3 digit' and 'other 2 digit'
does not reveal strong differences in post-merger performance. This
runs counter to the expectation (justified in section 8.a.(i) above)
that the non-diversified merger would typically offer the best hope
of improvements in profitability. Such weak differences as do emerge
suggest rather that the diversified group performs the better of the
two, recording improvements in adjusted profitability in two years
apart from the merger year, while in only one year is a decline signi¬
ficantly different from zero (and then only at the 5% and not at the
1% level); whereas in every year but y and y+7 the non-diversified
group records declines in profitability; and in three years the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































A central proposition in the work of Penrose and Marris has been that
beyond a certain point increases in a company's growth rate will exact
costs in terms of productive or administrative efficiency. These
costs are reckoned to stem chiefly from the difficulties of assimilat¬
ing additions to the management team. They are incurred in expansion
9
by new investment and by takeover alike, it is argued. This sec¬
tion examines the proposition with respect to growth by takeover,
comparing the post-merger performance of different quartiles of amal¬
gamations distinguished by the proportionate contribution of the vic¬
tim to the amalgamation's net assets. On the basis of the managerial
theorists' arguments one might expect a merger which represented very
great proportionate growth for the acquirer to prompt greater problems
and less favourable subsequent profitability performance than one
which represented only slight proportionate growth.
In addition there exists a mechanical relation between the victim/
amalgamation size ratio and the impact of merger on the amalgamation's
profitability, if it is assumed that any change in profitability is
either confined or positively related to the victim's assets. If it
is confined to the victim's assets, then say a one percentage point
decline in the return on the victim's assets will correspond to a j
point decline for the amalgamation if the victim is half the size of
8. See Penrose (1959), p.212, Marris (1964), p.114-8.
9. See Marris (1964), p.123.
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the acquirer, but to only a —■ point decline if the victim is a tenth
of the acquirer's size.
The pre-merger characteristics of victims and acquirers
Section a. of Table 8.D. reports the average size of the merger parti¬
cipants as a percentage of the population average for each of the
four groups. The chief dissimilarities between the four groups are
in the acquirer's size: typically, the smaller is X (the victim:
amalgamation size ratio) the bigger is the acquirer. The differences
in victim's size follow no such regular pattern, however: in only
two of the nine years does the ranking by victim's size follow that
by X, whereas in six of the nine years the ranking by X is the exact
reverse of that by the acquirer's size. Two other features of these
subsets emerge from sections a. and b. of the Table. Firstly, the
takeovers in quartile A are often 'reverse' takeovers: in many years
the typical acquirer is smaller than the typical victim, and on aver¬
age the victim subscribes more than half of the amalgamation's net
assets. Secondly, the acquirers in quartile D are typically enormous
(roughly 5 to 10 times the population average and 10 to 100 times the
victim average), while those in quartile A (and often those in
quartile B too) are relatively small (in all years below the popula¬
tion average).
Section c. of Table 8.D. reinforces a suggestion made in section
a.(ii) above. It shows the proportion of amalgamations in each
quartile by X which belonged to each of the diversification cate¬
gories used above. A majority of mergers in quartile A (high ratio
of victim size to acquirer size) took place within the same 3 digit
8.11.
TABLE 8.D.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MERGERS RELATED TO THE RELATIVE SIZE OF
VICTIM AND ACQUIRER
a. The average size of victims and acquirers as a percentage of the
average for the Department of Trade and Industry quoted company
population.
Quartile A Quartile B Quartile C Quartile D
Victim Acquirer Victim Acquirer Victim Acquirer Victim Acquirer
Year % % % % % % % %
1964 53 45 18 40 24 140 13 424
1965 23 23 58 173 47 319 36 662
1966 53 60 173 224 17 124 37 890
1967 33 33 19 61 68 292 14 539
1968 66 67 54 107 50 296 20 452
1969 80 48 32 77 45 214 63 1009
1970 41 28 30 61 19 172 12 805
1971 16 15 24 75 11 70 22 557
1972 41 17 7 22 15 124 33 589
Note: net assets is used as the size measure.
b. Victim's net assets as a percentage of joint net assets in the year
preceding takeover.
Quartile A B C D
All cases: mean 52 28 14 4
All cases: range 38-87 21-33 9-21 1-9
Number of cases 54 53 53 53
c. The relationship between diversification and the relative size c
victim and acquirer (percentage of column total)
-—-^CHiartile A B C D
Industry ~
Same 3 digit 64.5 54.7 39.6 32.1
Other 3 digit 11.1 18.9 15.1 11.3
Other 2 digit 24.1 26.4 45.3 56.6
8.12.
X = y (see section 7.c. above),
-1 + D iby-1 vy-1
Quartile A = top quartile by X
Quartile B = second quartile by X
Quartile C = third quartile by X
Quartile D = fourth quartile by X
8.13.
industry; while a majority of the takeovers which represented only
slight proportionate growth for the acquirer crossed the 2 digit
industry barrier.
On the profitability side reported in Table 8.E. the middle quartiles,
B and C, conform fairly closely to the pattern revealed for all cases
in chapter 7 above. The two extreme groups, A and D, display some
rather interesting differences from the average, however. On the
one hand, for quartile A, where the victim was very large in relation
to the acquirer, the participants have some of the features one would
expect of a 'rescue' or disciplinary takeover: the acquirer's profit¬
ability is very high (significantly greater than zero at the 1% level
in all three years, and more than 40% higher than the industry aver¬
age) and rising; whereas the victim's profitability is nearly 20%
below the industry average (again the difference survives the signi¬
ficance tests in all years), with some tendency to decline. On the
other hand, in the case of quartile D, where a typically very large
acquirer takes over a small victim, the pattern established by all
the amalgamations studied (see chapter 7) is reversed: the acquirer's
profitability is little different from the average for its industry-
year, while the victim can boast clear superiority over its industry-
year (a margin of some 30%, and one which is statistically significant
at the 1% level in 2 of the 3 years). In other words, according to
the criteria used here, a large mediocre company acquires a small
successful one, often from another industry.
(iii) Post-merger performance
If attention is confined to the middle quartiles, E and C, then the
records reported in Tables 8.F. (unadjusted) and 8.G. (adjusted)
TABLE 8.E. 8.14,
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MERGERS RELATED TO THE RELATIVE SIZE OF
VICTIM AIR) ACQUIRER (CONTINUED!
The pre-merger profitability of victims and acquirers as a percentage






























































a. significantly different from 100% at the 1% level,
y. year of merger.
The standard deviation appears in brackets beneath the mean.
Average profitability for the three years pooled:
3 83.9 143.3 100.3 118.9 91.6 122.5 130.1 107.7
years
See appendix I for the weighted average of both participants' profit¬
ability in the years before merger.
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conform with the expectation outlined in section 8.b.(i) above.
The quartile for which the takeover represented greater proportionate
growth displayed the worst post-merger performance. In five of the
post-merger years, quartile B experienced typical declines in adjusted
profitability (Table 8.G.) greater than 15%; and in four of these
years the declines were significantly different from 0 at the 1% level.
Quartile C's declines on the other hand exceeded 4% in only 1 year;
and only that year's decline was significantly different from 0 at the
5% level (not at the 1% level).^ Moreover, for quartile C the num¬
ber of companies reporting a decline in profitability represented a
majority in only two of the eight years considered, whereas for quar¬
tile B a majority experienced a decline in all but the merger year.
Section 8.b,(i) above argued that the amalgamations in quartile A
might be expected to suffer far sharper declines in profitability than
those at the opposite pole, in quartile D, for two reasons. Firstly,
the managerial theorists provide a convincing account of why moderate
growth rates should produce relatively high profitability while very
high rates of growth might beget difficulties for the maintenance of
a creditable profitability record. Secondly, if it is assumed that
any assimilation problems and consequent declines in profit will be
some positive function of the size of the victim, then a victim which
contributes a considerable proportion of the amalgamation's net assets
10. Improvements in profitability recorded for Y, the year of merger,
are positively related to X across all four quartiles. This is
consistent with the view that these apparent improvements result
from measurement error: the bigger the victim whose accounts
distort the picture, the bigger the distortion in year y (see
section 7.g. above).
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will be expected to have a greater effect on the amalgamation's
profitability than one which represents only a small fraction of the
amalgamation's size.^
The comparative experience of quartiles A and D runs counter to this
expectation, however. The takeovers in quartile A were character¬
ised above as the acquisition by highly profitable companies of rela¬
tively unprofitable victims of similar size to themselves (often even
bigger). Yet their performance after merger did not suggest that
they were suffering from massive assimilation problems. Only years
y+6 and y+7, to which very few amalgamations contributed, revealed a
decline in profitability greater than 8%; of the preceding years,
one shoxv's an actual improvement in profitability (apart from the mer¬
ger year, Y), and in only one does the decline pass the statistical
test of significance at the 5% level.
It was expected that the amalgamations in quartile D (described above
as typically resulting from the purchase of small successful companies
by large ones with mediocre profitability records) would be rela¬
tively unaffected by the takeover. But they experienced declines in
profitability possibly more severe than those in quartile A. Indeed,
in four post merger years, the decline exceeded 9%. Also, as the
distribution of H was generally a good deal narrower for quartile D
11. A study by Hitching (1967: see appendix H) found a high inci¬
dence of failure among takeovers where the victim was very small
in relation to the acquirer. However, even were, say, 10%
profitability converted into a 10% rate of loss for the victim's
assets after takeover, this would produce only a negligible eff¬
ect on the amalgamation's profitability if the victim represented
only 1% of the amalgamation.
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than for quartile A, three of the declines were significantly greater
than zero at the 1% level; and a further one passed this statistical
test at the 5% level. Finally, the proportion experiencing declines
in profitability was greater for quartile D than for quartile A in
four of the eight years studied.
c. Conclusions to both studies
The study of separate subsets of mergers in this chapter had two
objectives. The first was to see v?hether identifiable sub-groups of
mergers displayed very different post-merger performance from the
overall average reported in chapter 7. The second was to provide
evidence on the impact of diversification and of Penrose effects. On
the first issue, all seven of the sub-groups considered provided con¬
firmation of the average picture reported in chapter 7. In the
majority of post-merger years the typical amalgamation in any sub¬
group experienced a decline in profitability from the pre-merger level,
whether or not profitability was adjusted for the accounting bias.
Although the disaggregations performed here have not been exhaustive,
it does appear that the average decline in profitability reported in
chapter 7 was general over most types of takeover, and not the result
of steep declines in an identifiable subset coupled with unchanged
performance elsewhere.
No strong support was obtained for the very simple versions of the
two hypotheses being considered, that more diversified mergers would
be less successful in profitability terms, and that greater proportion¬
ate growth by merger would result in greater declines in profitability.
The worst performance records wrere displayed by the middling groups,
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TABLE 8.F.
THE CHANGE IN PROFITABILITY AFTER MERGER: QUARTILES BY SIZE OF
VICTIM IN RELATION TO ACQUIRER: UNADJUSTED PROFITABILITY
Year Quartile A Ouartile B
E S P n E S P n
z ez z z ez z
y 0.283a 0.148 0.204C 54 0.098a 0.122 0.340C 53
y+i -0.1143 0.119 0.681C 47 -0.039 0.342 0.563 48
v+2 -0.028 0.185 0.610 41 -0.024 0.352 0.535 43
y+3 -0.091 0.345 C.618 34 ~C.152a 0.312 0.563 32
y+4 -0.077 0.411 0.609 23 ~0.132a 0.211 0.762c 21
y+5 -0.056 0.352 0.533 13 ~0.218a 0.217 0.615 13
y+6 -0.121a 0.077 0.625 8 ~0.2.58a 0.125 0.714 7
y+7 -0.245° 0.168 0.800 5 -0.212 0.432 0.667 3
Year Quartile C Quartile D
E S P n E S P n
z ez z z ez z
y
a
0.059 0.063 0.396 53 0.013 0.050 0.547 53
y+1 -0.031 0.137 0.500 50 -0.032a 0.082 0.574 47
y+2 0.020 0.121 0.438 48 -0.114a 0.106 0.619 42
y+3 -0.013 0.230 0.477 44 -0.042a
-0.125a
0.081 0.528 36
y+4 -0.022 0.290 0.630 27 0.097 0.688c 32
y+5 -0.016 0.178 0.529 17 -0.146a 0.194 0.750C 24
y+6 0.181 0.208 0.273 11 -0.124 0.338 0.611 18
y+7 0.037 0.364 0.333 6 0.016 0.438 0.714 7
Notes:
Full definitions are given in Table 7.B, E is the average change in
profitability, and its standard deviation; P is the proportion of
companies for whom E < 0; n is the number of cases contributing to
the average; y is the year of merger.
a. significantly different from 0 at the 1% level.
b. significantly different from 0 at the 5% level.
c. significantly different from 0.5 at the 5% level.
The average values of for the various sets of amalgamations for
each year are reported in appendix I.
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TABLE 8.G.
THE CHANGE IN PROFITABILITY AFTER MERGER: QUARTILES BY SIZE OF
VICTEl IN RELATION TO ACQUIRER: /ADJUSTED PROFITABILITY
Year Quartile A Quartile B
H s, P n H S, P nz hz z z hz z
y 0.339f; 0.143 0.167C 54 0.140a 0.122 0.302 53
y+1 -0.046 0.139 0.574 47 0 0.331 0.542 48
y+2 0.016 0.222 0.561 41 -0.005 0.323 0.512 43
y+3 -0.062 0.357 0.588 34 -0.153®
-0.183a
0.306 0.594 32
y+4 -0.078 0.411 0.609 23 0.206 0.762° 2.1
y+5 -0.057 0.353 0.538 13 ~0.214a C.213 0.615 13
y-s-6 -0.123® 0.078 0.625 8 -0.253a 0.117 0.714 7
y+7 -0.246 0.168 0.800 5 -0.212 0.432 0.667 3
Year Quartile C Quartile D
H
z Shz Pz n Hz hz Pz n
y 0.08ia 0.061 0.358 53 0.0283
r*
0.048 0.528 53
y+l -0.003 0.142 0.480 50 -0.011 0.084 0.553 47
y+2 0.038 0.124 0.396 48 -0.095? 0.110 0.619 42
y+3 -0.007 0.229 0.455 44 -0.032 0.080 0.500 36
y+4 -0.029 0.286 0.630 27 -0.116a 0.097 0.656 32
y+5 -0.025 0.179 0.588 17 -0.1413 0.197 0.750° 24
y+6 0.179 0.211 0.273 11 -0.120 0.340 0.556 18
y+7 0.037 0.364 0.333 6 0.015 0.440 0.714 7
The notes to Table 7.B. all apply here too; but in addition is the
counterpart of E when adjusted profitability (F ) is used in placez z
of raw profitability (R ). The actual values of F are also given in
appendix I.
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those in allied but not widely diversified industries (ether 3 digit),
and those in the second quartile by X.
Perhaps the most interesting and promising conclusions emerge from
incidental comparisons that were made - especially those between the
pre-merger profitability of participants in a particular group, and the
amalgamation's subsequent success. These comparisons are especially
striking for the two sets of extreme groups (same 3 digitrother 2
digit; top quartile by X:bottom quartile by X). In each comparison,
the group whose acquirers had the highest average profitability prior
to merger achieved much less bad performance afterwards than had been
expected of them (the diversified in the first study, and quartile A
in the second). By contrast, the groups which, on apriori grounds,
should have been best able to raise, or avert declines in, profit¬
ability (same industry; those involving small proportionate growth)
displayed a poor record: and in both cases the acquirer's pre¬
merger record was the worst of the subsets being considered.
These features of the participants lend some support to a generalisa¬
tion that an acquirer with a relatively successful pre-merger record
will typically be more successful at subsequently improving or main¬
taining profitability after merger. Were this generalisation to be
corroborated by subsequent work, then an implication for merger policy
could be to add criteria of previous performance to those (market
share and victim size) which have previously dominated decisions to
12
refer prospective mergers to the Monopolies Commission. A policy
12. Confirmation of such a tendency would also weaken the support
for one account of the decline in profitability after merger.
This invokes the facts that acquiring firms tend to enjoy above
average/
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ill-disposed towards the acquisition of the strong by the weak nighc
both inhibit the type of merger which more often results in efficiency
losses and provide an incentive to increase efficiency for those com¬
panies intending to expand through merger.
12, Contd.
average profitability, and that above average profitability tends
anyway to regress towards the mean (see VJhittington (1971), chap¬
ter A on this latter observation). Only if the post-merger
decline exceeded the typical regression towards the mean associ¬
ated with economic factors unrelated to the merger, would any
decline be attributed to the merger. On this account it night
be expected that acquirers with profitability considerably above
average would typically record steeper declines than those with
profitability around the average: but this chapter suggests
the reverse.
9.1.
Chapter 9. Further Aspects of Growth by Merger
a. Introduction
This chapter broadens the discussion of growth by takeover in three
ways. Firstly, it examines the record of all acquiring companies
in the Department of Industry population, comparing it with that of
all non-acquiring companies. Secondly, it reports other features
of the acquirers than their profitability: the sources and uses of
funds, income allocation, and capital structure of companies are rela¬
ted to their rate of growth by acquisition; and, in particular, the
means of financing takeover are considered, to complement part I of
the thesis 011 the financing of new investment in fixed assets.
Thirdly, the characteristics of acquiring companies are compared
directly with those of companies which relied heavily on the major
alternative means of expansion: new investment in fixed assets.
As chapter 7 argued, the comparison of pre- and post-merger profit¬
ability was restricted to a possibly unrepresentative subset of the
population of acquirers: they had to have taken over 110 other quoted
companies in the 3 year pre-merger reference period, and their sub¬
sequent record was terminated if they took over another quoted company
in the post-merger study period. By including all continuing com¬
panies this chapter incorporates an important group which was left
out of the earlier analysis, companies which made frequent takeovers.
At the same time, the analysis in this chapter is less satisfactory
than the earlier study in some ways. Firstly, it does not distin¬
guish pre- and post-merger profitability: the average profitability
over a period is related to the average rate of growth by acquisi¬
tion in the same period. Secondly, the population studied is in one
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sense more restrictive than that for chapter 7: it only contains
acquiring companies which survived a 16 or 7 year period, V7hereas
survival for four years was the minimum requirement of the earlier
chapter. Thirdly, in contrast with chapter 7, no satisfactory
quantitative estimate is provided of the impact of growth by acquisi¬
tion upon profitability (see footnote 4 below for a discussion of this
relationship): this section of the work attempts only much narrower
conclusions based on correlation analysis and the comparison of aver¬
ages for broad sub-groups of the population. Chapter 10 brings
together the results of this and the earlier work to provide a fuller
view of takeover activity.
b. High, low and aero growth by acquisition
All the companies which continued as members of the D.I. population
of quoted companies throughout either 1943-64 or 1964-71 are consid¬
ered in this chapter. This section divides the population into
three groups: those with zero growth by acquisition join one group
('zero') while the rest are divided into two groups, the one contain¬
ing the top half when they are ranked by rate of growth by acquisition
('high'), and the other containing the bottom half ('low').
Table 9.A. summarises for each of the two periods the characteristics
of these three groups (a much fuller description is provided in
appendix J). A comparison of rates of profit, the key performance
variable examined in chapters 7 and 8, shows that the zero growth
group enjoyed the highest rate.''" However, the high group's perform-
1. Unlike the measure used in chapters 7 and 8, profitability is not
standardised for industry here (see the definition in appendix F).
The industry influence is, however, taken into account when the




ANALYSIS BY RATE OF GROWTH BY TAKEOVER
1948-64 1964-71
Zero Low High Zero Low High
Rate of growth by takeover^ 0 0.1 4.9 0 0.3 11.7
2
Pre-tax rate of profit 18.6 17.6 18.0 19.2 16.1 18.1
















Rate of growth of net assets^ 6.4 6.9 12.0 6.3 7.5 18.9
Rate of growth by external
f inance:





















Rate of growth by retention^ 5.3 5.2 5.9 5.3 4.6 5.8
Opening size (£ million) 0.754 2.935 2.859 5.181. 15.201 12.737
Goodwill as a percentage of
closing net assets 1.0 1.7 5.1 1.2 2.5 7.8
Number of companies 202 524 524 188 388 390
Notes:
All figures are simple averages across all companies within a group.
1. percent of opening net assets,
2, percent of average net assets.
For fuller results see appendix J, Tables J.C. to J.G.
For fuller definitions, see appendix F.
On the uses of funds side, the rate of growth of net assets (18.9%
for high in period 2) comprises the rate of growth by takeover (11.7)
plus the rate of growth by net new investment (5.5) plus the rate of
growth by accumulating net current assets (0, but not shown here),
plus the rate of growth by the acquisition of minority interests and
long term liabilities when new subsidiaries are consolidated (1.7,
but not shown here). On the sources side it comprises the rate of
growth by retentions (5.8) plus the rate of growth by external fin¬
ance (11.4) plus minority interests, etc. again (1.7).
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ance according to this criterion was only slightly less good, and
exceeded the average for all continuing companies in both periods
(the overall average was 17.9% in 1948-64, and 17.5% in 1964-71);
the low group is ranked lowest for profitability. Moreover, in the
case of the groups growing by takeover, this conventional measure of
profitability suffers from the accounting bias discussed in appendix
D, and taken into account in chapters 7 and 8. The profitability
denominator, net assets, is inflated by the goodwill arising on the
. .. 2
consolidation of new subsidiaries. The groups which grew by acqui¬
sition therefore had their profitability depressed by the accounting
bias; and were it possible to satisfactorily adjust for this bias,
the high group might well appear the most profitable.
The high group display marked differences from the other two groups
in their pattern of financing growth. They relied much more heavily
on new issue finance: for the sero and lov; groups, growth by exter¬
nal finance did not typically exceed 2.0% p.a. in either period (see
Table 9.A.), whereas for the high group it was 5.1% p.a. in the
3
first period, and 11.4% in the second. Moreover, in the second
period it was practically double the rate of growth that they attained
2. As would be expected, the share of goodwill in closing net assets
is positively related to the rate of growth by acquisition: see
Table 9*A.
3. The change in the valuation of share issues in exchange for sub¬
sidiaries which was introduced in 1964 places a higher valuation
on issues after 1964 than on those before (see appendix D).
The minority interests and long term liabilities acquired with
new subsidiaries are not included in this measure of growth by
external finance: their inclusion would increase the relative
importance of external finance for acquiring companies.
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through retentions; a major proportion cf this external finance was
raised by share for share exchange during takeover. Retention fin¬
ance, whose importance was emphasised so much in Part 1 of the thesis,
was a much less decisive contributor to the differences in growth
rate between the three groups: the difference between rates of
growth by retention between the high and zero groups was of the order
of only half of one per cent per annum.
Two of these results are somewhat surprising in view of the findings
of earlier observers: that the high group achieved much more rapid
growth than the others even though its rate of growth by retention
was roughly similar to that of the others; and that its rate of
growth by new issue finance was much the highest even though its
rate of profit was not decisively superior. There are strong
reasons for believing that a higher rate of growth is likely to be
associated with a high rate of profit (see the discussion in chapter
3 above): other things equal, more retentions would be available,
to the more profitable firm for reinvestment, and the capital market
would look more favourably on the relatively profitable firm in its
• • t 4 _ « • «
allocation of new issue finance. Empirical studies have confirmed
4. The managerial theorists hpcthesise a two way relationship between
profitability and growth. Growth is presumed to depend on profit¬
ability for the supply of finance; and profitability is reckoned
to be related to growth by a nonlinear relationship - positive in
the lower range of growth, and negative in the upper range. A
problem obviously arises in identifying one or other relationship
from a scatter of observations on the two variables. Earlier
empirical work has tended to attribute the observed association
to the financing relationship (profit to growth) (see VJhittington
(1971), p.74). This chapter does not pursue the complicated
statistical procedures which would be necessary to estimate the
effect of profitability on growth and vice versa: the weak cor¬
relation found between profitability and growth by merger,
together/
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this expectation when they have reported relatively strong relation¬
ships in cross-section between the rate of profit and the rate of
growth of net assets (Singh and Ivhittington (1963), chapter 7;
Whittington (1971) chapter 5).
The results reported in figure 9.A. are both consistent with this
earlier evidence and yet reinforce the suggestion made above that the
relationship between profitability and growth by acquisition operates
only weakly. This diagram summarises the results of correlating,
industry by industry, profitability with firstly, the rate of growth
of net assets, secondly the rata of growth by net new investment in
fixed assets, and finally the rate of growth by acquisition (the
latter two are of course components of the first, net asset growth)."*
A. Contd.
together with the description of intensive acquirers given in sec¬
tion 9.c. are sufficient to answer the limited questions posed
here. On the one hand they confirm that, when achieved chiefly
by takeover, growth rates much above average could be (and often
were) sustained without above average profitability; and on the
other hand they confirm that very rapid growth by acquisition did
not necessarily (and typically did not) result in profitability
well below average. This latter topic is also considered in
chapter 3, where the observation of changes in profitability over
time avoids many problems in determining the direction of causa¬
tion.
5. The use of a measure of investment net of depreciation may seem
odd in view of the argument of chapter 2 above that net and
replacement investment cannot be distinguished. It is adopted
here because the net asset growth measure incorporates investment
after depreciation; earlier work has used this net asset growth
measure when relating growth and profitability; and the aim here
is to contrast the results for growth by acquisition with those
for total net asset growth in earlier work and for other compon¬
ents of net asset growth.
FIGURE 9.A. Frequency Distributions of Industry Correlations
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In some respects this exercise is preferable to that reported in
Table 9.A. For, on the one hand, stratification by industry removes
the possibility that the conclusions drawn from Table 9.A. stem from
the influence of a third factor industry, to which both growth and
profitability are systematically related; and, on the other hand,
the accounting bias which caused the conclusions of Table 9.A. for
profitability to be qualified will affect alike the denominator (net
assets) of both the ratios which are being correlated, and it is
not clear that the correlation between the two biassed ratios will
be any less strong than would have been the case had the ratios been
unbiassed.^
The first section of the diagram confirms the results of earlier
studies (see e.g. Whittington (1971), Table 5.3.): the distribution
of correlation coefficients (one for each industry) clusters around
0.5. As the second section of the diagram shows, the distribution
of correlation coefficients is similar when the correlation is per¬
formed instead for growth by new investment in fixed assets: the
values cluster around a slightly lower value, but none falls below
0.1.7 'When the exercise is repeated for growth by acquisition, how-
6. Consider for the sake of argument the extreme case of a perfect
correlation with a one for one relationship between the variables:
multiplying any of the paired observations by any factor will
leave the correlation coefficient undiminshed.
7. Probably the closest relation would emerge between profitability
and the residual component of net asset growth not considered
here, the growth of net current assets. This is because retained
profits for which no immediate use is planned are converted into
bank deposits, etc. without any managerial initiative: retained
profit is automatically translated into growth of this form when
the net asset measure of growth is used. (This assumes of course
that retained profits are exogenous).
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ever, a different picture emerges (third section of Figure 9.A.):
the correlation coefficients cluster around a value much closer to
zero. In a minority of cases, a negative correlation actually
appears; and for only 2 out of 18 industries does the coefficient
exceed 0.3 (it exceeded 0.3 for 15 industries in the case of total
net asset growth).
The evidence of Table 9.A. and Figure 9.A. together suggests that one
of the control mechanisms which might be expected to operate in the
growth process functions relativily weakly in the case of growth by
takeover. For the dependence of growth upon profitability postu¬
lated by the managerial theorists (enforced by the automatic supply
g
of retentions to the more profitable, and by the presumed supply of
external finance to them) would at least ensure, other things equal,
that companies had to achieve above average profitability if they
were to gain control over an increasing share cf the economy. The
relatively strong correlations reported in Figure 9.A. between
profitability and growth by new investment suggest that this control
may operate for that 'internal' form of growth. Table 9.B. rein¬
forces this impression. It reports certain performance and finan¬
cing ratios for three subsets of the continuing population distin¬
guished this tine by their rate of growth by gross investment in new
fixed assets: having been ranked by this variable, the population
is divided into thirds, with 'high' containing the fastest growing
companies by this means, etc. The high group is in both periods a
good deal more profitable than either of the other groups (with the
8. See chapter 3 above
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TABLE 9.B.
ANALYSIS BY RATE 0? GROWTH BY GROSS NEW INVESTMENT
1948-64 1964-71
Low Middle High Low Middle High

















Pre-tax rate of profit 15.8 13.1 19.9 14.3 17.7 20.1
Rate of growth by takeover'*" 1.1 1.6 3.5 3.0 3.6 8.0
Rate of growth of net assets
1
5.5 8.0 13.3 7.4 9.6 18.5
Rate of growth by external
finance: i





















Rate of growth by retention*" 3.9 5.5 7.2 3.3 4.6 7.8
Opening size (£ million) 2.142 2.902 2.607 12.733 1.3.645 10.335
Number of companies 415 417 418 322 322 322
Notes:
All figures are simple averages across all companies within a group.
1. percent of opening net assets.
2. percent of average net assets.
For fuller results, see appendix J, Tables J.H. to J.L.
For fuller definitions, see appendix F.
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low group performing worst on this criterion). The rate of growth
by retention is positively and strongly related to the rate of growth
by new investment; and the rate of growth by external finance very
clearly follows the ranking by profitability, retentions and gross
investment. Such clear patterns of precedence for the more profit¬
able do not emerge for growth by takeover, however, either in Table
Q
9.A. or in Figure 9.A,
The high external growth group's similar rate of growth by retention
and considerably more rapid growth by external finance secure for it
an overall rate of growth of net assets much higher than that of the
other groups (Table 9.A, again). Its rate of growth by takeover
alone actually surpassed the other groups' rate of growth of total
net assets in the second period. Moreover, in both periods the
high group also achieved the highest rate of growth by new investment.
However, the differentials between means for this variable (in the
case of net investment not more than 2.0% p.a. greater than either of
the other groups) were slight in comparison with those for growth
by acquisition. As Table 9.C. shows, a considerable proportion of
companies in the high external growth group belonged to the bottom
third of the population by growth by new investment. Thus, while
there is certainly no strong evidence that rapid growth by external
and internal means were mutually exclusive, there is not strong supp¬
ort either for the view that they are mutually reinforcing,^
9. See the further discussion of the finance control on expansion
in chapter 10 below.
10. These conclusions relate to cross-section observations of six¬




THE PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS OF TEE HIGH GROUP ACCORDING TO GROWTH
BY ACQUISITION IN EACH OF THE THIRDS RANKED ACCORDING TO GROWTH
BY GROSS INVESTMENT IN NEW FIRED ASSETS.





Finally, Table 9.A. provides interesting information on the opening
size cf the three groups.^ In fact, size emerges as an important
distinguishing feature: in both periods, those with zero external
growth have much smaller opening size than both the groups which grew
by acquisition. This is consistent with the result in chapter 7 that
the acquirer was typically of above average size, and with the con-
conclusion of appendix C that giant companies enjoyed higher rates of
growth by takeover than did the rest.
In this section attention has been focussed oir the high external
growth group, because only for its members was takeover a major means
of expansion. The low group's typical member achieved only trivial
growth by acquisition: the group averages for this variable ware
only 0.1% p.a. and 0.3% p.a. for 1948-54 and 1964-71 respectively,
and the maximum values achieved by any member of the group were 0.9%
12
and 2.2% respectively. Again, the overall growth performance of
10. Contd.
new investment and growth by acquisition may be alternatives to
the individual firm in individual years - a possibility discussed
in George (1972). If, as Penrose (1959) argues, there are limits
on the sustainable growth of the firm, then growth by acquisition
nay sometimes come only at the expense of new investment. More¬
over, when the prospects are bleak for new investment, the growth-
e<^
manager may give up any attempt at internal expansion, pre¬
ferring the more secure alternative of growth by takeover. Such
a situation would be the analogue of that described by Rowthorn
(1971) for the multinational firm: when the home economy is
sluggish and further acquisition of domestic companies is inhibi¬
ted, the company may turn to investment overseas to satisfy its
growth aspiriations.
11. See appendix C on the choice of opening size for analysis,
purposes.
12. Given the D.I.'s method of deriving this figure, these trivial
levels of growth by acquisition might represent not just the
infrequent/
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the low group was barely distinguishable from that of the zero group -
its rate of growth of total net assets being only 0.5% p.a. higher in
the first period, and 1.2% p.a. higher in the second. The next sec¬
tion continues with this emphasis on the high group, this time focuss¬
ing on those in the high group with the most rapid growth by acquisi¬
tion.
c. Intensive growth by acquisition
This section takes up again the topic considered in section 8.b.:
the performance of companies with very high rates of growth by take¬
over, which might be expected, on the basis of the managerial
theories, to suffer severe problems in assimilating their acquisitions.
The same populations which have been divided into three subsets
earlier in the chapter are this time divided into two groups by a
ranking procedure: the top hundred by rate of growth by acquisition,
and the rest. In addition, a similar division is made when the
population is ranked according to rate of growth by gross new invest¬
ment in fixed assets, so that the features of intensive external
growth may be compared both with those of less rapid external growth
and with those of rapid internal growth.
Section 9.b. above showed that if comparisons were confined to broad
subgroups of the population, or if correlations were performed across
12. Contd.
infrequent acquisition of relatively small subsidiaries, but also
piecemeal purchases of shares which :lo not necessarily yield full
control over ether companies; or perhaps the net outcome of
purchases and sales of subsidiaries.
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the whole population, only a weak positive relationship emerged
between profitability and growth by acquisition. In the light of
the managerial theories, which argue that beyond a certain growth
rate higher rates of growth will result in lower profitability, it
seemed possible that the weak positive linear relation found between
growth and profitability might have resulted from a scatter of obser¬
vations actually conforming more closely to a nonlinear relationship,
with higher profitability being associated with higher growth over
the lower range of growth rates, but negatively over the higher range.
This possibility was examined to some degree for single takeovers in
13 ...
section 8.b. above; ~ the results in Table S.D. allow this discussion
to be extended to high sustained rates of growth by acquisition.
Again the results do not suggest that extremely rapid growth by
acquisition entailed drastic assimilation problems which caused poor
profitability performance: the top 100 by growth by acquisition
enjoyed average profit rates above those of the rest (substantially
higher in period 2).^ Moreover, their profit rates were not (parti¬
cularly in period 2) greatly different from those of the top 100 by
growth by new investment (see Table 9.E.). Furthermore, the account¬
ing bias discussed above and in appendix D, which deflates the repor¬
ted profitability of active acquirers, makes the comparison of unadj-
13. No strong support was found for the view that extremely high
growth by merger was associated with unduly great subsequent
declines in profitability.
14. Of course, no distinction is made here between pre- and post-
merger profitability (see the caveat in section 9.a. above and
the reconciliation with the results of chapter 7 which is provi
ded in chapter 10 below).
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usted profit rates relatively unfavourable to the intensive acquir¬
ers.^ These results suggest therefore that some companies are
able to sustain very high rates of growth by acquisition while main¬
taining above average profitability.
Their higher profit rate did also secure for the intensive acquirers
a higher average rate of growth by retentions: almost one and a
half times that of the rest in period 2 (see Table S.D.). Neverthe¬
less, in the light of section S.b.'s findings for the three way
division for growth by acquisition, it is not surprising to find that
external finance (mostly raised in the course of takeover) fed most
of the differential in growth rates: the intensive acquirers enjoyed
rates of growth by external finance six or seven times those of the
rest. The scale of their reliance on external finance was far
greater than for the top 100 by new investment. The latter enjoyed
considerably greater superiority over the rest in terms of growth by
retention: more than double the rest's in period 2 and appreciably
higher than that of the top 100 by growth by acquisition (10.6%:
15. Goodwill represented a much larger proportion of closing net
assets for the intensive acquirers than for the rest (see Table
9.D.; see also footnote 2 above).
16. The fact that the intensive acquirers had profitability above
the average for all high external growth companies means, of
course, that the other (non top 100) high acquirers appear in a
rather less favourable light, with a rate of 17.9% in 1948-64,
and 17.0% in 1964-71. These values are much closer to those
of the low external growth group (Table 9.A.: 17.6% and 16.1%
respectively) than are the overall averages for the high group.
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TABLE 9.D.
ANALYSIS BY RATE OF GRGVm-1 BY TAKEOVER
1948-64 1964-71
R.est Top 100 Rest Top 100
Rate of growth by takeover* 1.0 14.3 2.1 28.6
• 2
Pre-tax rate of profit 17.9 18.4 17.1 21.2











Rate of growth of net assets* 7.9 21.0 8.9 37.2
Rate of growth by external fin¬
ance















Rate of growth by retention* 5.4 7.0 5.0 7.7
Opening size (£ million) 2.683 1.029 12.869 6.944
Goodwill as a percentage of
closing net assets 2.3 11.0 3.4 13.4
Number of companies 1150 100 866 100
Notes:
All figures are simple averages across all companies within a group.
1. percent of opening net assets.
2. percent of average net assets.
For fuller results see appendix J, Tables J .M. to J. Q.
For fuller definitions see appendix F.
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TABLE 9.E.
ANALYSIS BY RATE OF GROWTH BY GROSS NEW INVESTMENT
1948-64 1964 -71
Rest Top 100 Rest Top 100












Pre-tax rate of profit 17.7 20.0 17.0 22.1
Rate of growth by takeover'*' 1.8 5.6 3.9 13.5
Rate of growth of net assets'*" 8.1 18.6 10.1 27.3
Rate of growth by external fin¬
ance : 1















Rate of growth by retention 5.3 8.7 4.6 10.6
Opening size (£ million) 2.562 2.420 12.974 6.042
Number of companies 1149 101 866 100
Notes:
All figures are simple averages across all companies within a group.
1. percent of opening net assets.
2. percent of average net assets.
For fuller results, see appendix J, Tables J.R. to J .V.
For fuller definitions see appendix F.
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7.7% ~ see Tables 9.1?. and 9.E.). In period 2 the top 100 by new
investment matched each percent of growth by retention with roughly
1.5% by external finance; whereas the top 100 by growth through
acquisition matched 1% of growth by retention with almost 4% by exter¬
nal finance.^
Someone sceptical of the intensive acquirer's success might yet argue
that, though its profitability performance was creditable, neverthe¬
less, since assimilation problems limit the feasible rate of growth,
these active acquirers could not have had the managerial resources
available to administer very fast growth by new investment too.
Again, however, the record of the 100 intensive acquirers is in this
respect more impressive than that of the rest: their rate of growth
by net nev investment was roughly double that of the rest. More¬
over, it is higher than that of the typical member of the total high
group considered in section 9.b., and from which these 100 companies
are drawn.
With their superiority in terms of retentions and external funds on
the finance side and of acquisitions and new investment on the expen¬
diture side, the intensive acquirers achieved a dramatic total rate
of expansion (in period 2 especially). Their average rate of growth
17. Period 1 reveals smaller differentials. The lower average
growth rates and more conservative valuation of issues in exchange
for subsidiaries in that period (see appendix D) make for more
muted comparisons: but the ranking is still the same.
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18of net assets was 37% p.a. (see Table 9.D.), which means that the
average firm in this category was practically doubling its size
19
every two years. Moreover, this growth rate is an average sustai-
20
ned over seven years. It is 10% p.a. faster than the average
21 22
growth rate of the top 100 by new investment (see Table 9.E.).
The more rapid overall growth rate of those relying heavily on take¬
over than that of those notable for their internal growth is consis¬
tent with the views of the managerial theorists: "except under
special circumstances, a greater rate of expansion is made possible
by merger (than by internal means)" argues Penrose (1959, p.155),
and this position is endorsed by Harris (1964, p.123).
The separation of the most intensive acquirers from the high external
growth group provides further interesting results on the role of size.
The average opening size of the high group was found to be above
average, and considerably greater than that of those making no acqui¬
sitions. As Table 9.D. shows, however, those in the high group
18. All performance ratios were constrained to be no greater than 100%
before averages were computed, so the result does not simply dep¬
end on a few freak extreme observations, However, the distribu¬
tion of the top 100 companies by rate of growth by acquisition is
positively skewed: see appendix J, Table J.B.
19. Size is admittedly measured in money terns; but inflation of
around 6% p.a. which prevailed in this period would not seriously
affect this result.
20. And it prompts reservations over Hewbould's (1970, p.148) conclu¬
sion that the "inability of firms to merge repeatedly is empiri¬
cally confirmed."
21. The ranking is the same in period 1, but the differences are
smaller - partly as a result of the valuation differences discus¬
sed in footnote 17.
22. The difficulty of distinguishing between net and replacement
investment (see chapter 2) must also be borne in mind in these
comparisons. Replacement investment (by definition equal to
depreciation) represented about 7% of net assets for the inten¬
sive acquirers in period 2, but 11.5% for the top 100 by new
investment.
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growing most rapidly were much closer in size to the group making no
acquisitions. This means, in addition, that the other members of
the high group were typically larger than the averages reported in
Table 9.A. (the average for these high but not intensive external
growth companies was 3.29 in 1948 and 14.73 in 1954): as was the case
with profitability they were very similar to the average of the low
group. These characteristics of the middling groups (low and the
less dynamic high), large size, mediocre profitability and reliance
on takeover, accord well with the results of appendix C (that the
giants were less profitable than the rest and relied more heavily
23
on growth by takeover). But given the known reliance of the
giants on growth by takeover, it is encouraging to find that giant-
ness is not a necessary condition for rapid growth by takeover:
some fluidity will be obtained in industrial structure if the small
efficient company is able to use the most rapid means of growth to
challenge those currently dominating the economy.
d. Summary
While the group growing intensively by acquisition recorded profit¬
ability well above average, those with middling growth by takeover
(the low group and the high group except for the top 100) were no
more profitable than those with zero growth by acquisition. Thus
correlations performed on an industry basis revealed weak relation¬
ships between profitability and growth by acquisition compared with
those between profitability and either total net asset growth or
23. Moreover, appendix C shows that the Giants display a narrower
dispersion of performance than the rest (through time or across
companies). One would not therefore expect them to be so highly
represented at the extremes of the distribution by rate of growth.
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growth by new investment.
The results suggest that above average growth by retentions was not
normally a necessary condition for above average overall growth when
that growth was secured by takeover. The strong positive associa¬
tion found between growth by new investment, growth by retention,
profitability and growth by external finance did not seem to prevail
when growth by merger rather than by new investment was pursued.
Mediocre growth by retention on the part of companies unremarkable
for their profitability must often have been matched by considerable
growth by external finance when the finance was raised in share for
share exchange during takeover. Moreover, managers and the capital
market seem to tolerate much higher matching ratios between external
and internal finance when takeover is the principal means of growth
than when companies are expanding chiefly by new investment.
While the intensive acquirers also grew by new investment at an above
average rate, many of the companies further down the scale of growth
rates by acquisition were unremarkable for their growth by new invest¬
ment: a large minority of companies with high growth by acquisition
achieved rates of growth by new investment that were below average.
The average size of members of the different groups provided an
interesting comparison with the study of size in appendix C. As in
the case of profitability a nonlinearity emerged: the two extremes
of the distribution of companies by acquisition rate (zero and
intensive) were relatively small; and low or middling growth by
acquisition was associated with large initial size.
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Chapter 10. Conclusions of Part II.
a. Merger and internal efficiency
For the mergers studied in chapters 7 and 8 post-merger profitability
typically showed a decline from the weighted average profitability
achieved by the participants prior to merger. For the full set of
mergers considered in chapter 7 this result held for all seven post-
merger years considered, whether or not outliers were included and
whether or not profitability was adjusted for a known accounting
bias: only the year of merger itself proved an exception, but this,
it was argued, was probably due only to special measurement diffi¬
culties in that year. When the experience of particular subsets
of these mergers was considered separately in chapter 8, none of the
groups' post-merger experience was found to run counter to the typi¬
cal pattern described in the earlier chapter: the vast majority of
post-merger years for all groups distinguished either by degree of
diversification or by the relative size of victim and acquirer revea¬
led declines in profitability for the average participants.
Chapter 9 broadened the study of merger and profitability, relating
the average rate of profit to the rate of growth by acquisition over
a run of years and across all continuing quoted companies. A
positive relation was found, but it was much weaker than the relation¬
ship between profitability and internal growth. Moreover, it was a
rather uneven relationship: the profitability of those with fairly
high rates of growth by acquisition was not very different from
average, and members of the group with low rates of growth by acqui¬
sition were typically less profitable than those with no such growth.
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However, those companies enjoying very rapid growth by acquisition
(in the top 100 by this variable) were markedly more profitable than
average.
Chapter 7 raised the possibility that the set of mergers studied there
might not be typical of the population of mergers in the quoted com¬
pany sector for this period. The criteria for inclusion in chapter
7's study, which were adopted to facilitate comparisons of profit¬
ability before and after merger, might, it was argued, debar the more
successful acquirers which relied heavily on growth by merger. At
first sight, the juxtaposed results of chapters 7 and 9 might seem
consistent with this suggestion, since chapter 7 found that mergers
resulted in profitability declines, and chapter 9 that low or middling
growth by merger was associated xtfith mediocre profitability perform¬
ance, but rapid external growth with profitability appreciably above
average. However, the results of chapter 7 do not need to be quali¬
fied in this way. In fact the set of acquiring companies examined
in chapter 7 was well represented in chapter 9's group of intensive
acquirers whose profitability was above average: 33% of the 1964-71
top 100 by external growth were included in the study in chapter 7,
compared with 32% of the high but not intensive external growth
group, and only 9% of the low external growth group (see appendix K,
Table K.A., for full details of the overlap between the populations).
Moreover, there need be no inconsistency between the observed decline
of profitability (chapter 7) in merging companies and the high level
(chapter 9) of profitability (relative to the average) of intensive
acquirers. As chapter 7 showed, the typical acquirer enjoyed
profitability 23% above the average for its industry-year in the 3
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year period prior to merger. The typical decline in profitability
after merger (according to chapter 7 again) was of the order of 7%
of the level for the industry-year: so post-merger profitability
would still be 16% above the average, and the seven-year average
profitability level reported in chapter 9 would still appear credit¬
able for the acquirer, even despite the declines attributed above to
the merger.
Thus the conclusion of chapter 7 is unamended by the results of
chapter 9: there is quite strong evidence to support a presumption
that a limited loss of efficiency followed the typical merger. As
was argued above, the transition from results for profitability to
such efficiency conclusions can be fairly readily made since profit
is likely to receive a boost as a result of the enhanced market
power of the amalgamation, and any efficiency loss would first have
to offset the gains from improved trading terms before being trans¬
lated into a decline in profitability.
These conclusions for the efficiency consequences of merger are all
the more significant because so many other considerations weigh
against merger. The enhanced bargaining power of the amalgamation
may work against the interests of its trading partners not only
through price but also through such features as reduced product range.
In addition, the concentration of economic power in ever fewer units,
to which merger contributes, is anathema to observers at both ends
of the political spectrum: to liberals who cherish the ideal of a
private enterprise decentralised economy, and to socialists who fear
increases in the power of capital relative to that of labour or that
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of the state. Perhaps the only argument voiced in favour of merger
(apart from the general one of gains in internal efficiency) is the
countervailing power suggestion: that, say, a bigger retailer is
desirable to hold in check an already big manufacturer. The typical
justifications of merger have been variants of the claim that inter¬
nal efficiency would be increased; and the presumption of government
policy that efficiency gains would on the whole materialise, so
clearly voiced by Mr. Crosland in 1969,^ has not yet been displaced.
The evidence of this study, together with that of the earlier work
reported in appendix H, surely demands that this presumption be
abandoned.
b* The incentive to grow by takeover
One account of companies' desire to acquire subsidiaries, even though
the amalgamation's profitability has typically suffered as a result,
would stress the importance of imperfect information. As Newbould
(1970) discovered in his interviews with managers of acquiring com¬
panies, little appraisal was generally conducted of the prospective
returns to the investment in the subsidiary. It is possible that
the acquirers' managements were confident that gains would be reali¬
sed, and were surprised to discover assimilation problems after mer¬
ger (which they also admitted to Newbould). In other words, the
efficiency losses were a mistake.
Two other accounts of growth at the expense of profitability would
1. See section 7.b. above: 'In general, mergers are desirable if
they lead to better management or genuine economies of scale
without eliminating workable competition. In my view more often
than not in Britain mergers will fulfil this condition.'
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take as their starting-point the divorce of ownership from control
emphasised by Berle and Means (1932) and the consequent possibility
that conflicts might emerge between the interests of owners and those
of managers. Firstly it might be argued that the reduced profit¬
ability of the combine was one consequence of a deliberate policy on
the part of a satisficing managerial team. The managers' objectives
in the merger could be seen as the elimination of competition and
the consequent survival of their own organisation even despite reduced
efforts on their behalf to maintain sales and efficiency.
The second related account would also see gro\?th by merger at the
expense of profitability as deliberate and rational action by mana¬
gers anxious to maximise their own utility; but this time their
interests would be served neither by profitability nor by a "quiet
life", but by growth. This would emphasise the rewards which result
from growth. Harris (1964, chapter 2) gives a convincing account
of the strong pressures on and incentives to managers to increase
the size of their companies. Not only does greater size typically
bring the directors of a company greater power and prestige; but,
other things equal, it also brings more stable performance (see
appendix C) and greater immunity from takeover (see Singh (1971)).
In addition, it is typically accompanied by higher salaries for
directors. Appendix E argues against the majority of earlier studies
that the influence cf profitability on directors' pay is not trivial;
but it is in agreement with earlier work in according a major role
to size. Table 10.A., which is derived from the regression esti¬
mates of appendix E and the results of chapter 7, provides some
orders of magnitude for the effect on directors' pay of the typical
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changes in size and profitability involved in the mergers studied in
chapter 7. The method of, and problems in, predicting pay changes
through time from cross section regression estimates are discussed in
appendix E; and while the results should not be interpreted too
precisely, Table 10.A. suggests that the increase in pay which follo¬
wed the growth implied by the typical merger studied in chapter 7
would far outweigh the decrease in pay which the regression estimates
would predict because of the decline in profitability associated with
the merger. If these estimates are to be trusted, the highest paid
director would gain a net pay rise of over £1000 p.a. as a result of
the typical merger studied in chapter 7. In other words, while the
typical merger may well have been to the detriment of the collective
shareholders of the victim and acquirer, it would yield appreciable
benefits to the acquirers' directors.
To summarise, it is relatively easy to find explanations for growth
by merger at the expense of profitability in a world of imperfect
information, imperfect markets which leave directors some discretion
in the choice of their objectives, and managerial objectives other
than profit maximisation.
c. Constraints on growth by takeover, 1: finance
While directors nay well be eager to grow by merger even at the exp¬
ense of profitability, one might expect the level of profitability
actually achieved to constrain the rate of growth by acquisition.
There are strong theoretical arguments, discussed above in chapter 3
and emphasised by the managerial theorists of the firm, that managers
will be reluctant to expand by much more than they can finance from
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TABLE 10.A.
THE IMPACT OF THE AVERAGE TAKEOVER ON THE SALARY OF THE HIGHEST
PAID DIRECTOR
Averages of the estimates provided in appendix E suggest that a unit
difference in the natural log of size"' was associated with a differ¬
ence of £4204 in pay;*5 and that a difference of one percentage point
in the rate of return was associated with a difference of £89 in pay.
The typical merger reported in chapter 7 represented growth of one
third for the acquirer, which corresponds to an increase of 0.285 in
the natural log of size.
It produced, according to chapter 7, a decline in profitability of
about 7% of the industry-year level. Taking the industry-year level
as about 15%, this implies a decline of roughly 1.05 percentage
points.
Thus:
Gain on merger = 0.285 x £4204 £1198
Loss on merger = 1.05 x £89 £ 93
Net gain on merger - £1105
Notes
a. when assets are used as the size measure: see annex to appendix E.
b. when the salary of the highest paid director is used as the measure
of pay.
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internal sources: the manager's ability to survive the failure of
an investment project is believed to fall as the investment - saving
ratio rises. Thus a decline in profitability following merger will
(other things equal) curtail further growth from retentions.
Growth by external finance is also believed to be positively related
to profitability: Kaldor (1971) argues that "the amount that can be
raised by new issues ... is ... dependent on, and related to, the
growth of internal reserves." In the case of issues of fixed inter¬
est loan stock this relation may apply because, when future profits
are uncertain, managers will be cautious over how much future income
to commit to interest payments. Again, in conditions of uncertainty,
the capital market may be expected to exert a control over the ratio
of equity issues to profits, since current performance may be taken
as one of the best guides to future earnings and hence to the attrac¬
tiveness of new issues: a creditable profit record may be the sine
qua non of new equity issues.
These are the reasons generally emphasised for the fairly strong
positive relationship between the rate of profit and the rate of
growth of net assets which earlier studies have reported and which
has been produced again in chapter 9 for the data used in this study.
But as chapter 9 also showed, the relationship between profitability
and growth by acquisition is by no means as strong as that between
profitability and either growth by new investment or overall net
asset growth. Moreover, when the top 100 by rate of external growth
were compared in chapter 9 with the top 100 by growth by new invest¬
ment, the intensive acquirers were found to have grown at a much
higher overall rate despite a considerably lower rate of growth by
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retention: the rate at which they matched retentions with new exter¬
nal finance was appreciably higher than that achieved by the top
100 by new investment. Thus in 1964-71 the intensive acquirers
managed to grow at five times their rate of growth by retention, while
the top 100 by growth by investment grew at some two and a half times
their rate of growth by retention. It seems then that the con¬
straint imposed by profitability upon growth may be less effective for
.2
growth by acquisition than for growth by new investment.
This observation can be rationalised. It can be argued that the
purchase of a going concern involves far smaller risks and uncertain¬
ties for the acquiring management than does expansion by new invest¬
ment: the problems associated with new investment, of using new
technologies, entering new markets and challenging competitors whose
response cannot be forecast, may be much less severe in the case of
takeover. The status quo in the acquirer's and victim's factories
and markets need often be little altered as a result of the merger.
In the extreme case the acquirer might resemble a financial inter¬
mediary, using its own equity to finance shareholdings in various
firms, but not intervening in the running of the subsidiary. Growth
by takeover would then become akin to portfolio management, and the
constraints on the growth of the portfolio much weaker than those on
the internal expansion of the individual enterprise within the port¬
folio.
2. That the capital market has looked favourably upon acquiring
companies is an inference which may also be drawn from the rela¬
tively high price-earnings ratio reported for them in the sixties
(see the studies reviewed in appendix H).
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d. Constraints on growth by takeover, 2: the state
Four generalisations about growth by takeover have been emphasised in
this part of the thesis. Firstly, the efficiency gains which in
public policy statements have been presumed to be the saving grace
of groxv-th by takeover cannot be relied upon: strong evidence was
reported of declines in the efficiency of the typical amalgamation
after merger (chapters 7 and 8). Secondly, there are strong incen¬
tives to managers who have little or no oxmership interest in the
company to pursue groxv-th by merger even at the expense of profitability
(appendix E and above, chapter 10). Thirdly, very high rates of
growth are attained through takeover: the fastest rates so attained
are higher than those attained by internal means, and the top 100
by external growth x^ere practically doubling their size every txro
3
years in the period 1964-71 (chapter 9). Finally, the finance con¬
trol which has been frequently cited as strongly favouring profitable
companies seems to operate much more weakly for growth by takeover:
much less reliance is placed on retention finance and many of those
growing fairly rapidly by takeover were unremarkable for their profit¬
ability (chapter 9).
Any of these four generalisations alone might cause concern that U.K.
government policy towards merger has been so permissive; but together
they prompt alarm. The onus is surely upon the proponents of growth
by merger to demonstrate why government policy should not be reorien-
3. See also appendix C on the relative gains through takeover of
the well established giant companies.
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ted with a presumption against takeover. As a second best or interim
measure there would appear to be a case for adding efficiency consi¬
derations to those used in screening mergers to see whether a refer¬
ence to the Monopolies Commission is necessary: more detailed
scrutiny could perhaps be devoted to prospective mergers where the
acquirer's profitability record is less good than average or than the
victim's.^ Not only would such a step inhibit the acquisition of
the relatively efficient by inefficient (a match which does not appear
to have been very successful from some of the evidence provided above
(chapter 8)), but also it would act as a ginger for those companies
anxious to grow by takeover. Unlike a blanket hostility towards
merger, it would also allow small but dynamic and efficient companies
to use this means of growth to challenge the established large com¬
panies. But whatever the details of policy changes, the presumption
that efficiency gains will more often than not follow merger requires
amendment.
4. True a profitable firm may not necessarily be efficient (it may
owe its performance to a strong monopoly position); but a persis¬
tently unprofitable company (compared with say the industry aver¬
age) is surely unlikely to be as efficient as average.
The inadequacies of conventional historic cost accounting (empha¬
sised in chapter 2 and appendix B) also present difficulties for
such a policy. It may be hoped, however, that the Sandilands
Committee on Inflation Accounting will soon propose a less imper¬
fect measure of profitability.
G. Whittington suggested one potential abuse of such a policy:
where a bid was uncontested and the actual acquirer was the less
profitable, the actual victim might purport to be the acquirer.
More careful scrutiny would be required to close this loophole.
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One other side effect of a more stringent policy towards merger might
be to channel the evident growth aspirations of those currently
growing by acquisition into the major alternative form of growth,
new investment in fixed assets. It is difficult to demonstrate that,
in the past, growth by acquisition has come at the expense of growth
by new investment. But the evidence of chapters 7 and 8 does suggest
that mergers have often caused assimilation problems which must have
absorbed some of the energies of company directors; and that had
many of these takeovers been inhibited, managers' ability to pursue
growth by new investment would have been enhanced. Not only does
this alternative method of growth carry strong possibilities of
socially desirable consequences (increased labour productivity,
challenge to existing market positions, new products, etc.), but
also it appears to be more susceptible to the finance control which




Subsequent Debate on the Measurement and Taxation of Profits
In the last quarter of 1974, a new debate developed over the
appropriate definition of profits for the purposes of taxation and
price control: the chief contributions to the debate were those
of Merrett and Sykes (1974) and Godley and Wood (1974), and it also
prompted a considerable correspondence in the national newspapers.
The debate did not, however, produce any arguments or evidence to
modify the conclusions of Chapter 2. This Appendix presents an
interpretation of the debate in the light of the arguments of that
chapter.
The Merrett and Sykes Position
Merrett and Sykes' diagnosis of a profit and liquidity crisis for
U.K. companies rests on the assertion that "under inflationary
conditions profits must be considered net of both depreciation at
replacement cost and of stock appreciation." Indeed, it is because
profits have not been so considered that, according to them, the
symptoms of the crisis have not been recognised sooner. The profit
figures conventionally provided in companies' accounts are based on
historic costs: depreciation provisions fail to allow for increases
in fixed asset prices with inflation, and the whole of stock apprec¬
iation is treated as profit. Such figures are misleading, their
argument runs: they claim that both the excess of replacement over
historic cost depreciation and also stock appreciation are pre-empted
to maintain the firm's fixed and current assets; and hence that
these components of profit are available neither for distribution
nor for tax payments, even though under present arrangements they
are liable to tax. And the record shows that the gap between
conventional profits and profits a Merrett and Sykes is a critical
one: with the recent acceleration of inflation, though conventional
profits rose in aggregate for the U.K. by around 30% in 1973 from
their level the year before, profits net of stock appreciation,
current cost depreciation, tax and interest fell quite steeply in
the same year. Having pointed to accounting conventions as vill¬
ains of the piece, Merrett and Sykes naturally next prescribe
altering them. For the purposes of both tax assessment a.nd price
control they advocate a replacement cost basis in place of historic
cost: in other words, exempt depreciation at replacement cost and
stock appreciation from taxation, and permit companies to pass
increases in the costs of their inputs straight on to the customer.
The consequences of such a course of treatment would be a drastic
reduction in company taxation (assuming unchanged tax rates, as
Merrett and Sykes do), accompanied by an appreciable rise in the
profit figures that would be recorded on the conventional basis.^
This position was directly challenged by Godley and Wood (1974),
who issued an outright denial of the very existence of any profits
squeeze, and proposed alternative cures for the admitted liquidity
squeeze.
The Godley and Wood Case
Godley and Wood reckon they can "demonstrate that one of the central
contentions of Merrett and Sykes - that concerning stock apprecia-
1. These consequences for the company sector in aggregate would be
associated with widely varying proportionate decreases in taxation
and increases in conventional profit for different companies.
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tion - is entirely incorrect." The models they use for this demon¬
stration are reproduced, with some slight modifications and exten¬
sions, in Table A.A. Their starting-point is the standard historic
cost accounting model; and they assume there is only one asset,
stocks, financed entirely with borrowing. The key to model 1 is
that in year 1, with inflation then running at 30%, loans at a zero
rate of interest are available to finance the whole increase in the
value of stocks. The goods bought in year 0 at 100 are sold in
year 1 at 130; the 30 difference is available to be paid out in
dividends and taxation; whilst the extra 30 necessary to finance
replacement stocks is, in the model, provided by the bank.
In flat contradiction of Merrett and Sykes, Godley and Wood's
prescription to the government is: don't remit company taxation
on stock appreciation, but instead, enable the increase in stocks
(in money terms) to be financed through loans to the company sector.
Of course, they are aware that in model 1 the burden of inflation
is simply being shifted to the lender. Though he disburses 30
units in year 1, and receives not a penny back, in year 0 prices
his claim on the company at the end of the year is exactly the same
as at the beginning. Model 2 replaces this clearly implausible
assumption of zero interest with a controversial one. In this case
the lender does receive some interest - 39 in the example - but the
interest is immediately shifted forward to the customer: the value
of sales rises by 39 (model 2a). It begins to become clear that,
in a Godley and Wood world, profits could never be squeezed: for
again (model 2b), raise tax by 20 and the value of sales goes up





































































































































































































































































































































































































are inclined to believe", they write, "that in the absence of price
control, increases or decreases in taxes on profits (and evidently
in interest charges) are eventually more or less completely passed
on in the form of higher or lower prices."
Only one line of Table A.A. remains unchanged despite variations in
4 ■
other aspects of Godley and Wood's model; net profit (h). This is
taken as the datum in their argument; any potential squeeze on it
is deflected in full to the lender or the customer. If firms are
willing and able to maintain the value of this variable, as Godley
and Wood imply, then Merrett and Sykes' diagnosis is wrong; and
their prescription of changes in accounting conventions and in the
tax base will simply have no effect on company liquidity. Moreover,
Day's objection (1974) that Godley and Wood exclude equity capital
from their model, making no provision for companies to maintain the
real value of their capital intact, is not decisive. Model 3a
(my own) in section B of Table A.A. is constructed to work as does
model 2a (Godley and Wood's) in Table A.A.except that stocks are
financed entirely by equity rather than by loans. It can be seen
that in model 3a the value of sales taken for granted in model 2a is
almost sufficient, other things being equal, to maintain the real
value of equity intact and to yield the same net profit as in the
loan financed system. True, it is not quite sufficient, but only
because Godley and Wood have unrealistically assumed in model 2 a
pre-tax rate of interest equivalent to the rate of inflation, imply¬
ing a negative real post-tax rate. Had model 2a included a more
realistic pre-tax rate of interest, and hence slightly higher prices,
Godley and Wood could then have argued against Day that the sales
necessary to support at least a zero post-tax real rate of interest
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would equally meet his requirements for a company financed entirely
by equity (maintenance of real capital and net profit intact). Such
a situation is represented in model 3b, with sales at 175. But they
do not use this argument in replying to their critics - perhaps
because it would undermine their own diagnosis of companies' liquid¬
ity problems and show their prescription (increased borrowing) to be
beside the point: why would companies have any need to borrow if
the prices necessary to maintain net profit and to service loans (or
to keep their real capital intact (i.e. finance stock replacement))
will always be paid? The crucial issue - assumed away by Godley
and Wood - is: have profits been sufficient for both these tasks?
The historical record suggests not. Figure A.A. compares, for U.K.
quoted companies, the paths over recent years of conventional profit
(after historic cost depreciation and before tax) and of "net"
profit (conventional profit less tax, interest, stock appreciation
and the difference between current and historic cost depreciation).
The former shows an upward trend over the whole period, 1961-72,
whilst the latter shows a clear decline since the mid-sixties. The
role of inflation in this divergence is discussed in detail above in
chapter 2.
Moreover, even if Godley and Wood's analysis were successful at the
aggregate level, it would still neglect certain aspects of inflation's
uneven impact on the profits of different firms. In their second
article ('The Times', 12.11.74) Godley and Wood maintain that "the
whole issue of what is the 'proper' basis for assessing taxable
profits seems to us to be sub specie aeternitatis, of little import-














Coverage:U.K.quoted companies in mfg.,distbn.,etc.(see Appendix F).
Source:Department of Industry(1973)•
Note:The coverage of the data changes in 196^,1969»and 197J.: hence
2 values are given for each of these years,the one comparable
with the previuos,the other with the succeeding year.
"Net" Profit is not the accountant's concept of net profit,
which is: represented here by Conventional Profit, but Godley
and Wood's:it comprises dividends and conventional retentions,
less stock appreciation and the difference between current
and historic cost depreciation.
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ance." They see little at stake since for them the level of com¬
panies' net profit is a datum, varying neither with accounting con¬
ventions, nor with the definition of the tax base. However, the
incidence of stock appreciation or the shortfall of historic cost
below current cost depreciation (say as a proportion of conventional
profit) varies a good deal between different firms and industries:
these components form a larger proportion of conventional profit,
the more stock- or capital-intensive the firm (see the discussion in
section f. of chapter 2 above). It might be, as Godley and Wood
claim, that firms are able to pass on in full to the customer the
'cost' of these vehicles of inflation; but when inflation is on the
increase, this means that the prices of the more stock- or capital-
intensive firms will rise relatively fast. They will presumably
pay a penalty of reduced or more slowly growing demand, even if their
unit net profits are not squeezed. This bias between firms would
clearly be diminished if the tax base were amended to exclude the
two elements of conventional profit associated with inflation. Such
a change would redistribute taxation from the more to the less stock-
and capital-intensive firms, a procedure which could be justified
on grounds of equity as restoring the status quo prior to inflation;
and it could be accompanied by an increase in the nominal rate of
corporation tax in order to keep the total tax bill of the company
sector unchanged. However, in their advocacy of changes in the tax
base, Merrett and Sykes do also presume that tax rates would not be
changed and hence that the company sector's contribution to state
revenue would be drastically reduced - a development which for macro-
economic balance would have to be accompanied by a reduction in
state benefits or an increase in the taxation of other groups. Many
observers might readily accept the first set of proposals, on grounds
of equity, and yet jib at the large scale redistribution of income
involved in the second; and a consensus on the first might more
readily be achieved if it were not presented, on Merrett and Sykes
lines, as inextricably tied to the second.
I
Two remaining points in Godley and Wood's critique of Merrett and
Sykes received too little attention in the debate. Firstly, they
are surely right to suggest that Merrett and Sykes are unreasonable
in their assumption that nominal pre-tax profits would be the same
after a drastic change in the nominal incidence of the country's tax
bill as they would be in the absence of the change. Secondly, they
usefully point out that, for given output and distributional objec¬
tives, the appropriate government policy response to inflation will
differ according to whether the inflation is imported or 'home brewed'
the former implies transferring real resources to the foreigner,
whilst the latter may imply making no direct change in the resources
available to residents, but instead acting to maintain the distribu¬
tion of income between profits and 'earned' income.
The debate on how to adjust depreciation for inflation was conducted
with much less urgency than that on stock appreciation. Perhaps
this is because the tax system is already so indulgent in allowing
companies accelerated depreciation. Watts points out that ,:since
1957 at least, the various 'investment incentives' have exceeded
replacement cost depreciation." (Latter to the 'Financial Times',
10.10.74). Where real investment in the current year is higher
than the average for earlier years (the typical case for post-war
Britain), it is easy to see that the 100% depreciation currently
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allowed by the Inland Revenue on this year's investment is likely
to exceed replacement cost depreciation on the total capital stock.
This favourable feature of the tax system for companies' cash flow
was generally underplayed in the debate (e.g. letter by Lawson to
the 'Financial Times', 21.10.74). But a second favourable aspect
of depreciation for liquidity has not been mentioned at all. This
is the argument developed above (section d. of chapter 2) that if
investment is on the increase over time, the replacement cost of
those assets actually being retired in the current year (the pur¬
chases of many years ago when real investment was smaller than today)
will be less than replacement cost depreciation on the whole capital
stock (which has increased over time); and that in the late sixties
and early seventies for the U.K. quoted company sector, the current
replacement cost of retirais (the actual cash needed to buy replace¬
ments) would typically be less even than total historic cost deprec¬
iation provisions made in any year on a straight line basis (let
alone on the accelerated basis allowed for tax purposes). At least
until very recently, part of historic cost depreciation has still
been available for net investment after financing the replacement of
. , 2 3current retirais.
2. See section d. of chapter 2 on the rising ratio of replacement
costs to depreciation with accelerating inflation, and on the
vicious circle which develops as inflation rises and the growth
of investment slackens.
3. The debate concentrated on the impact of inflation on income
measurement, as did chapter 2. Its consequences for asset
valuations and rates of return on assets are dealt with to some
extent in Appendix B below.
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Appendix B
The Development of Accounting i?ith Inflation Adjustments
a. Recent progress
Charged by the professional accounting institutes with producing
recommendations on the adjustment of conventional company accounts
to reveal the impact of inflation, the Accounting Standards Steering
Committee (A.S.S.C.) produced their suggestions in Exposure Draft 8
(E.D.8.) in January 1973. Essentially this proposed that all the
transactions recorded in conventional accounts at historic cost be
reexpressed, using a general price index in the prices obtaining at
the end of the relevant accounting period. These proposals evoked
very strong opposition, notably from academic accountants and from
investment analysts.'*" Their objections are of two main types:
that general index adjustments may give a grossly misleading picture
of the experience of the individual firm when the price changes of
different classes of goods differ drastically from the movement of
the general index; and that certain adjustments proposed imply
taking credit for unrealised gains. These objections are further
discussed below.
As a result of the disagreement among accountants on how best to pro¬
ceed with inflation accounting, the government stepped in to set up
an independent committee to review the A.S.S.C. proposals, take
further evidence on the issue, and recommend which system should be
adopted. The Inflation Accounting Committee (I.A.C.) began to take
1. See, for example, Gynther (1973), Merrett and Sykes (1974) and
Society of Investment Analysts (1973).
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evidence early in 1974. Pending a decision by the I.A.C., the
2
A.S.S.C. proposed in June 1974 that companies should thenceforth
provide the additional index-adjusted information detailed in E.D.8.
as a supplement to their financial accounts.
Meanwhile, in the budgets of November, 1974 and April, 1975 the
Chancellor acknowledged the cash flow difficulties of the company
sector (see chapter 2 and Appeiidix A above), and granted tax relief
on the bulk of stock appreciation (of an amount equal to the change
in the book value of stocks during the year minus 10% of trading
profits: this relief was allowed from 1973-4). These relief pro¬
visions are to be reviewed in the light of the I.A.C.'s report,
whose brief includes considering "implications (of inflation) for
3
the taxation of the profits and capital gains of companies."
The next section simulates the effect of these 'E.D.8. adjustments'
on the past accounts of the quoted company sector, using the aggre¬
gates for the whole sector and for individual industries. This has
two purposes. Firstly, it gives a foretaste of the new information
which will become available as this system of inflation accounting is
adopted, giving orders of magnitude for the individual adjustments
(identifying the major and the trivial) and relating their size to
rates of inflation and to industry circumstances. Secondly, it
2. Accounting Standards Steering Committee (1974).
3. See terms of reference of Inflation Accounting Cotmittee.
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provides a further source of information on the impact of inflation
on the income of the company sector in recant years, complementing
the discussion above (chapter 2) of inflation's effect on cash flow.
b. The Effect of the E.D.8. Adjustments on Company Accounts
As in (chapter 2) above the basic conventional accounts used through¬
out are the aggregates for the quoted company sector compiled by the
Department of Trade and Industry from the individual accounts of, on
average, 1800 companies. All quoted companies engaged in manufactur¬
ing, distribution, etc., operating primarily in the U.K., and above
a certain size, are included.^ The adjustments made to these
accounts, to approximate the effect of the E.D.8 proposals, are
described in detail in the annex, but they may be summarised as
follows:"*
Adjustments to conventional profit:
1. Deduct: the excess of notional depreciation based on estimates
of current costs over actual depreciation provisions based on histo¬
ric cost.
2. Deduct: stock appreciation, the purely inflationary rise in stock
values over the year.
3. Add: gains from the erosion of net monetary liabilities (short
and long term) by inflation.
4. Add: gains on re-expressing the excess of sales over costs in
end of year prices (purchases and sales adjustment).
4. See below (Appendix F) for details of the population coverage.
5. The estimation method closely follows that used for a small sam¬
ple of companies by Cutler and Westwick (1973).
B.4.




All the adjustments proposed in E.D.8. are effected by means of a
general price index.'' The drawbacks of this procedure are well-
known: the value of any company's specific assets may diverge
widely from historic cost adjusted by a general index. Such
adjustments nay then provide a grossly misleading impression of
that individual company's experience and current situation. This
must be a formidable objection to the general introduction of E.D.8.
However, it may be said in defence here that the 'general index'
adjustments made below are more appropriate for our amalgam of
companies than for individual firms: both the aggregate accounts
and the price index summarise the experience of individuals in the
same broad area, the whole economy. On the other hand, certain
crude assumptions are necessary to approximate the effect of E.D.8.
on the aggregates, and in retrospect, so that my estimates fall
3
short of the aim of E.D.8. Too precise a meaning should not be
attached to the results: they only represent orders of magnitude,
even in their limited role as expressions of 'E.D.8. effects', let
6. Ideally, investments would be upvalued too. But I was unable to
do this since I had no way of estimating their date of purchase.
7. As originally prescribed in E.D.8., the Consumer Price Index was
used for these calculations, supplemented by the Index of Retail
Prices for monthly details. The A.S.S.C. has since recommended
the general use of the Index of Retail Prices. This change would
not materially alter the results given.
8. The adjustments and assumptions are detailed in the annex.
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alone in the broader context of realistic inflation adjustments.
c. Profit Adjustments
The first column of Table B.A. gives the annual rates of inflation
used in these calculations. The rate practically doubled between
1961 and 1972; and during the period it ranged from 2.5% to almost
8%. Trie second column presents the total profit adjustment pro¬
duced by the detailed adjustments in the subsequent columns. It
emerges that the net effect is to reduce the profit figure in every
year of the period: the maximum amount of reduction is over 17%
9
(1971). On the whole, the impact of the adjustments has increased
over the period, though the increase has by no means been smooth:
some years have witnessed quite sharp reversals to the trend.
The individual adjustments which comprise the total do not all show
the same pattern over time. Taking depreciation first, the adjust¬
ment rises in absolute terms (not shown) in every year but 1962.
As a proportion of profit, it sometimes falls when profits rise
sharply, but it still rises in every year from 1964 to 1971. Since
this adjustment reflects the total inflation between the date of
purchase of fixed assets and the balance sheet date (an average of
seven years according to the estimates used here), the size of the
adjustment has increased with the long term rise in inflation rates,
9. Chapter 2 argues that the impact of inflation on companies' cash
flow has been a good deal more drastic than this estimate of its
effect on income: the proportion of profit pre-empted directly
and indirectly as a result of stock appreciation reached 35% in
the same period (in this case in 1970; see Table 2.B. above).
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TABLE B.A.
The effect of the 'E.D.8. adjustments' on the profits of the U.K.

























1961 4.0 -9.0 -6.3 -9.4 -1.7 5.7 2.7
1962 2.5 -6.5 -5.8 -2.7 -0.8 3.6 -0.8
1963 2.9 -9.6 -5.6 -7.7 -1.0 4.3 0.4
1964 4.7 -8.2 -5.4 -9.8 -1.6 6.6 2.0
1965 4.1 -11.0 -7.6 -9.9 -1.0 6.0 1.5
1966 3.6 -12.5 -9.6 -10.0 -0.6 6.3 1.4
1967 2.6 -10.3 -9.9 -6.2 -0.5 5.0 1.3
1968 5.9 -11.8 -10.1 -13.5 -1.7 10.4 3.1
1969 4.6 -16.3 -12.7 -13.2 -1.1 8.5 2.2
1970 7.3 -16.0 -16.0 -20.1 0.8 14.5 4.8
1971 6.6 -17.4 -16.1 -18.3 1.2 12.5 3.3
1972 7.9 -12.7
.
-14.9 -16.9 0.5 13.6 5.0
AVERAGE 4.7 -11.8 -10.0 -11.5 -0.6 8.1 2.2
(1) The percentage increase in the price index between the beginning and
the end of the year.
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but is not highly sensitive to the current year's inflation rate
alone.^ As against this, in absolute terns, the impact of the
other adjustments does vary directly with the current year's rate of
inflation. But the effects of the two most significant adjustments,
stock appreciation and the erosion of long term liabilities, are
opposite in direction; and since they are a similar order of magni¬
tude, they tend to cancel one another out. Taking the adjustments
together, the longer term determination of the depreciation adjust¬
ment, and the broadly self-cancclling effect of the other adjust¬
ments imply only a muted relation between the current inflation rate
and the total adjustment. This is borne out by the Table.
^ * Asset Valuation
Table B.B. gives estimates of the amount by which fixed assets and
stocks would be revalued, following E.D.8., as a percentage of the
value recorded under present conventions. The revaluation of stocks
is seen to be insignificant: it represents only the inflation in
the (estimated) two month average period for which stocks are held.
But the revaluation of fixed assets is much more drastic, and increa¬
ses markedly in importance over the period, the estimate rising to
45% in 1972. This reflects the increasing importance of inflation
during the average asset's relatively long life.
10. The estimated lifetime of fixed assets used here differs con¬
siderably from that employed in chapter 2 above. It was empha¬
sised in chapter 2 how difficult it is to estimate asset life¬
times, and the conflicting evidence of Dean (1964) and Shonfield
(1965) was reported. Here the estimation procedure of Cutler
and Westwick (1973) was followed so that the results were at
least consistent with those for their sample of companies. How¬
ever the warning in section b. above against too precise inter¬
pretation of particular results is clearly very appropriate in
the case of this adjustment.
TABLE B ,B.
The effect of the 'E.D.3. adjustments' on the asset valuations of
the U.K. quoted company sector; as a percentage of the conventional
valuation.



















e. Rate of Return on Net Assets
These profit and asset adjustments can now be combined to yield a
measure of companies' performance, the rate of return on net assets,
\jith and without these allowances for inflation. Table B.C. pre¬
sents this comparison, and divides the difference between the two
measures into a profit effect and an asset effect. Two conclusions
emerge. The first is obvious from the earlier calculations: both
adjustments always reduce the rate of return. Secondly, unadjusted
profitability was on average higher in the second half of the period
than in the first half, (13.4% for 1961-6; 13.6% for 1967-72);
while by contrast, adjusted profitability fell - from 10.9% for 1961-
6 to 9.8% for 1967-72. So the disparity between the two measures
was growing sufficiently fast to reverse the slight upward trend of
conventional profitability. It follows that economic interpretation
of profitability movements in this period will depend crucially on
the accounting conventions which underlie the measure used: one
measure is not an adequate proxy for the other. In particular,
measurement according to E.D.8. precepts again casts doubt on the
contention of some observers discussed above (chapter 2) that pre¬
tax profitability was maintained in the sixties.^
f. Individual Industry Experience
A further important aspect of the impact of inflation accounting is
whether the effect of the adjustments on different industries and
firms would be unequal. Unfortunately, it is precisely in compari-
11. Panic and Close (1973): "after I960 there is simply no evidence




The effect of the 'E.D.8. adjustments' on the pre-tax rate of return












1961 13.9 -1.3 -1.5 0.2 11.3
1962 12.6 -0.8 -1.2 0.1 10.7
1963 13.5 -1.3 -1.2 0 11.0
1964 14.4 -1.2 -1.3 0.1 12.0
1965 13.8 -1.5 -1.4 0.1 11.0
1966 12.1 -1.5 -1.4 0.1 9.3
1967 12.0 -1.3 -1.5 0.2 9.4
1968 13.7 -1.6 -1.8 0.2 10.5
1969 13.4 -2.2 -2.0 0.3 9.5
1970 12.8 -2.0 -2.2 0.3 8.9
1971 13.8 -2.4 -2.7 0.5 9.2
1972 16.1 -2.1 -3.4 0.5 11.1
Rate of return = pre-tax profits -r average of opening and closing
net assets
Profit adjustment = (P^A) - (P ~ A)
*
Asset adjustment = (P -rA) - (P rA )
* &
Balance = (P A ) - (P j-A) - (profit adjustment + asset
adjustment)
(This is simply the difference between the sum of the two adjustments
applied individually and the total change when both adjustments are
applied simultaneously).
Uhere; PA = unadjusted profits
P = adjusted profits
Aa = unadjusted average net assets
A = adjusted average net assets
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sons of different industries and companies that the shortcomings of
E.D.8. become acute. Different areas of the economy and different
classes of assets experience widely different rates of price increase:
yet E.D.8. abstracts from this variety of rates and uses a single
index for all. But as noted above, E.D.8. may be introduced; and
in any case, investigating its effect on different industries, even
using the inadequate general price index, does show the possible div¬
ersity in the adjustments arising for reasons other than different
rates of inflation - e.g. different asset and financial structures,
and varying proportions of fixed assets and stocks to profits. As
indicators of the "true" impact of inflation, the results are, of
course, even rougher than my earlier estimates for the aggregates.
Table B.D. details various consequences of the adjustments implied
by E.D.8. for the 22 broad industrial groups which form the aggregate
considered in earlier sections. The figures relate to 1968 (chosen
for convenience in terms of data), when the rate of inflation was
almost 6% (moderate by today's standards). The first column shows
the total profit adjustment expressed as a proportion of the indus¬
tries' conventional profits. A fairly systematic pattern emerges:
the effect on services (industries 70 to 88) and on many of the con¬
sumer goods producers (e.g. 21, 23, 44, 48) is beneficial or less
harmful than the average; while setting aside the tiny leather indus¬
try (43) the six engineering industries (broadly defined as inaus-
12
tries 31 tc 39) suffer most. This is chiefly because the latter
12. In fact, for two of these industries (non-electrical engineering
and vehicles) the E.D.8. reduction in profits exceeded their
retentions; so that, according to these estimates, they were
distributing capital.
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tend to have core fixed assets and stocks in relation to their pro¬
fits than do the 'lighter' industries, so that the stock appreciation
and depreciation adjustments bear more heavily on them. A similar
story is told when assets too are revalued on the basis of E.D.3.:
columns two and three compare the rate of return on net assets of
the different industries before and after adjustment. Taking the
six 'engineering' industries as a group, and averaging, their adjus¬
ted profitability falls below the overall average; the3' slip further
behind after the E.D.8. adjustment. If we compare their rankings
according to the rate of return before and after adjustment (column 6
of Table B.D.), it can be seen that they either fall or roughly main¬
tain their ranks at the bottom of the league. In contrast, services
and 'light' industry either maintain their lead positions or rise as
a result of the E.D.8. reshuffle.
The extent of the reshuffle has important implications for the allo-
cative role of the capital market, a concern of the Inflation Account¬
ing Committee. If the inflation-adjusted accounts are considered to
more nearly approximate "real" or "underlying" profitability, and if
it is desired that new investment finance should go to the more pro¬
fitable firms, it could be argued that the introduction of inflation
accounting would contribute to the more efficient allocation of fin¬
ance by the capital market. On the other hand, some would maintain
that even this adjusted profitability would be a poor criterion for
the allocation of finance; that inflation already erodes a dispro¬
portionate amount of the "heavy" industries' internal finance (see
chapter 2); and that further discrimination against them by the



















































































































































































































































































































































consequences for the economy in future years. And, in any case, if
inflation adjustments impinged more forcefully en managements as a
result of inflation accounting, more of the "costs" of inflation
might be passed on in price: so the structure of profit rates might
itself be changed as a result of the change in the accounting system.
Whatever the consequences, it is clear from Table B.D. that the pre¬
sent proposals would produce a substantial and systematic re-ordering
of companies within the performance table.
g. Some Implications for Taxation
It was not proposed in E.D.O. that the revised accounts should pro¬
vide an alternative tax base. However, the case was argued long
ago for the use of certain inflation adjustments in arriving at a
13
company's tax base; also the Inflation Accounting Committee's terms
of reference raise the question of whether the tax base should be
altered from conventional profit; and the Chancellor's relief for
stock appreciation establishes a presumption that the definition of
profit for tax purposes is going to be changed to take account of
inflation. In Table B.E., estimates are given of the proportionate
effect on the tax bill of individual industries if 'E.D.8. profit'
were used as a tax base. These estimates are based on the assump¬
tion that the company sector's total tax bill should remain unchanged
(following the I.A.C.'s terms of reference). Since in 1960, as in
all years cf the study, total 'E.D.O. profit5 was less than conven¬
tional profit, a higher rate of tax would have to be levied on E.D.O.
profit than on conventional profit to yield the same sum of revenue.
13. J. H. Keeling and G. P. S. MacPherson. Submission to the Royal
Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, 1952.
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According to ray estimates, the new rate of Corporation Tax would have
to be about 7.5 percentage points higher in I960 than that paid on
conventional profit. As against this, most industries would have
smaller taxable profits: an industry with an average proportional
E.D.8. adjustment in profits would have an unchanged tax bill;
those which did better than average under E.D.O. would pay more, and
14
vice versa. The nature of the results in Table B.E. is implied
by the inter-industry comparisons of Table B.D. and of course is sub¬
ject to the same qualifications: the tax burden x?culd be radically
redistributed; the engineering sector would pay around 15% less;
light industry and services would often pay more.''""'
h. Conclusions on the Simulation of E.D.8.
Two reservations must be attached to all these estimates. Firstly,
the 'general index' approach embodied in E.D.8. is imperfect, espec¬
ially when applied to individual industries. Secondly, in order to
estimate the E.D.3. adjustments retrospectively certain crude assump¬
tions have been necessary: the effect of E.D.8. is only approximated.
Typically, after adjustment, profits appear lower and assets are up¬
valued. And the size of the adjustments has been rising with infla¬
tion over recent years, so that in comparisons of adjusted and unadj¬
usted figures - either in a single year, between years, or across
14. Details of the adjustments underlying the figures in Table B.E.
are given in the annex.
15. Repercussions on profits cannot be ruled out. Those industries




The percentage change in individual industries' tax liabilities if
'E.D.O. adjusted' profit were used as the tax base, and the total








26 Chemicals and allied +2.0
31 Metal manufacture -16.1
33 Non-electrical engineer¬ -12.6
ing
36 Electrical engineering -7.1
37 Shipbuilding and marina -33.3
engineering
33 Vehicles -34.5
39 Metal goods, n.e.s. -9.6
41 Textiles -3.1
43 Leather, leather goods, -25.0
and fur
44 Clothing and footwear +17.0
46 Bricks, pottery, glass, +3.0
cement, etc.
47 Timber, furniture, etc. +3.3
48 Paper, printing and +6.3
publishing
49 Other manufacturing -4.5
50 Construction -1.4
70 Transport and communica¬ +5.6
tion (exc. shipping)
31 Wholesale distribution -1.3
32 Retail distribution +12.4
33 Miscellaneous services +20.5
CHANGE IN AGGREGATE LIABILITY 0
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industries - conventional profit is becoming an increasingly inade¬
quate proxy for inflation-adjusted profit. It is not likely that
this general conclusion would need qualification if specific price
adjustments were made.
The results form a complement to chapter 2. For that chapter was
devoted to tracing the impact of inflation on managements' ability to
finance investment from internal sources. This appendix, on the
other hand, gives some impression of the more complicated picture for
the measurement of shareholders' income after allowance for inflation.
In fact, it appears that cash flow has typically suffered more severe¬
ly as a result of inflation, than has this measure of income (see
footnote 9 above). This is because some of the adjustments proposed
in E.D.8. produce increases in income as a result of inflation (for
instance gains from the erosion of liabilities fixed in money terms).
In general, companies' cash flow position and their inflation-adjusted
income position may diverge widely. This will happen especially for
companies with high proportions of debt and of stocks in their net
assets. Section i. below emphasises these differences when it
discusses some consequences of using the income measure proposed in
E.B.8. as a proxy for cash flow.
i. Some Issues raised by the A.S.S.C. Adjustment Method
The method proposed by the A.S.S.C. of deriving an inflation-adjusted
set of accounts (henceforth 'C.P.?.') has one particular virtue: it
employs as a basis the historic information currently used in finan¬
cial reporting, familiar to practising accountants and readily veri¬
fiable with conventional accounting information; only adjustment
with a single and easily accessible index is required. As against
B. 19.
this, the usefulness of the resulting information is open to question.
The recent erratic movements in property and raw material prices
illustrate the dangers of using historic cost adjusted with a general
index as a proxy for the current (replacement or realisable) value
of say the fixed assets or stocks of an individual firm. And yet
the specific revaluation of all its assets by each individual firm
every year clearly implies both that more resources be devoted to
providing information (a cost which would have to be weighed against
the benefits of improved decision-making which followed) and that,
where a limited market is available for a good, greater subjectivity
would enter the valuation. Probably the best that can be hoped for
in the short term is a method of index-linked adjustments, but
employing a small number of indices for specific product groups, in
place of the single index used in C.P.P. Difficulties would still
remain, however, in the treatment of some of the major items in the
C.P.P. adjustment process, particularly of stock appreciation and the
erosion of debt.
Where the prices of a company's stock have risen faster than the rise
in a general index, should the excess of the former over the latter
be counted as profit? This is a major sticking-poing between the
respective proponents of replacement cost and C.P.P. accounting.
C.P.P. advocates would argue that this excess represents a real enough
holding gain which is retained by the business; and presumably that
it should be taxed in the same way as other retentions. Their
opponents maintain, however, that this gain can be neither distribu¬
ted ncr used to expand the physical capacity of the business: tax¬
ing it actually reduces the funds available for distribution or
expansion compared with the situation had the "gain" not arisen.
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The suggestion of the National Institute (1974, p.22) seems reason¬
able on this issue: for a going concern give tax relief on the act¬
ual value of stock appreciation (or some approximation to it)5 but
if a company ceases trading and disposes of its stocks, tax any real
appreciation (in excess of the rise in a general index).
An analogous situation arises with the erosion of debt. There is a
potential gain for a borrower when the value of an asset rises with
inflation and the loan with which it is financed is fixed in money
terms. Under C.P.P. an estimate of this gain is included in income.
However the gain is realised only if the asset is sold and the loan
paid off, an event which may never occur for a continuing business.
Hence, the adherents of replacement cost would argue, there is likely
to be no liquidity gain to management, and the taxation of the poten¬
tial gain would entail a liquidity loss.
The increasing reliance on debt financing by companies in recent years
has meant that their potential gain from debt erosion through infla¬
tion has been rising by more than would be expected from the rise in
inflation rates alone (see the rise in the importance of debt ero¬
sion in relation to other E.D.O. adjustments in Table B.A. above).
Consequently, for some companies the deductions from conventional
profit made using the E.D.3. method for stock appreciation and inade¬
quate depreciation are for recent years completely offset by the
'E.D.8. gains' from the erosion of debt. This has led some commen¬
tators in the financial press (e.g. the Financial Editor in The Times,
11 February 1975) to argue that the implementation of inflation
accounting is not a matter of great consequeiice, since, by and large,
conventional profit and inflation-adjusted profit are not greatly
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dissimilar. However, the distinction between potential and real¬
ised gains and losses is crucial here: the "costs" of inflation
(particularly the inflated price of replacement stocks) impinge on
the company's cash flow in the current year, whereas the "gains" from
the erosion cf debt may be realised only in the distant future.
Neglect of inflation in accounting (especially for tax purposes) on
the 'rough justice' argument suggested above is therefore likely to
lead to acute liquidity problems.^
It is arguable that the importance of gains to companies from debt
erosion is part of another major problem in the incidence of taxation
in a period of inflation. With the present rates of inflation and
of interest, it is clear that part of interest represents compensa¬
tion to the lender for the erosion of his claim - in other words re¬
payment of the part of capital that inflation will erode. And yet,
16. This is not to say, as do Godley and Wood, that conventional
profits need be no higher under inflation than under constant
prices provided that stocks are financed with debt (see Appendix
A). As is argued above, their case requires that loans be
interest free (or else that interest be passed on in full to the
consumer, leaving post-interest income intact). Neither of
these conditions has been mot in recent years: in fact the com¬
panies which have been "benefitting" from debt erosion have
often been paying interest rates which have been swollen as the
result of inflation; and conventional profits have not risen
sufficiently fast to maintain income after the various costs of
inflation (see .Appendix A).
17. Moreover, even for income purposes, the rough justice argument
would only apply for individual firms if each of the gains
and losses represented the same proportion of conventional pro¬
fit for ail firms. This is clearly not the case (see section
f. above).
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under present arrangements, this capital repayment is taxed as income.
Indexation of the loan principal, leaving only the real rate of int¬
erest to be paid over and taxed would both relieve the drain on com¬
pany liquidity of high interest rates, and be consistent with a gener¬
al policy of indexation of capital gains.
These difficulties on both the stock and the debt side are in part
instances of the general problem of taxing capital gains in a period
of rapid inflation. Though the debate on alternative inflation
adjustments for company income draws special attention to it, the
same problem keeps cropping up in a whole range of contexts (see, for
instance, Flamming and Little (1974), p.6). In his April 1975
Budget Speech, Mr. Healey promised tc review the incidence of capital
gains tax in the course of the subsequent year. His area of interest
does, however, seem rather narrow, centring on whether the capital
gains tax "is bearing unduly heavily on those who hold assets for
long periods and is too lenient on those who hold for very short
periods." Given the importance of the subject both for company finan¬
cing and for equity, there would perhaps be a case for the Chancellor
referring to the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and
Wealth those aspects of the issue not considered by the Inflation
Accounting Committee.
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ANNEX TO APPENDIX 3.
1. The 'E.D.3. Adjustments'
a. Profit
1. Depreciation
Additional provision for E.D.8. depreciation = conventional
depreciation x proportional rise in the price index since the aver¬
age date of purchase of fixed assets.
Average age of assets estimated as: accumulated depreciation r
current year's conventional depreciation provision.
2. Stock appreciation
Stock appreciation = change in book value of stocks - value of
physical increase in stocks.
Value of physical increase in stocks = revalued closing stocks -
revalued opening stocks.
Revalued closing stocks = book value of closing stocks x (1 +
proportional rise in the price index since the average date of
purchase of closing stocks).
Revalued opening stocks are defined in the same way as closing
stocks. Total months purchases held in stock estimated as: 12 x
stocks f year's cost of sales.
3. Erosion of net monetary liabilities
a. Loss on holding net monetary assets = net monetary assets at
beginning of year x proportional rise in price index during year +
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increase in net monetary assets during year x proportional rise in
price index since mid-year.
Net monetary assets - current assets (excluding stock) - current
liabilities.
b. Gain from holding long term liabilities is calculated in the
same way as the loss on holding net monetary assets. Long term
liabilities ~ preference capital plus loans plus tax equalisation
account.
4. Purchases and sales




Addition to fixed assets - conventional fixed assets x proportional
rise in price index since the average date of purchase of fixed
assets (see a.l. above).
2. Stocks
E.D.O. stocks = revalued closing stocks (see a.2. above).
2. Special Assumptions
a. Accounting date
The data for any year includes companies with accounting dates
between April of that year and March of the following year. Most
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accounting dates are in fact in December of the year or March of
the following year. I have assumed that the 'aggregate account¬
ing date' is December 31st.
b. Age of stocks
The age of stocks calculation requires data on sales, available
only from 1969 in the D.T.X. accounts. As the age varied little
after 1969, I have assumed that the 1969 estimated age was approp¬
riate for all earlier years (in a.2. and b.2. above).
3. The Estimates of Changes in Individual Industries' Tax Liabilities
The change for each industry has two components:
a. due to the change in the industry's taxable profit;
b. due to the change in the overall rate of tax required to raise
the same aggregate tax on changed aggregate profits.
(a) is computed as the marginal rate of tax x the change in the
industry's taxable income. The marginal rate of tax is taken as
the current rate of Corporation Tax. The change in the industry's
taxable income is assumed equal to recorded profit minus 'E.D.8.
profit'. This implies for example that capital allowances for
tax purposes are inflated by the same amount as companies' own
depreciation provisions.
For (b) each industry's adjusted tax bill (i.e. original bill plus
adjustment in (a)) is increased by a uniform factor for all indus¬
tries, so as to yield the same aggregate tax revenue as originally.
This factor is calculated as: the original aggregate tax bill r
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(original aggregate tax bill plus the sun of the individual industry
tax bill adjustments made in (a)). In 1968 the sua of adjustments
under (a) was negative, so this factor was greater than one.
Note. Only Corporation Tax, and not Schedule F on dividends, is
taken into account in these calculations. If, as seems likely, divi¬
dends were reduced when inflation accounting was introduced (see foot¬
note 12. above), the yield from Schedule F income tax would be reduced,
and the tax rate on adjusted income would have to be yet higher to




The Pattern and Financing of Growth; Giant Companies; 1948-69
a. Introduction
This appendix forms a complement to chapters 5 and 9 of the thesis:
it compares the growth and financing characteristics of giant com¬
panies with those of other quoted companies. In their assessment
of growth by takeover and the methods by which this growth was
financed, those chapters rely on simple averages of ratios across
all companies, and largely leave out of account the relative size of
the companies belonging to the different groups analysed. This
procedure could give a somewhat misleading impression of the import¬
ance of certain activities, for instance takeover, to the whole
economy because the size distribution of companies is positively
skewed. In fact a relatively small number of companies dominate
the economy, and increasingly so: in 1969, the top 100 companies
accounted for 65% of the total net assets (at book value) of the
quoted company population whose aggregate accounts were published by
the Departaent of Trade and Industry. This compares with 50% in
1957 and 46% in 1948.1
This appendix is the joint work of G. Whittington and myself. An
earlier version of it is to be published in The Economic Journal,
December 1975.
1. The 1969 figure is overstated somewhat relative to earlier
years, since the Department of Trade and Industry excluded cer¬
tain small quoted companies in 1360, and the 1969 total figure
excludes companies above the minimum size requirement which
had newly obtained a quotation between 1964 and 1969. See
Whittington (1972) for further discussion of these comparisons.
For complementary figures on the increase in the share of
national net output accounted for by the top 100 and on the
associated changes in industrial concentration, see Aaronovitch
and Sawyer (1974).
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A separate study of the Giants is anyway worthwhile. In the first
place, their ascendancy has marked them out for special treatment by
recent governments of both Right and Left. The Conservative
Government sought to effect price and profit controls by concentrat-
2
mg monitoring efforts on the Giants; and the Labour Party and
Government have been anxious to increase public involvement in the
policies of the Giants, either through state ownership or through
3
planning agreements. Secondly, much recent theoretical work on
the firm has focussed on giant companies, in the belief that they are
more emancipated from market constraints on their behaviour, and that
for them the divorce of ownership from control has proceeded far-
4
thest. Finally, some empirical work has suggested incidentally
certain important differences between the Giants and the Rest, in
particular in their involvement in mergers (see Singh, (1S71)), in
the stability of their performance (see Whittington, (1971)), and in
their relation with the capital market (see Tew and Henderson,
(1959)); although the only specific study of giant British companies
(Prais, (1957)) concluded that the similarities between the Giants
and the Rest were "more striking than the differences." As is
shown below, Prais5 conclusion, which related to the period 1948-53,
has to be modified for more recent periods, primarily as a result of
the high level of merger activity, in which the giant companies have
been particularly involved. In fact, the conclusions of chapter 6
2. See Counter Inflation Act, 1973. Actually, 'category 1'
embraced rather mere than the top 100 companies.
3. See Labour Party Study Group Report (1973), and White Paper
(1974).
4. See, in particular, Harris (1964), Galbraith (1972).
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and S on the role of growth by takeover are re—emphasis*®'-1 wHcn differ¬
ences in company size are taken into account.
b. The Subsets of Companies Selected for Study
The population of quoted companies used throughout the thesis (and
described in appendix F) has been divided into Giants and the Rest,
where a giant company is defined as a member of the top 100 when the
population is ranked according to the book value of net assets. Mem¬
bership of the top 100 is inevitably an arbitrary definition of
'giantness', though it has been popular in earlier work."* The
length of the period selected prompts a further problem of defini¬
tion! when both the top 100 membership and the total quoted company
population are continually changing, at what point during the period
should companies be classified as Giants or the Rest? If the top
100 at the end of the period is separated out, then, firstly, their
experience during the period will emphasise the causes of giant
status rather than its consequences, and secondly, some members will
not even have been alive for the whole period. If the top 100 and
the Rest for each individual year are chosen, and their experience
averaged over all years of the period, comparisons become confused;
the experience of a single company could contribute to the Giant
result in some years, to the Rest's in others, and to neither in yet
others (if it did not survive the period).
In this study the analysis has been confined to those companies which
5. For instance, the definition is adopted in studies by Kaplan
(1954), Prais (1357) and Shannon (1973).
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survived^ the whole period, a procedure wnich, while eliminating
the experience of companies which were born or died during the period
of study, does allow the persistent features of a defined population
to be isolated, without the confusion of continual changes in the
identity of its members. 393 companies survived from 1948-69 and
are included in the main analysis (this is the set of companies which
constitutes the aggregates in Table 6.A). Then as a criterion for
allocating these continuing companies to the two groups, Giants and
the Rest, the opening status of the company has been chosen so as
to concentrate on the consequences of giant status: members of the
top 100 in 1948 which continued in existence to 1969 are compared
with those of the Rest in 194S which were still alive in 1969 (see
Table C.A., Section (a) for the numbers within each group).
Of course, by the late sixties, this list of Giants becomes outdated:
though all are alive, some will have lost their place in the top 100
and some members of the 1948 Rest will have gained promotion to the
ranks of the Giants. To meet this difficulty two further sets of
comparisons have been made. Firstly, members of the top 100 in
1964^ which survived until 1969 are compared with those of the Rest
in 1964 who also survived until 1969, this shorter period giving
less scope for drastic changes of status (1535 companies -
6. 'Survival' means continued membership of the population as an
independent quoted company.
7. 1964 was chosen because additional information on acquisitions
was made available by the D.T.I, from that year (see appendix D).
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nearly twice as many - continued in independent existence for this
five-year period; see Table C.A., Section (b)). Secondly, the
records over the twenty-one years of a group of 'Growing Giants'
(which includes many companies which entered the top 100 between 1943
and 1969), and a group of :Shrinking Giants' (many of which left the
top 100 between 1948 and 1969), are compared with the experience of a
group of 'Stable Giants' who maintained their status and a stable
growth rate for the full period. Both these supplementary studies
have some importance in their own right, in addition to that of com¬
plementing the basic comparisons for the longer period. The study
for 1964-55 focusses on the Giants' experience in the special economic
circumstances of recent years, which, as chapter 6 shows, have wit¬
nessed very high merger rates; whilst the comparison of Growing,
Stable and Shrinking Giants reveals some of the causes of status
g
change and the concomitants of success or failure.
The precise definitions of Growing, Stable and Shrinking Giants intro¬
duce some complications. Classification according to the single
'success' criterion of whether a company had moved (up or down) past
the arbitrary rank of 100 would produce certain anomalies. To take
an extreme example, a company which rose from rank 101 in 1948 to rank
100 in 1969 would be termed a Grower, whilst another firm which jumped
from rank 100 to lead the whole field by 1969 would join the more
ordinary group, the Stable Giants. Accordingly, additional growth
criteria were added to the full definitions of these groups:
8. Extreme failure would, of course, involve takeover or liquida¬




Number of companies in the various populations studied
1948-1969
(a) Surviving 1948 Giants compared with
other Surviving Companies:
Giants (Members of the 1948 top 100) 58
The Rest 835
Total continuing companies (1948-1969) 893
(b) Growing Giants contrasted with
Stable and Shrinking Giants;
Growing Giants
(All of them in the 1969 top 100) 32
Of whom; in the 1948 top 100 4
in the 1948 Rest 28
Shrinking Giants
(All of them in the 1948 top 100)
Of whom: in the 1969 top 100





(All in the 1948 top 100, and all but
one in the 1969 top 100) 37
1564-1969
(c) Giants (Members of the 1964 top 100)





Growing Giants; Companies outside the 1948 top 100 which grew into
Q
the 1969 top 100, plus companies in the 1948 top 100 which grew" at
more than tvice^ the rate of money national income from 1948 to
1969. (Most of the former group also grew at more than twice the
rate of growth of money national income, and the remainder failed
to do so by a narrow margin. All of the latter group were still
members of the top 100 in 1969).
Shrinking Giants: Companies in the 1948 top 100 whose growth was
slower than that of money national income from 1948 to 1969. (Their
shrinkage was thus relative rather than absolute. These companies
included all but one of those which were in the 1948 top 100 but not
in the 1969 top 100).
Stable Giants; Members of the top 100 in both 1948 and 1969, whose
growth rate lay between that of money national income and twice that
of money national income for 1948 to 1969. (All but one of these
companies were members of the top 100 in 1969; the exception was
actually ranked 105 in 1969, having been ranked 93 in 1948).
The numbers in each group are detailed in Table C.A., Section (b).
c. Surviving 1948 and 1964 Giants compared with other Surviving
Companies
Table C.B. details the growth of the typical Giant and of the typical
9. Growth, like size, is measured here in terms of the book value
of net assets.
10. This cut-off point has no special economic significance: it was
a convenient round number which divided the potential Stable or
Growing Giants into two fairly distinct groups of similar size.
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member of the E.est (the definitions being based upon opening size)
for the two periods (1948-69 and 1964-69). The comparison of rates
of growth of net assets reveals that in 1964-69 the Giants grew fas¬
ter than the Rest,^ or than both groups for the period 1943-69.
As a result, the 1964 Giants had slightly increased their share of
12
joint net assets by 1969. Moreover, the 1964 Giants grew faster
on average than the 1948 Giants despite the fact that the average
growth rate of money national income was lower in the shorter per-
The section of Table C.3. headed 'Uses of Funds' shows how the rela¬
tively high growth rate of the 1964 Giants was achieved. Their
14
growth by new investment in fixed assets was lower than for the
11. Except in annex Table C.G., "The Giants" or "the Rest" means a
typical member of the Giants or of the Rest respectively.
12. Strictly, the change in shares stems from differences in the
weighted average growth rates of the two groups. And the
differential between the weighted averages was only 0.6% p.a.
(in favour of the Giants; see annex Table C.G.) in 1964-69:
consequently the Giants' share increased only slightly. In the
longer period, although the Rest's simple average growth rate was
somewhat below that of the Giants, their weighted average was
actually higher, with the result that they increased their share
of joint net assets.
13. In comparisons of the growth rate of companies' net assets with
that of money national income, the former is probably overstated
when the rate of inflation is rising. The denominator in the
former case is in the prices of various earlier years, whilst in
the latter case, it is in the prices of the previous year.
14. In the summaries of sources and uses of funds in these tables,
depreciation has been netted out of both investment in fixed
assets and retentions, in order to arrive at the net increase in
the value of companies' capital (which corresponds to the growth
measure; see chapter 2 above on the arbitrariness of equating
depreciation with replacement investment). Similarly, the net
increase in all current assets minus all current liabilities is




The anr.tomy of growth: giants and the rest
1948-1969 1964-1969
'48 '48 '64 '64
Giants Rest Giants Rest
Rate of Growth cf Net Assets (% p.a.) 7.8 7.7 10.2 8.0
Shares of Joint Net Assets %
1948 59.9 40.1
1964 57.6 42.4
1969 54.8 45.2 58.1 41.9
Rate of Growth of Money National
Income3 (% p.a.) 6.4 6.4 5.7 5.7
Uses of Fundsb (% Df nat asSets)
Fixed Assets, Net of Depreciation 3.6 3.2 3.3 3.S
Net Current Assets2 1.9 2.2 0.9 0.3
New Subsidiaries and Trade
Investments2' 1.9 2.0 5.4 3.7
Average Interval between Acquisition
of Quoted Companies (years) 5 40 2.5 33
Number of Companies within Group: 58 835 75 1620
Notes:
All ratios are unweighted averages across individual company/years.
a. Central Statistical Office (1972) and earlier years.
b. Individual uses sum to slightly less than Rate of Growth of net
assets because expenditure on new subsidiaries is shown net of
increases in minority interests in subsidiaries.
c. Increases in stocks, debtors and liquid assets, minus increases
in trade creditors and provisions, dividend and tax liabilities,
bank overdrafts, etc.
d. Valued at book value (in acquirer's books) until 1963; at stock
market valuation from 1964 (see appendix D).
For fuller details of the source and definitions see appendix F.
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1964 Rest, or for the Giant group during the period 1948-69;'''"' but
the 1964 Giants markedly surpassed the other groups in their growth
by the acquisition of new subsidiaries, a use which had overtaken
new investment in fixed assets as the major component of growth and
represented more than half of total growth in the typical Giant.^
14. Contd.
Those familiar with company accounts at this tine will realise
that many companies deducted the value of investment grants from
the purchases of fixed assets recorded in their accounts. In
standardising these accounts, however, the Department of Trade
and Industry was generally able to add back investment grants.
The minority of cases where this was not possible on account of
inadequate disclosure by companies is not sufficiently large to
invalidate any of the conclusions presented here.
In fact, the slight remaining downward bias in reported invest¬
ment is offset by another measurement bias. The allocation cf
increases in fixed assets to "new investment" on the one hand,
and to the purchase of fixed assets belonging to new subsidiaries
on the other, relies on the Department of Trade and Industry
being able to identify new subsidiaries and the value of their
fixed assets. By default, unidentified fixed assets acquired in
a takeover swell the "new investment" figure.
15. The Giants' ability to operate with proportionately fewer net
current assets (evidenced here and in the balance sheets which
were also available) may simply reflect their membership of ind¬
ustries with relatively small working capital requirements. On
the other hand, it may be the result of the Giants' greater effi¬
ciency in the management of stocks and of cash balances, or yet
again, of their greater market power, which could yield a more
favourable creditor-debtor ratio than for the Rest.
Too much significance cannot be attached to the results for net
current assets, however; the figure as defined here is essen¬
tially a residual comprising all elements of growth in net assets
apart from investment and acquisitions. It thus comprises inc¬
reases in stocks, debtors and liquid assets minus increases in
trade creditors, dividend and tax liabilities, bank overdrafts,
etc. Greater attention is paid in this appendix to movements in
long term investment and financing.
16. A major caveat attaches to detailed comparisons of the acquisi¬
tions figures for different periods: they are hindered by a
change of definition in 1964. Formerly, acquisitions were
recorded at the book value attributed to them in the acquirer's
books. From 1964, both the acquisition figure and our defini¬
tion of net asset growth are based on the cash paid for subsid¬




The importance of merger activity ' for Giants in the recent period
is supported by a second statistic, the frequency of acquisition of
quoted companies: in 1964-69 a typical Giant acquired another quoted
company once every two-and-a-half years, whereas members of the 1964
g
Rest acquired a quoted company only once in thirty-three years.
Moreover, as chapter 6 shows, merger activity increased in overall
importance for the later period, when both groups were acquiring
subsidiaries much more frequently than were their counterparts for
the whole period, 1943-69.
The scale of the Giants' reliance on growth through merger provides
a striking contrast with the results of an earlier study. In his
analysis of the growth of the 320 largest U.K. companies for the
period 1954-65, Utton (1972) attributed only around 16% of the
19
growth of the top 80 companies to acquisitions, and found, raore-
16. Contd.
exchange for subsidiaries. Typically, this market valuation
exceeds book value (see appendix D).
As was mentioned above (footnote 14), unidentified acquisitions
of non-quoted companies swell the other uses headings, depress¬
ing the takeover total, and the total is under-stated throughout
the period for a second reason: only the purchase price of a
subsidiary is included here, not the value of minority interests
or of the subsidiaries' long-term loans, which serve to swell the
assets over which control is gained, and which are, in fact,
included in our definition of growth of net assets. Singh and
Whittington (1968, p.213), provides a discussion of consolida¬
tion procedures.
17. "Merger" and "takeover" are used interchangeably here.
18. The comparison between Giants and the Rest is not totally fair.
Companies typically acquire subsidiaries smaller than themselves
(see chapter 7), and the smaller Rest may have acquired non-
quoted companies (not included in our analysis) relatively more
often, although we have no empirical evidence of this.
19. Utton's lower acquisition figure is all the more striking as he
includes in it the minority interests and loan stocks of
acquired/
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over, "some suggestion of an. inverse relationship between size and
importance of growth by merger." Two explanations of his loirer
figure nay be invoked. Firstly, and of over-riding importance,
Utton's period closes before the merger boon of the late sixties;
the figures in Table C.B. relating to the longer period, 1948-69, are
much closer to Utton's; and, unless the comparison is upset by
differences between the two giant populations, the fact that the
1964-69 average growth by merger exceeded the 1948-69 average implies
that the 1948-63 average (which, like Utton's period, excludes the
main merger boom) was lower than that for the whole tv7enty-one
years. Secondly, it is possible that Utton's method of allocating
growth to external means (mergers) and internal means (all other
growth) may overstate the latter at the expense of the former. It
is common for acquiring companies to pay more for an acquisition than
the "victim's" book value and to deal with the surplus payment either
by creating "goodwill" or by revaluing tangible fixed assets (see
appendix D). On Utton's definition of internal growth as total
growth minus the book value of victims, the figure of internal growth
will then incorporate the increase recorded in the valuation of take¬
over victims. The different period adopted and valuation differences
could also contribute to the second discrepancy between our findings
and Utton's, over whether there exists an inverse relationship between
20
size and importance of merger. In this context, another factor
19. Contd.
acquired companies, which are excluded from our definition of
acquisitions.
20. Chapter 9 does, however, suggest that companies growing very
rapidly by takeover tend to be smaller than average; while
companies with middling growth by acquisition are larger than
average.
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nay be the dissimilar range of company size in the two studies: the
smaller companies in Utton's sample of the 320 largest are still very
big (near Giants) in terms of our sample.
On the financing side, our results for 1964-69 also present an inter¬
esting contrast with earlier work, which in this case had prompted
a clear expectation that retentions would represent the paramount
source of companies' funds. Baumol (1965), in his review of the
capital market, concluded that "for the bulk of American enterprise,
(the stock market) only constitutes a capital source of last resort",
citing the evidence of Donaldson that "only a small minority push
the rate of investment to the point of having a need substantially
in excess of internal generation over extended periods of time."
Kaldor, too, in his recent writings on company taxation (1971), has
emphasised the dominant role of internal finance in companies'
21
growth. Similar views have passed into the less technical litera¬
ture: Galbraith (1972, p.81) for instance, argues that "retained
earnings of corporations have become an overwhelmingly important
source of capital." 3annock (1973, p.96) maintains that "the mature
corporation finances most of its growth from internal sources."
21. These views were indeed supported by empirical evidence for the
early post-war period in the U.K.: see Tew and Henderson
(1959, p.70), and Whittington (1971, p.108). It must also be
remembered that we have confined our attention to net invest¬
ment: gross investment is of course financed to an important
extent by internally generated depreciation funds (see chapters
2 to 4 above).
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The results presented in Table C.C. suggest that the widely held view
that internal finance is of paramount importance for large companies
may have been correct in the period 1948-64. However, in 1964-69,
the giant (or mature) corporations (which account for over half the
activity of the quoted company sector - see above) typically financed
almost 70% of their net asset growth by new issues; and even the rest
of the sector financed more than half (55%) of their net asset growth
through the capital market in this period. Just as, on the invest¬
ment side (Table C.B.), "external growth" by acquisition had in 1964-
69 displaced net new investment in fixed assets as the major means
of expansion for the Giants, so, on the financing side, long term
external funds had overtaken retentions as the principal source of
22
finance. In fact, the two developments are closely related, since,
for 1964-69, more than half of these external funds were raised in
the course of share for share exchanges on the acquisition of new
subsidiaries. The increased importance of external finance as it
is defined here, does not, therefore, necessarily mean that the com¬
pany sector was increasing its reliance on funds from other sectors:
the major role of this external finance was in re-allocating control
over existing assets among companies, not producing growth cf the
assets of the company sector (see the discussion of takeover finan¬
cing in chapters 9 and 10).
22. This external finance measure, like the acquisition measure in
the uses cf funds statement, excludes new minority interests
and new subsidiaries' existing loans, and might be said to
understate new external finance (see footnote 16).
TABLE C.C.
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The financing of growth; giants and the rest-
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4.2 4.9 2.9 3.4
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Pre-tax P^ate of Return on
Net Assets (% p.a.) 14.6 17.2 13.0 15.4
Proportion of Pre-tax




See appendix F, for fuller details of the source and definitions.
a. Sources of funds in this Table sun (by definition) to the same
amount as Uses of funds in Table C.B. Like the Uses figures,
they sun to rather less than total Growth of Net Assets because
they omit increases in minority interests in subsidiaries.
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The second part of Table C.C., when compared with Table C.B., reveals
a further interesting feature of the Giants' financing pattern: the
faster growth rate of the Giants in 1964-69 and equality of growth
rate with the Rest in 1948-69 were achieved despite a lower rate of
23
profit. Indeed, the 1964 Giants achieved easily the highest growth
rate of the four groups, even though they typically recorded the low¬
est rate of profit (2.4 percentage points below the 1S64 Rest), and
saved the smallest proportion of that profit; that is, even though
the growth rate attained through internal finance was lowest for them.
The apparently strange result emerges that the capital market provi¬
ded the least profitable group, the 1964 Giants, with proportionately
more external finance, enabling them to grow faster than the Rest;
and this seeming perversity extends to the longer period too, when
23. Some would argue from the deficiencies of accounting data that
these differences in recorded profitability might be accounted
for simply by measurement biasses, with the Giants valuing their
assets more highly, consequently inflating the denominator of
the rate of return, and (through higher depreciation provisions
than those of the Rest) depressing its numerator. It seems
unlikely in fact that the differentials can be readily explained
by the two particular asset valuation biasses commonly adduced.
Firstly, the Giants' disclosed rate of return would indeed
suffer if they revalued their assets more frequently or more
extensively than the Rest. Yet for 1964-69, the period for
which such data are available, revaluations represented 6.4% of
1964 net assets for the Rest, compared with only 4.7% for the
Giants. Secondly, even without revaluations, inflation can
impart a bias, under historic cost accounting, to comparisons
of the profitability of companies with different growth rates:
the faster growers acquire and so value a bigger proportion of
their assets at more recent prices, consequently recording a
lower rate of return. However, over the full twenty-one year
period, the two groups grew at very similar rates. Then, in
1964-69, the faster growth of the Giants was due to a higher
takeover rate, which would probably not impart so strong a bias
as a higher new investment rate (and of course, it was the Rest
who had the higher rate of growth by new investment): acquisi¬
tions are sometimes valued in the acquirer's balance sheet at
the victim's historic cost book value and rarely at their full
current market value (see appendix D).
C.17.
the least profitable group, again the Giants, were favoured like-
24
wise.
There are, however, some mitigating factors which may help to explain
the capital market's favour of the Giants. The Giants' performance
displayed less variability than the Rest's in both periods so that
compensation for their lower average rate of profit may have been
found in lower risk. Table C.D. illustrates this in two ways.
Firstly, the average inter-year standard deviation of the rate of
25
return was appreciably smaller for the Giants. Secondly, the
Table records the typical interval between years in which a loss is
made; and in keeping with Galbraith's dictum that "big corporations
almost never lose money" ' the figures show that the 1964 Giants had
a statistical expectation of loss only once every 62 years, compared
27
with once every 16 years for the 1964 Rest - a pattern confirmed
by the figures for 1948-69.
24. Of course, we are dealing x^ith averages here: all the
external finance might have passed to the more profitable among
the Giants. Nevertheless these results are consistent with
the finding cf chapter 9 that the relationship between profit¬
ability and growth by takeover is much weaker than that between
profitability and internal growth.
25. This conclusion holds also for the inter-company dispersion: in
every individual year of the two periods, the inter-company stan¬
dard deviation of the Giants' profitability -was smaller than
that for the Rest,
26. Galbraith, 1972, p.82.
27. Of course, all the companies studied here are big by some
standards: unquoted and smaller quoted companies are not
included in the analysis.
C.18.
TABLE C.D.
The stability of performance, the pattern of financing, and the rate
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Average Interval between Years in
which Losses are Made (years) 87 29 62 16
Loan Issues ~ Total Net Sources (%) 17.0 8.6 35.2 18.2
Loan Issues ~ Total Issues (%) 44.3 32.7 58.8 50.3
Average Pre-tax Bete of Return




All ratios are unweighted averages across individual companies.
See appendix F, for fuller details of the source and definitions.
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The relative stability of the Giants' performance may make their
managements more willing to tolerate a higher level of gearing: as
Table C.D. shows, issues of loan stocks accounted for a much higher
proportion of sources of finance, and of total issues, for the Giants
than for the Rest. As a consequence, their return on equity capital
alone may compare more favourably with the Rest than does the return
on the total capital at their disposal and this might further miti¬
gate the market's apparent favour of the Giants. To assess the
impact of gearing on returns to ordinary shareholders, a measure of
the return on equity assets has been obtained by excluding loan
interest and preference dividends from the numerator of the rate of
return on net assets, and loans and preference capital from the
denominator. Whereas for the full twenty-one year period the Rest
achieved a return on total capital 2.6 percentage points above that
of the Giants (see Table C.C.), Table C.D. shows that the pre-tax
rate of return on equity capital of the Rest was only 2.1 percentage
points above that of the Giants. For 1964-69 the margin between
the two groups' performance was again smaller for the equity return
(1.7 percentage points) than for the return on total capital (2.4
percentage points). Thus, the Giants still failed to equal the
Rests' return on equity, although the differential was slightly smal¬
ler than for the return on net assets as a whole. Since the return
on equity assets is the more appropriate measure of shareholders
income (though not necessarily of the overall financial success of
the firm) the favour accorded the Giants by the capital market seems
less than the rates of return on net assets might suggest. Further¬
more, the risk attaching to the equity return (as measured by the
inter-year standard deviation shown in Table C.D.), is lower for the
Giants than for the Rest.
C.20.
The Giants' higher gearing brings them a further advantage. Since
the tax system, and, in particular, the Corporation Tax system which
was introduced in 1964, benefits more highly geared companies by
exempting loan interest from Corporation Tax, it favours the Giants
relative to the Rest; the lower proportion of income paid in tax by
the Giants is evident from our data, although the detailed results
are not reported here.
28
d. Growing, Stable and Shrinking Giants
The Growing Giants, by definition, have an outstanding expansion rate;
and Table C.E. shows that, like the growth rate of the Giant popula¬
tion studied in the previous section, it owes a great deal to take¬
over: growth by expenditure on new subsidiaries equalled that by net
investment in fixed assets for the Growing Giants, whereas Stable and
Shrinking Giants grew by at least two percentage points by the latter
29
means for every percentage point of growth by acquisition.
Moreover, the Shrinking Giants had relatively infrequent recourse to
acquisition of quoted companies (once every 16 years), whilst both
faster growing groups typically took over a quoted company every
* 30four years.
28. This section examines some factors in the diversity of growth
experience which contribute to fluidity in the composition of
the top 100, a feature documented by Whittington (1972).
29. See earlier discussion of the measurement biasses which cause
takeovers to be understated relative to investment in new fixed
assets (footnotes 14 and 22).
30. Very likely, the Growing Giants acquired more non-quoted com¬
panies than the Stable Giants, particularly in the early years
of the period when they were themselves small and would have
had difficulty in absorbing the typically larger quoted com¬
panies (see footnote 18).
TABLE C.E.
C.21,
The anatomy and financing of growth; shrinking, stable and growing,
giants, 1948-69
Shrinking Stable Growing
Rate of Growth of Net Assets (% p.a.) 4.1 8.7 16.6
Rate of Growth of Money National
Income^ 6.4 6.4 6.4
Uses of Funds (% of Net Assets)
Fixed Assets, Net of Depreciation












Average Interval between Acquisi¬
tion of Quoted Companies (years) 16 4 4
Pre-tax Rate of Return on Net
Assets (% p.a.) 11.7 15.9 18.0
Proportion of Pre-tax Income
Retained (%) 23.8 24.5 26.6









Number of Companies within Group: 17 37 32
i
Notes;
a. Central Statistical Office (1972) and earlier years.
b. Valued at book value (in acquirer's bocks) until 1963; at
stock market valuation from 1964 (see appendix D).
c. Increases in stocks, debtors and liquid assets, minus increases
in trade creditors and provisions, dividend and tax liabilities,
bank overdrafts, etc.
For fuller details of the source and definitions see appendix F.
Ratios are unweighted averages across individual companies.
Sources and Uses of Funds sometimes fail to sum to the rate of
growth of net assets because changes in minority interests in
subsidiary companies, which are a component of net assets, are omitted
from Sources, as presented here, and deducted in calculating the Use
of Funds "New Subsidiaries, etc."
C.22.
However, whereas in the comparison of the Giants with the Rest, the
former typically grew faster even despite lower profitability, here
profitability is positively associated with growth, and the propor¬
tion of profits retained is also least for the Shrinking Giants and
greatest for the Growing Giants. Nevertheless, on the financing
side, it is differences in the receipt of external finance which
chiefly account for the differences in growth rate. Each percentage
point of growth from internal funds was matched by 0.46 percentage
points' growth by long term external finance for the Shrinking Giants,
0.70 for the Stable Giants, and 1.31 percentage points for the Growing
32
Giants. For the Growing Giants then, capital issues were of major
importance; and whilst information is not available for this period
on the proportion of external finance raised in share exchange during
takeover, it is probable, in view of the importance of takeover to
the Growing Giants and of the role of share exchange for the typical
Giant in 1964-69 (revealed above), that merger financed through share
exchange was a very significant factor in the Growing Giants' devel¬
opment .
Table C.F. summarises these factors in the growth disparities. The
differences between the three groups' average rates of net investment
in fixed assets exceeded those for profitability, but the differ¬
ences for total net asset growth were greater still, thanks to the
31. These conclusions echo those for the study in chapter S of com¬
panies which grew intensively by acquisition.
32. Again, external finance may well be understated because of
measurement factors (see Footnote 22).
C.23.
greater external financing associated with the drastically greater
differences in the rate of growth by acquisition.
e. Summary
(a) Characteristics of the Typical Giant:
1. It typically grew appreciably faster than its counterpart in the
Rest in 1964-59, but not in 1948-69. A greater proportion of its
expenditure was devoted to takeovers than was the case for the Rest;
and, indeed, in 1964-69, the typical Giant spent more on takeovers
than on net new investment in fixed assets. This reinforces the
conclusions of chapter 6 on the importance of takeover to the typical
company.
2. In both periods, its pre-tax rate of return on net assets was
roughly two-and-a-half percentage points below that of the Rest.
As the proportion of pre-tax income retained was, however, similar
for both groups, the growth rate the typical Giant was permitted by
the supply of internal finance fell short of that permitted for the
typical member of the Rest. Necessarily, therefore, its higher
growth rate was achieved by greater reliance on the capital market:
in 1964-69, the capital market in fact supplied roughly 70% of the
growth of the Giant's long term finance as against 56% for the Rest.
The Giant's greater reliance on external finance in 1964-69 compared
with the Rest and also with the earlier period is associated with its
high rate of takeover; more than half of its new issues were made
in exchange for new subsidiaries, a procedure which, of course,
involves no inflow of funds from other sectors, but only a re¬
allocation among managements of control over existing assets. These
results are consistent with those of chapter 9 that profitability is
relatively weakly associated with growth by takeover.
TABLE C.F.
C.24,
Summary of relative performance; shrinking, stable and growing
giants, 1948-1969
Shrinking Stable Growing
Stable Giants = 100
Pre-tax Rate of Return 74 100 113
Net Investment in Fixed Assets r
Opening Assets 60 100 147
Rate of Growth of Net Assets 47 100 191
New Subsidiaries and Trade
Investments r Opening Net Assets 42 100 311
Note:
For details of definition, see Table C.E.
C.25.
3. Two factors may explain why the capital market supplied relatively
more external finance to the less profitable group, the Giants.
Firstly, less risk may attach to ownership of the Giant's shares;
its performance was more stable over time, and it lost money less
often. Secondly, the typical Giant enjoyed a higher level of gearing
(which perhaps was fostered by its more stable performance and was
certainly encouraged by the tax system) with the result that its
average rate of return on equity capital showed it in a slightly less
unfavourable light than did the average rate of return on net assets.
(b) The Rise and Fall of Giant Companies:
The study of Growing, Stable and Shrinking Giants re-emphasises the
importance of growth by merger, financed through share for share
exchange. For the Growing Giants, the acquisition of new subsid¬
iaries typically accounted for a higher proportion of expenditure
than did the purchase of new fixed assets. Though the Growing
Giants were typically the most profitable of the three groups, and
saved the biggest proportion of their income (with the Shrinking
Giants displaying the lowest profitability and the lowest retention
ratio), so that their internal sources permitted a higher growth
rate, yet it was differences in the ratio of new issues to retentions
which chiefly accounted for the disparities in growth rates.
It seems likely that much of the Growing Giants' greater external
finance was raised by share for share exchange in the course of their
frequent takeovers.
C.26.
ANNEX TO APPENDIX C.
1. The Choice of Summary Statistics
The earlier work of Prais (1957) x^as based on a comparison of aggre¬
gate accounts summed over a five-year period and across all companies
v/ithin two groups, Giants and the Rest. For the twenty-one year
period considered here, however, such a procedure would involve giv¬
ing the later years much greater weight than the earlier ones, as the
unit of measurement, money, declined in value throughout the per-
33
iod. To remedy this problem, performance variables (profitability,
growth, investment, etc.), have been computed in ratio form for each
3A ^5
company-year and averaged for each group-period; whilst flow
accounts have been computed in percentage form for each company over
36
each of three seven-year sub-periods, and the arithmetic averages
of these sub-period results have then been computed for each group.
This gives equal weight to each sub-period, although the later years
within each sub-period are still likely to have high weight relative
. . 37
to earlier years.
33. Prices typically doubled during the period: see Central Stati¬
stical Office (1972), Table 16.
34. This is the same procedure as is adopted in chapters 6 and 9.
In all cases, extreme individual ratios (above 99.9% or below
-99.9%) have been constrained (to 99.9% or -99.9% respectively),
when computing summary statistics for a group.
35. Growth rates were also calculated on a geometric basis for each
firm across each period. The average of the geometric growth
rates yielded similar results to the arithmetic company/year
average. The latter is preferred in the main text because of
its convenient property as the sum of individual Sources or Uses,
and because of its advantages in offsetting the effects of infla¬
tion in eroding the weight of growth achieved early in a period.
36. One five-year period in the case of the 1964-69 study.
37. A preferred procedure would have been to compute and average
percentage flow accounts for each company-year; and this was, in
fact/
C.27.
Averaging the experience of individual companies within a group gives
equal weight to each firm, irrespective of size, and gives a picture
of the "typical" company which would be masked by the influence of a
feu large companies in a weighted average. For, even with the
Giants separated from the Rest, the diversity of size within each
group is still extremely large: in 1969 the biggest company was
roughly 40 times the size of the company ranked one-hundredth in size,
which was itself, about 40 tines that of the smallest companies
considered. Consequently, the experience of smaller companies within
either group would have relatively little weight in crude aggregates
or weighted averages for the group. The main analysis, then, is
based on simple averages of ratios, representing the typical behav¬
iour of members of a group, though certain weighted averages are
33
reported in Table C.G.
2. Industry Growth and Diversification
This section of the annex presents some limited and speculative con¬
clusions on the association between the industry environment of Giant
companies and their growth. The members of the three groups, Grow¬
ing, Stable and Shrinking Giants, were classified by their 1948 two-
digit industries; and the 22 industries represented were themselves
37. Contd.
fact, attempted. However, the volatility of income meant that
the denominator of these annual accounts, profit or total sources
of funds, was often very small or negative. This led to many
enormous and/or negative values for individual percentage flows,
which would have had to be excluded from the analysis if they
were not to distort the averages. When the percentage flows
were computed for a longer period, however, very few companies
had to be excluded for this reason.
33. The comparison of a weighted average with an arithmetic average
across firms gives some indication of the x-ray in which a variable
is affected by size of firm within a group.
C.28,
table c.g.














































The weighted variables are computed from group annual aggregates
using the definitions provided in Singh and Whittington, 1968,
p.236, Figures in brackets are numbers of companies within the
relevant group. The unweighted variables are extracted from
Tables C.3., C.C., and C.E.
C.29.
ranked by their average rate of growth of net output for the twenty-
39
one year period. Taking each group in turn, the proportion of
companies which belonged to the 11 faster-growing industries was
calculated with the following results:
Percentage of the -
Shrinking Giants in the faster-growing industries ... 53
Stable Giants " " " " " ... 51
Growing Giants " " " " " ... 66
Whilst, according to this very crude indicator, Shrinking Giants
appear on average to have enjoyed at least as favourable an industry
environment as the Stable Giants, the Growing Giants did typically
"benefit" from membership of faster-growing industries from the
first.
Some information has also been extracted on the attempts by Shrink¬
ing, Stable and Growing Giants to change their industrial base. As
a proportion of their total acquisitions of quoted companies, take¬
overs of companies outside their own two-digit industrial classifica¬
tion amounted to:
39. Central Statistical Office (1972) and earlier years.
40. This implicitly assumes that causation runs from industry to
company. The reverse may sometimes be true: for instance,
even if the company could take the growth of home demand for
the industry's output as given, the company's export perform¬
ance could still significantly affect its industry's growth
of home output.
C.30.
% by number % by value
Shrinking Giants 48 53
Stable Giants 53 58
Growing Giants 34 21
Of course, this study gives a very incomplete picture, since it is
based on crude industry classifications and also excludes both
acquisitions of non-quoted companies and diversification by direct
investment. Nevertheless, it complements the information on
industry growth, showing that the differences in this diversification
41
rate between Shrinking and Stable Giants were relatively slight,
whilst Growing Giants devoted a much smaller proportion of their
42
takeover activity to diversified mergers. This supports the
suggestion that the Growing Giants found their initial industry
environment relatively favourable to their expansion.
41. Of course, the typical Growing Giant spent much more on
acquisitions, in relation to its size, than did the member of
the Stable or Shrinking Giants (see Table C,F.); and conse¬
quently its "rate of groxjtn by diversified acquisition" would
still be higher.
42. Gort (1966) found evidence for the United States that®
in the majority of cases, companies diversified into indus¬




The Valuation of Acquired Companies; and its Impact on Profitability
a. Introduction
In a regime of rising prices, the book value of companies' assets
(which for the most part represents their historic cost) typically
understates their realisable value. When a company is taken over,
the acquirer often pays more than the book value of the victim, and
sometimes enters the victim in its own books at a value exceeding
that in the victim's books prior to the merger. This excess will
normally be entered in the acquirer's balance sheet under the asset
heading 'goodwill'; the victim's assets will then be added to the
other components of the balance sheet at historic cost. In these
cases of revaluation, the rate of return of the amalgamation (profit
■p average book value of net assets) will be lower than the weighted
average rate of return for the two separate entities would have been
in the absence of merger: for a bigger denominator (incorporating
goodwill) is used in calculating profitability.^"
1. A further bias exists in the calculation of the rate of return for
an amalgamation in the year of takeover.
If we assume that the takeover typically occurs in the middle of
the financial year, then the actual rate of return of the amalga¬
mation will be computed as:
R - Dby + *Dvy
1(D. .+D. Id )2 by-1 by vy




D c net assets
The weighted average profitability of the acquirer and victim,





Although accounting conventions prompt a clear expectation of a bias
in any profitability results (one which would in fact weaken if not
reverse the typical conclusions of earlier work) only Singh's study
makes allowance for it. He dismisses it, however, as slight, and
insufficient to seriously modify his results. Nevertheless, infla¬
tion has continued apace since Singh's period of study (the late
fifties), and it seems likely that premia over book value will have
been increasing.
b. The available data on merger valuation, and the estimation of
goodwill arising cn consolidation
Three values of a new subsidiary may be distinguished (although two
or even all three may in some cases be identical):
V.ls the valuation attributed by the Department of Industry (D.I.).
V.2: the amount at which the acquisition is recorded in the acqui¬
rer's balance sheet.
V.3: the value of the victim in its own balance sheet, prior to
acquisition.
1. Contd.
v' U, + UR = by vy
ny TOT . + D' +~D ~TD )by-1 by vy-1 vy
If the victim's and the acquirer's profitability are identical
and if D >D ., then R<R'.
vy' vy-1
Of course D will normally exceed since the growth of net
assets by retentions is generally positive. Fortunately, however,
the bias on this account is only likely to be slight on average,
insufficient to modify the results. For instance (substituting
typical values), suppose that the victim is one-fifth the size of
the acquirer; that one-fifth of profit is retained; and that the
rate of return cn net assets is around 15%. Then k will fall
short of R' by about 0.02%. But where the acquisition takes
place late in the year, and victim net assets grow by more than
average the difference will be larger, and vice versa (see the
discussion in chapter 7 of profitability in the year of merger).
D.3.
Before 1964, V.l, the D.I.'s valuation in the flow of funds state-
\
ment was taken as V.2. From 1964, however, the D.I. provided,
wherever possible, a current valuation of the newly acquired subsid¬
iary, defined as:
"... the cash paid or the market price at the date of issue of
shares or loan stock issued ... Where market values are not avail¬
able (not generally the case for the quoted companies dealt with
here) or the cash consideration is not disclosed (sometimes it would
be difficult to infer this value from companies' accounts before the
1967 Companies' Act, which required more detailed disclosure of
changes in assets and reserves) acquisitions are in general valued
2
at the net book value of the acquired company."
However, there is no statutory requirement of companies that they
disclose the market value of the shares and stocks which they issue
in exchange for new subsidiaries (in fact, company reporting of
acquisitions leaves much to be desired: often neither V.l nor V.2
nor V.3 is detailed in companies' accounts - see Lee (1974)). The
D.I, obtains this information from the Stock Exchange Weekly Intelli¬
gence and from the financial press. V.l appears in the Data Bank
at T73 (consideration for subsidiaries) from 1964* and this is the
valuation used (along with information on trade investments, etc.)
at T39 (expenditure on subsidiaries and trade investments) in the
Uses of Funds Statement (see appendix F). Hence it is the measure
used, from 1964, in the net assets growth measure employed elsewhere
3
in the thesis.
2. Department of Industry (1975).
3. See chapter 9 and appendix C in particular.
V.2/
The D.I. have typically provided V.3 in the computer file of company
accounts, but only since 1964. This information appears at T78 to
T87 and T90 (composition of subsidiaries' assets) in the Data Bank,
where the D.I. analyse the accounts of the victim prior to acquisi¬
tion (this analysis of the subsidiary's net assets into its compon¬
ent asset headings also enables the D.I. to exclude from uses of
funds headings, such as investment in fixed assets, the change in
the balance sheet heading, fixed assets, due simply to the takeover,
and not representing purchases of new fixed assets). However, the
D.I. does not perform this analysis for all acquisitions: only an
assumed total book value is provided where the purchase considera¬
tion (V.l) is less than £0.9 million or the victim is a foreign
registered or private exempt company. Since the threshold is def¬
ined in terns of market value, however, victims with a book value
of much less than £0.9 million are often analysed by the D.I. (N.B.
mergers with quoted victims whose accounts have not been analysed
by the D.I. are still included in the sample studied in chapters 7
and 8: these exclusions apply only to the valuation study reported
4
below). Nevertheless, increases in asset headings in the uses of
funds statement will be distorted when a company acquires another
which does not fall within the categories for analysis: increases
in assets will include the stocks of assets purchased with the new
3. Contd.
V.2 represents the actual change in the acquirer's net assets;
but it is arguable that V.l, being based on current values, is
more consistent with other components of not asset growth, such
as investment in new fixed assets which are measurad in current
values. Problems do arise in comparing V.l between individual
years, however: it is a volatile measure moving with the
often violently fluctuating level of stock market prices.
D.5.
subsidiary, and, since the purchase price also appears as a use of
funds at T39, a balancing adjustment appears under T44, the consoli¬
dation adjustment. This problem will often be trivial in the case
of very big acquiring companies, but could be more serious for small-
4
er ones.
In the years since 1964, the period of the merger study, V.2 is not
provided separately in the D.I.'s computer record, and hence not in
the Data Bank either. Yet this is the critical value for assessing
the accounting bias in post-merger profitability, since the differ¬
ence between V.2 and V.3 is the distorting element in the profitabi¬
lity calculation, goodwill. A procedure has therefore been develo¬
ped for estimating the goodwill arising on consolidation in order
that allowance can be made for its effect on post-merger profitabi¬
lity.
This component of goodwill (G) is estimated as:
G ■ T15 - T15 , - T38 - T80 (D.i)
ay ay-1 ay ay
Where:
a: acquirer
t: year of acquisition
T15: goodwill per balance sheet
T38: increase in intangible assets per uses of funds statement
(i.e. purchases of intangible assets other than goodwill on acquisi-
4. This information on valuations has been obtained from the D.I.'s
duplicated instructions prepared for the Department's staff respon¬
sible for the analysis and standardisation of the accounts in our
Data Bank; and from discussions with the Departm-sat's staff,
Mrs. W. R. Borland and hr. P. G. Reeve.
D • 6.
tion),
T80: goodwill in the accounts of the victim company at the time
of takeover.
Lest this estimation procedure might produce extreme and inapprop¬
riate results because of odd treatments of goodwill by individual
companies or D.I. analysts, the absolute value of G was constrained
to be no greater than the absolute value of (V.l - V.3). It is poss¬
ible that V.2 sometimes actually exceeded V.l, with the result that
this estimate of G would be biased downwards; but given the account¬
ing profession's predisposition to conservative valuation, it did
not seem likely that the acquirer's book valuation of a subsidiary
would exceed the market value too frequently, or by too much. Given
the possibility of unforeseen and unwarranted extreme results if the
constraint were not applied, the expedient seemed justifiable.
Profitability adjusted for the accounting bias on acquisition (F in
chapter 7) was then defined as:
F_ = 2,Uy (D.ii)
7 D + D - G
y y-i
- 2,Vl CD.iii)
Vl + Dy - 2G
F - 2*Uy+2 (D.iv)
7
°y+2 + Dy+1 ~ 2G
... etc.
Where U = profit (T66 - T32 - T33 - T34 + T59)
D = net assets (T22).
D.7.
(See appendix F for definitions of variables in the °T' sequence).
Except that, if a company wrote off goodwill in a year succeeding
the acquisition, and the total which was written off exceeded G,
then it was assumed that it was the goodx^ill arising on consolidation
which had been written off; and G rather than 2G was deducted from
the denominator for the year of write-off with no goodwill deduction
in subsequent years.
c. Comparison of adjusted with unadjusted profitability: an example
Table D.A. illustrates the potential scale of the accounting bias
by comparing profitability according to the usual definition
(2Uy/(Dy + with F for the acquirer in a famous takeover of
the late sixties, G.E.C.'s purchase of A.E.I. Profitability after
allowance for the accounting bias is around a sixth higher than the
conventional measure in the year of acquisition, and about a third
higher in subsequent years. Consequently, if adjusted profitability
(F) after the takeover were as high or even marginally higher than
that achieved on average by the two companies prior to the takeover,
tests based on the conventional measure of profitability alone (R)
would reveal a marked decline in this performance indicator for
G. E.C.
d. The typical extent of the accounting bias
To see whether G.E.C.'s experience was typical, or whether the
accounting bias was by and large slight, the premia over book value
and their effect on the conventional profitability measure were
estimated for all acquisitions of quoted companies analysed by the
D.8.
TABLE D.A.
Profitability according to the standard measure and profitability
adjusted for the accounting bias; G.E.C. in 1968
Principally as a result of the takeover of A.E.I., goodwill on
consolidation of some £170 million was added to the net assets of
G.E.C. in 1968, apart from the addition of the net assets of the
new subsidiaries at historic cost.
According to the estimation procedure detailed above,
G = £170.6ma
This figure was used to obtain an adjusted profitability figure for






aThe goodwill figure given by Lee (1974) for the takeover of A.E.I,
alone which was obtained from a detailed examination of the com¬
pany's accounts was £ £167.lm. The small difference is probably
due to goodwill arising on the other two minor acquisitions by
G.E.C. in the same year.
D.9.
D.I. between 1964 and 1971."*
Table D.B. illustrates the relationship between the three valuation
methods outlined above (V.l, the D.I. valuation (market in this
period); V.2, the valuation in the acquirer's books; and V.3, the
valuation in the victim's books). Goodwill arising on consolidation
(V.2 - V.3) and the excess of market over victim's book value (V.l -
V.3) are expressed as percentages of the victim's book value.
Though they are provided for reference, the relationships between
the aggregate (all acquisitions) values of these variables are not
the most useful in assessing the likely impact of the valuation bias
on profitability: they depend to a great extent on the accounting
treatment of a small number of takeovers which dominate the aggre¬
gates (the size distribution of companies, and hence of takeover
victims exhibiting high positive skewness). The studies of take¬
over's influence on profitability, reported above, give each com¬
pany equal weight: so it is appropriate here to calculate the ratio
of goodwill and market premium to book value for each individual
acquiring firm, and then take simple averages of these values across
companies, The resulting statistics are provided in the final col¬
umns of Table D.B.
The premium of market over book value is considerable, of the order
of one to two thirds of book value. Moreover, being very sensitive
to the general level of stock market prices, it fluctuates consider¬
ably between years. This illustrates the shortcomings cf this mea¬
sure as a guide to year to year changes in the volume of takeover














































































































































































































































































The goodwill recorded in the acquirer's books, the key variable in
estimating the bias in profitability, is appreciably lower than
the market premium (it is of course constrained to be no greater -
see above); but it is still around a third of book value. It also
fluctuates much less violently than the market premium, so that any
bias which it produces in profitability measures is unlikely to vary
a great deal between mergers undertaken in different years.
Table D.C. reports the effect on profitability of this goodwill
increment to the assets of an amalgamation. In the year of acquisi'
tion, adjusted profitability (with G deducted from the denominator)
was typically between about 1 and percent higher than unadjusted
profitability. In the subsequent year (when 2G is deducted from
the denominator), the difference ranged between 1.3% and 5.5%. Of
course, for a persistent acquirer the difference would be cumulative
and could far exceed these averages: these estimates include the

























































































































































Directors' Pay, Growth and Profitability
The last fifteen years have witnessed a series of theoretical works
that have sought to replace the traditional motive of company direc¬
tors, maximisation of profit, with the maximisation of some form of
growth.^" In support of this new maximand, several writers maintain
that increases in size present overwhelmingly greater material incen¬
tives to directors than do increases in profitability. Several ana¬
lysts have reviewed the evidence for this contention, using correla¬
tion or regression techniques to estimate the respective influence of
size and profitability on pay. Studies before 1970 obtained results
that were surprisingly decisive by the standards of applied economics,
and reported in favour of the "managerial theorists'" arguments with
2
remarkable unanimity. The relation between size and pay was found
to be positive and passed the usual statistical significance tests
with flying colours, whereas that between profitability and pay earned
only scorn: the estimated coefficient was not significantly differ-
This appendix is the joint work of G. Whittington and myself. An
earlier version is to be published in the Journal of Industrial
Economics, August 1975.
1. For example, Baumol (1967), Penrose (1959), Marris (1964), etc.
2. Roberts (1956) concludes that the "relationship (of executive
compensation) to the level of profit is superficial and disappears
when the influence of size upon both compensation and profit is
taken into account." Marris (1964) concurred with Roberts in
holding that "profitability had no apparent effect on salaries."
And McGuire, Chiu and Elbing (1962) found "that sales and execu¬
tive compensation are significantly correlated in five of the
seven cases given; while profits and executive compensation are
not significantly correlated."
A paper by Cosh (1975), which examines these relationships for
U.K. data, appeared after this study had been completed. It
reaches very similar conclusions to the analyses of U.S. data
which appeared before 1970; and its interpretation too requires
the qualifications applied below to the earlier work.
E.2.
ent from zero even at the permissive 5% level.
In 1970 the harmony was disturbed by Levallop. and Huntsman (1970), who
declared, on the basis of new estimates, that "... reported profits
are substantially more important in the determination of executive
compensation than are sales - indeed sales seem to be quite irrele-
3
vant ..." This paper, using hitherto unavailable data for a very
4
large sample of U.K. companies, reconciles these apparently conflict¬
ing statistical results; and, in interpreting them, rejects both
extreme positions.
a. The Model
The managerial theorists contend firstly that, above a certain growth
rate, increases in a company's growth rate are possible only at the
expense of the profit rate; and that market forces leave directors
some discretion in their choice of growth/profitability combination.^
This opens the way for a conflict between the interests of directors
and those of shareholders (if the latter are served only by profit
maximisation). Secondly, these theorists allege that, in decisions
3. In one respect, Lewellen and Huntsman's paper could boast superior¬
ity over both the earlier work (see footnote 2) and this study;
data was available for forms of income other than the salary, fees
and bonuses relied upon here (for instance for stock options which
are often thought to be more sensitive to profitability). In the
light of Lewellen and Huntsman's findings, neglect of these other
components would not, however, seem to restrict conclusions based
on the limited measure: typically, the broader definition of in¬
come proved to be no better explained by profitability than the
narrow variant.
4. Only since the 1967 Companies Act have U.K. companies been required
to disclose information about individual directors' pay; such data
were only accessible to us for all companies from 1969.
5. This formulation follows Harris (1964) in particular.
on directors' pay, a far higher premium is placed on growth than on
profitability. This means that the salary system, far from resolv¬
ing the conflict of interest by bribing directors to pursue share¬
holders' objectives, will instead induce directors to trade profit¬
ability for growth.
The claim that pay is more dependent on growth than on profitability
has been investigated here by estimating for cross-section data the
model;
(1) directors' pay - a + b.log size + c.rate of return
Underlying the model is the assumption that, over the whole range of
sizes and profit rates, any constant absolute difference in profit¬
ability will be associated with a constant absolute difference in
directors' pay; and, over the whole range of sizes, any proportion¬
ate difference in size will be associated with a constant absolute
difference in directors' pay. This formulation of the relationship
between size and directors' pay is that which is most consistent with
the view that directors are likely to be paid according to the pro¬
portionate growth rather than the absolute growth of their firms:
thus £100,000 of extra size will add more to the pay of the directors
of a £1 million firm than to that of the directors of a £10 million
,. 6
firm.
If the cross-section relationship (1) represents the payment rates
applicable to the average firm, the estimated slope coefficients can
6. This form of relationship is plausible in view of the shape of the
frequency distributions for the different variables; the size
distributions are strongly positively skewed, while only a slight
positive skewness is exhibited by pay or profitability (see annex,
Table E.F).
E.4.
ba used to infer the relative rewards dirostora might expect from
alternative policies with various growth and profitability implica-
if
tions, althouglyis argued below, the process of inference involves
important simplifying assumptions.
b. The Estimated Relationships
The model was estimated for the years 1969, 1970 and 1971 using a
variety of pay and size measures. However, in the text the results
of only one variant, common in the literature, are reported: pay is
defined as that of the highest paid director, sales are used as the
size measure, and the current year's rate of return is employed.
The results for other variants of the model, as well as a fuller
description of the data, are provided in the annex, where it can be
seen that none prompts a radically different conclusion from that
reported here, and that the choice of the specific model shown in
the text does not yield conclusions specially favourable to our
interpretation.
At first sight the results presented in Table E.A. might seem roughly
to confirm the standard conclusions.^ In terms of both statistical
and economic significance, size appears to trump profitability. The
reliability of b (as reflected in its t value) is much greater than
that of c. In economic terms, the model predicts that a shift from
7. Roberts (1956) (1959) and McGuire, Chiu and Elbing (1962) used
correlation analysis, and the rough similarity of our results to
theirs is confirmed by the simple correlations referred to in
the annex (Table E.G).
E.5.
g
the average to the top 5% of the respective distributions would,
in 1969, have increased salary by approximately £10,000 p.a. in
the case of size, as against only approximately £2,000 p.a. for
profitability. Consequently, the conclusion of Roberts (1956)
(1959), echoed by Marris (1964) and by McGuire, Chiu and Elbing
(1962), that, compared with size, profitability ha3 little or no
effect on salaries, might not seem to call for drastic revision:
profitability could be promoted to a somewhat more important minor
part, but with size retaining the lead role.
One step implicit in the managerial theorists' case here, however,
is a dubious one. They evidently argue that since the premium on
size outweighs that on profitability, so the premium on changes in
size, that is growth, will be paramount. This move can be challen¬
ged because, although the range of experience represented in the
cross-section observations may be attainable by the individual firm
in the case of profitability, it surely is not in the case of size.
While very swift progress from the lower to the upper tail of the
profitability distribution (and vice versa) is not uncommon (see
Whittington (1971), p.86), a comparable drastic shift within the
size distribution in the space of a few years is most unlikely.
To make the transition from smallest to largest of those companies
used in this study would imply a 750 fold increase in size; and
8. Taken as the mean of the variable plus two standard deviations,
on the assumption that the distribution of the variable is normal.
E.6.
since actual annual growth rates much ab&y© 20% afe unusual, such a
change would typically take many years. Accordingly, the exercise
carried out above which purports to evaluate the impact on salary of
the two explanatory variables, by comparing "equivalent" shifts
within their distributions, produces misleading results.
The relevant exercise, for inferring the consequences of changes
through time from the static model and comparing the incentive to
grow with that for raising profitability, would instead confine pre¬
dictions of pay increases to those associated with the feasible
growth and profitability achievements of the individual firrn.^
Table E.B. has been prepared on this basis, focussing on the range of
growth rates actually experienced over time, rather than on the
arbitrary dispersion of size observations at a single point in time.
It draws on the regression slopes reported in Table E.A. to present
the additional pay the director might be expected to receive for
raising the growth rate or profitability from the mediocre to the
outstanding, that is by increasing either performance measure from
9. Singh and Whittington (1968) document extensively the actual growth
rates achieved by U.K. companies. Constraints on the growth of
firms are imposed both by internal difficulties (see especially
Penrose on the problems of expanding the management team), and by
factors external to the firm, such as the growth of a company's
market or the national economy (on the latter, see Rowthorn (1971).
10. Better still for this purpose, the relationships would be esti¬
mated directly from observations of actual changes through time.
This has been attempted (see below), but the "static" results have
still been afforded pride of place firstly because the time period
for the dynamic exercise is necessarily so short, and secondly so
that the results may be directly reconciled with earlier work
which has concentrated on static relationships.
E.7.
TABLE E.A.






j *= 1969 -23896 3820 97 .345
(-14.6) (22.8) (5.1)
j = 1970 -23698 3872 68 .375
(-15.3) (24.5) (3.9)




D.. - a + b.log S. . + c.R.. + e..
D.. e salary, including bonuses, of highest paid director (£) for
the ith company for year j.
S = sales (£000)
R «= rate of return (%)
e = stochastic error term
Source: Published accounts of 1008 major U.K. quoted companies which
continued in existence from 1967 to 1971 (see annex and appendix F.
for further details).
Note: The t value of each coefficient is reported in brackets under
that coefficient. All the coefficients are significantly different
from zero at the 1% level. The constant term is expressed in £'s of
directors' pay and the other coefficients in £5s pay per unit change
in the relevant variable. In 1969, for example, a unit difference in
the natural log of size was associated with a difference of £3,820 in
pay, while a difference of one percentage point in the rate of return
was associated with a difference of £97 in pay.
Certain extreme values were omitted before estimating this and subse¬
quent models.
The results of the same exercise using alternative measures of salary,
size and rate of return are reported in the annex (Table E.H).
E.8.
its respective mean to two standard deviations above the mean. In
the case of profitability, this calculation merely involves the app¬
lication of the estimated coefficient c to the relevant change in
profitability. In the case of growth, the calculation is almost as
simple because the logarithm of the growth multiple ([1 + g], where
g is proportionate growth) is the change in the logarithm of size:
the logarithm of the relevant growth multiple is therefore applied to
the estimated coefficient b.^
In view of the established interpretation, the results shown in
Table E.B. are quite startling: the profitability premium exceeds
that for growth in two of the three years, while in the third, the
benefits for profitability are not drastically less than those for
.V 12growth.
11. The average and standard deviation of annual growth rates are
those of U.K. quoted companies for the period 1964-9 which are
available from another study. For consistency, the profit rate
statistics are taken from the sane group, though in fact they
are very similar to those for the sample used in the regressions.
As these growth estimates include the contribution of inflation
to nominal growth, whilst the static cross-section estimates are
necessarily in constant prices, they over-estimate the feasible
real growth of companies, and hence cause the premiums on growth
in Table E.B. to be inflated.
12. It might be objected that a director's salary boost for moving to
a much bigger company would still far exceed that for attaining
the maximum possible profitability in his present firm. However,
though this might be a significant factor in explaining direc¬
tors' personal strategies, it is irrelevant to the question of
how motivation impinges on the company's policy: someone has to
choose for the company between different profitability and growth
combinations, and the possibility of changing to a company of
vastly bigger size, though perhaps available to its directors, is
not open to the company. In fact, executive mobility has been
found to be low (see Roberts (1956) and (1959): it may well not
loom large in directors' personal strategies.
E.9.
TABLE E.B.
The premium on growth and profitability.




1969 A 344 1484
B 1413 2406
1970 A 343 1040
B 1433 1687
1971 A 360 704
B 1481 1141
A: Additional payment to the highest paid director for raising the
performance variable from zero to its mean (£).
B: Additional payment to the highest paid director for raising the
performance variable from its mean to two standard deviations
above its mean (£).
Source; Derived from the regression estimates reported in Table E.A
by the method described in the text.
Note; The results of the same exercise using alternative measures
of salary and size are reported in the annex (Table E.I).
E. 10.
Of course, all that these calculations assess is the economic signi¬
ficance of the regression coefficients. By contrast, earlier ana¬
lysts have relied heavily on the relative statistical reliability of
their estimates in discriminating between the potential influences on
directors' pay, and finding in favour of growth. It is certain,
however, that the regression of pay on growth, by restricting atten¬
tion to the zone of observations adjacent to an individual firm's
position in the size distribution and attainable by that firm would
diminish the relative reliability of the growth coefficient, b (as
reflected in its t value), compared to that which is obtained by
13
regressing pay on size. The extent of this effect is uncertain,
and there are further consequences of the transition from the use
of size to the use of growth as a regressor which are discussed
below. It is therefore misleading to rely on the relative stati-
13. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the model,
pay = a + b.log size
were estimated for two samples, the first being that on which
our regressions have been performed, and the second similar in
all respects except that the range of the regressor size was
drastically reduced. Thus, given:
b (the estimated regression coefficient), V (the residual vari¬
ance) and the size of the sample are common to both samples.
The range of x^ (size of the ith company minus mean size) is the
only difference. Necessarily, the sample with the restricted
V
A 2
range of sizes (smaller value for t.
See Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1970), page 23, for a fuller argn
ment.
£•11.
stical reliability of the estimates of the effect o£ size cn pay in
drawing inferences for the effects of growth.
c. The "Dynamic" Extension
The question cf how pay is affected by growth can be investigated
more directly by estimating (again in cross-section) a model comple¬
mentary to model 1 above:
(2) ^directors' pay = a + b.Mog size = c.&rate of return
It is surprising that previous studies have all preferred to infer
the effects of growth from those of size, rather than attempting dir¬
ect estimation.
Table E.G. presents the results of estimating model (2) where the
changes are those recorded between 1969 and 1371 in the particular
14
variables used for Table E.A. The new results confirm our
reservations about the inferences for the effects of growth which
can be drawn from model 1. The movement of pay with profitability
through time (reflected in c) is consistent with the relation across
firms observed for the static model; yet that of pay with changes
in size (reflected in b) is much reduced in comparison with model 1.
Again, the economic significance of the two slope coefficients is
illustrated by comparing the predicted rewards for outstanding as
14. So that the regression estimates were more directly comparable
with the static version 1, despite the high rate of inflation at
this time, ^directors' pay was expressed in constant prices (see
the general discussion of the impact of inflation in the annex).
Again, variants of the model with different measures of pay and
size were estimated. See annex, Table E.J.
E. 12.
opposed to nediocre growth or profitability performance: the compari¬
son is presented in Table E.R. the counterpart of the "static"
Table E.B. It can be seen that the previous conclusions are rein¬
forced: considering comparable achievements in terms of growth or
profitability within the period, the premium on profitability is
indeed at least as great as that for growth - in this dynamic case
it is in fact almost four times greater. Moreover, the relatively
superior statistical reliability of b observed for the static case
disappears when the changes in size are automatically constrained, in
the dynamic case, to those actually attained by companies.
Though, in terms of both economic and statistical significance, the
dynamic results appear to support the interpretation given for the
static model, too precise a construction should not be placed on the
comparisons of estimates obtained for models 1 and 2: the link be¬
tween the two is not without difficulties. Model 2 was designed as
an analogue of model 1, obtained simply by subtracting the static
equation for each company at the beginning of a period from that at
the end of the period:
D.. - a + b.lcg S.. + c.R.. + e..
lj J ij IJ ij
minus D.. , = a + t.log S.. . + c.R.. . +e.. ,ij-1 0 ij-1 ij-1 ij-1
gives the dynamic equation:
D. . - D. . - = (a - a) + b.(log S. . - log S. . ,) + c.(R. . - R. . ..) +
ij ij-1 & ij J ij-1 ij ij-1
(e. . - e. . , )
ij iJ-l
There are, however, three reasons in addition to that discussed
15. As predicted in the discussion above of the influence of the
regresscr's range on the coefficient's t value.
E. 13.
TABLE E.C.
The regression cf change in directors' pay on log growth and change






-626 1601 108 .09
(-3.6) (3.1) (8.7)
AD.. = a + b.Alog S.. + c.AR.. + e..
i = ith company
j = the period 1969 to 1971 (differences, A, are 1971 flows, less
1969 flows).
R = = rate of return (%).
D = salary of highest paid director in 1971 prices (£)
S = sales (£000)
e = stochastic error term
Source: As in Table EA.
The t value of each coefficient is reported in brackets under that
coefficient. All the coefficients are significantly different from
zero at the 1% level. A unit change in the natural log of size was
associated with a rise of £1,601 in pay, while a rise of one percent¬
age point in the rate of return was associated with an increase of
£108 in pay.
Note: Estimates of the model using alternative salary and size
measures are reported in the annex (Table E.J.).
E.14.
TABLE E.D.
The premium on growth and profitability
Period










A: Additional payment (£) for raising the performance variable
from zero to its mean.
B: Alditional payment (£) for raising the performance variable
from its mean to two standard deviations above its mean.
Source: Derived from the regression estimates reported in Table E.
Note: The results of a similar exercise using alternative salary a
size measures are reported in the annex (Table E.K.).
E. 15.
earlier^ why the size or reliability of the estimated coefficients
in the static and dynamic cases may not correspond precisely:
(i) Even if the underlying real relationship is constant, the
coefficients relating the nominal values of the variables will change
with inflation (see the annex): so a, b and c may differ in the
static equations at time j-1 and j.
(ii) It seems likely that, insofar as the error term represents the
relative generosity of the pay policy of the individual firm, e^
will be positively correlated with e^ since there is no reason
to expect that companies which initially pay above or below the norm
described by the regression will cease to do so. ^ This would mean
a lower residual variance for the dynamic than for the static model,
with correspondingly higher t values for all the individual coeffi¬
cients .
16. See the final paragraph of section b, and footnote 13.
17. This problem could be dealt with by estimating an error compon¬
ent version of model (1) from pooled cross-section and time
series data. Such a model might explicitly recognise that the
error term has several components, e.g. (1) a 'time' component,
(2) a component unique to each individual firm, and (3) a
component unique to the individual industry (see footnote 26).
The estimation of such a model from our present data would, how¬
ever, pose a considerable computing task. Moreover, it would
require an assumption that the population slope coefficients do
not change from year to year - an assumption which is likely
to be violated under inflation. Some adjustment of the data
to allow for inflation would certainly be necessary (see annex).
Error component problems are discussed in the context of simi¬
lar data by Kuh (1963), Chapters 4 and 6.
E.16.
(iii) There is a strong theoretical argument for expecting the obser¬
ved values of b and c to change over time, and to differ for dynamic
and static regressions, even in a regime of constant prices. Ana-
18
logously with the movement of consumption or dividend distributions
in permanent income theories, pay may well adjust to size and profit¬
ability changes only with a lag. And indeed, as this argument
suggests, average profitability for the three years ending in year j
does explain pay in year j better than does profitability in year j
alone. Accordingly, even if the underlying "ideal" relationship
were constant, the relationships observed at particular times (or
over any period) might represent various stages of (or movements in)
an unfulfilled adjustment process, and, simply because of lags,
might differ both from the ideal and among themselves.
In summary, for all these reasons, even with a constant structural
relationship, estimates of essentially the same model at different
times and through time may differ considerably.
d. The Lewellen and Huntsman Restoration of Profitability
Lewellen and Huntsman propose initially a model similar to that
adopted above to discriminate between the influence of profits and
sales on pay. As a starting point for their argument they propose
the specification:
(3) D.. = a + b.S.. + c.P.. + e..
ij ij iJ
where S is sales, P is profits, and the other variables are as
18. See Lintner (1956) in particular.
E. 17.
defined above. Noting, however, that this specification poses the
statistical problems of multicollinearity (avoided in our formula¬
tion by the use of the rate of return in place of total profits,
which removes the "size of firm" element from profitability) and
19
heteroscedasticity, they attempt to sidestep these difficulties by
employing an amended specification:
D.. S.. P.. e..
W A.. A.. *A.. "A.. A..
3-J 3-J
where A is assets and P/A is the rate of return, R. It is this
stage of their work which prompts the "reversal" of earlier conclu¬
sions; but its economic rationale is open to question: model 4
actually eliminates the influence of size (represented by assets) on
pay, the main concern of earlier work, asking only what is the influ¬
ence of the profit rate and the sales-asset ratio on directors' pay.
This is quite different from the question posed by earlier writers:
and it is not surprising, therefore, that Lewellen and Huntsman
arrive at an apparently different conclusion from that of earlier
writers.
Size (as represented by assets) is absent from equation (4), but might
be reinstated by inserting a constant term (since A../A.. = 1).
13 ij
Lewellen and Huntsman report that they suppressed the constant term
because, when it was present, it was not statistically significant.
19. Heteroscedasticity is not a serious problem in large sample
studies, since its effect is to reduce the efficiency of the
estimates rather than imparting a bias: we do not therefore
consider it to be a serious drawback of our own analysis. Our
estimates, despite heteroscedasticity, are still unbiased and
consistent; and we have more than one thousand observations, so
that the lack of efficiency of our estimates is not serious.
E. 18.
However, the lack of statistical significance does not necessarily
imply lack of quantitative importance. Furthermore, if our speci¬
fication (equation (1) above) is correct, there is a curvilinear
(logarithmic) relationship between size and pay: this relationship
might not be adequately tested by fitting the linear approximation
embodied in the constant term (log A../A., being the correct speci¬
fication).^
To illustrate this objection, and the fact that the conclusions both
of earlier writers and of Lewellen and Huntsman may be derived from
the same data, an extension of model 1 above has been estimated:
S. .
(5) D. . = a + b.log A. . + c.R. . + d.-r~— + e. .
iJ J-J ij
For comparability with Lewellen and Huntsman's model this formula¬
tion discriminates between the profit rate and sales-asset ratio as
explanations of pay; but, in addition, it yields an estimate of the
impact on pay of assets. The regression results, presented in
Table E.E., echo and counterpose the figures of both sides in the
debate. True, as Lewellen and Huntsman argue, the influence of the
sales-asset ratio is very weak compared with that of profitability.
As the table shows, in one year of the three reported, d was not sig-
21
nificantly different from zero at the 1% level, and in another year
20. This criticism of Lewellen and Huntsman is made by Yarrow (1972),
p.159.
21. The 1% level is used, rather than the more common and less strin¬
gent 5% level, because our large number of observations means
that the chance of a point estimate being accepted is greater
(the standard error being lower) than in the smaller samples which
are typically used.
E.19.
barely so; whilst, in 1969, moving from the mean to two standard
deviations above the mean of the sales-asset ratio implies an inc¬
rease in pay of only £400. As against this, in line with the results
of earlier writers, the economic and statistical significance of size
is decisively reaffirmed. This fact, crucial for the managerial
theories, is thus compatible with theestimates of Lewellen and Hunts¬
man, despite their claims to the contrary.
e. The Results in Perspective
Notwithstanding the exercise performed by Lewellen and Huntsman, size
is confirmed as being of overwhelming importance in the explanation
of the level of directors' pay. However, the usual inference of
earlier writers, that the pay incentive offered for growth will out¬
strip that for profitability, has been qualified: when just the con¬
sequences of the limited range of policies open to the firm in any
one year are considered, it emerges that growth pays no better than
profitability.
However, even this conclusion has to be set in perspective. Though
the comparison of increases in growth and increases in profitability
in Tables E.B. and E.D. is appropriate to the managerial theories of
motivation, there remains an asymmetry between the growth and profit¬
ability premiums reported. For while the profitability payment is
received in subsequent years only so long as that element of perform¬
ance is maintained, the influence of growth on pay has a cumulative
or "ratchet" effect: on just the weak assumption that the current
year's closing size is maintained (that is, even allowing a zero
growth rate in subsequent years), the growth premium is paid not just
in the year in which any growth is achieved, but for ever after.
E. 20.
TABLE E.E.






j = 1969 -25771 4233 127 101 .40
(-16.6) (25.9) (6.8) (1.0)
j «= 1970 -24755 4218 79 224 .42
(-16.8) (27.0) (4.7) (2.3)
3 = 1971 -24891 4295 57 375 .43
(-16.8) (27.5) (3.5) (3.6)
S. .
a + b.log A. . + c.R. . + + e. .
pay of highest paid director (£) for the ith company for year j
total assets (£000)
rate of return (%)
total sales (£000)
stochastic error term
Source; As Table E.A.
All the coefficients except d in 1S69 are significantly different
from zero at the 1% level. The constant term is expressed in £'s
of directors' pay, and the other coefficients in £'s of pay per unit
change in the relevant variable. In 1969, for example, a unit
difference in the natural log of size was associated with a differ¬
ence of £4,233 in pay; a difference of one percentage point in the
rate of return with a difference of £127 in pay; a difference of










Consequently, the relative importance of the pay off for growth or
profitability hinges on the director's time horizon; the stream of
benefits arising from additional growth in the current year may yet
far outweigh the immediate "opportunity cost" in terms of profit¬
ability foregone.
Nevertheless, it may still be contended that the influence of profit¬
ability on the average level of directors' pay is non-trivial either
22
in itself, or in relation to the corresponding influence of growth,
in rebuttal of the claim in earlier studies that "profitability had
23 24
no apparent effect on salaries."
22. The predicted reward for shifting from average profitability to
two standard deviations above average was, in 1969, 18.22! of
the average pay of highest paid directors; for shifting from
zero profitability to two standard deviations above average it
was 29.5% of the average.
23. Marris (1964) p.84.
24. Of course, these conclusions relate to only one of several ele¬
ments in managerial reward. Lewellen (1968) and (1971) has
argued that other components of directors' income, notably stock
options and income from shareholdings, increase their concern to
maximise those variables such as profitability, dividends and
share price which are of interest to shareholders. The
Lewellen and Huntsman results did not suggest that the substitu¬
tion of managerial compensation for salary payments in our ana¬
lysis would have led to different conclusions as to the relative
rewards of profitability and growth. However, we have no
direct evidence as to how our results would be affected by the
inclusion of ownership income, as defined in Lewellen's later
work (1971). Again, the consequences of different policies for
directors' security of tenure may seriously impinge on their
action, though the implications for the growth-profitability
trade off are not unambiguous. The threat could come directly
from profit-oriented shareholders; as against this, both stabi¬
lity of performance (documented by Singh and Whittington (1968)
and VJhittington (1971) and immunity to take-over (documented by
Singh (1971) and Uhittington (1972) increase with size, and
might be expected to prompt a preference for growth. Finally,
a host of less tangible pressures and incentives influence
directors: these are considered at length in Marris (1964).
It should be noted that these factors will net all favour inc¬
reased size: for instance, greater size can bring with it
greater responsibility.
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ANNEX TO APPENDIX E
1. The Variables
a. Directors' Salaries
Two limitations are imposed by the availability of data. Firstly,
only directors' pay, and not that of other senior managers is con¬
sidered. Secondly, our measures include only payments in the form
of salaries, fees and bonuses, and not stock options or benefits
from the ownership of shares. Two measures of salary have been
used in the tests. On the one hand, that of the highest paid
director typically represents the highest to which any employee of
the company can aspire; and it has been used in the earlier work
of both Roberts (1956) and (1959) and McGuire, Chiu and Elbing
(1962). On the other hand, the average salary of directors' summ¬
arises the rewards of the top management group. However, as pay¬
ments to part-time directors are included in this average, diffi¬
culties arise in comparing the payment level of companies with diff-
25
erent proportions of part-time directors.
b. Size
Results using three size measures were estimated. The capital mea¬
sure, total assets at net book value, is sensitive to the vagaries
of accounting measurement. The sales measure is relatively free of
these measurement problems, though it may exaggerate the importance
of firms in certain industries, such as wholesale distribution,
25. A third available measure, the chairman's salary, was not inclu¬
ded, because acute difficulties arise in comparing companies
where the chairman is the chief executive with those where he is
only a part-time employee. Commonly, where the chairman is
also chief executive, he will also be the highest paid director.
E. 23.
which have an unusually high ratio of sales to either assets or
26
value added. The third measure, value added, has its attractions
as a measure of the company's contribution to National Income.
However, we face limitations in attempting to approximate a true
measure of value added by adding total wages to total profits since
U.K. companies are only required to disclose payments to U.K. employ¬
ees.
Since none of the size measures is clearly optimal, results using all
three wete estimated. The results using sales are reported in the
27
text since they occupy pride of place in the literature,
c. Profitability
The measure of pre-tax profitability shows the rate of return on the
long-term capital in the business. It too is subject to the limi-
28
tations of accounting measurement.
26. If pay is also independently influenced by industry, then, when
sales are used as the size measure, correlation between sales
and industry might cause the industry influence to be wrongly
attributed to size. Even in the absence of such a correlation,
our model will have excluded an important explanatory variable
if pay is systematically related to industry (see footnote 17).
Industry differences in pay have net been examined here.
Yarrow's (1972) work suggests that this may be an important omis¬
sion.
27. A fourth size measure, profits, is available. But as our pur¬
pose has been to discriminate between the influence of size and
profitability, using a measure which combines both elements
could lead to confusion.
20. A fuller definition and discussion of this variable is presen¬
ted in Singh and Whittington (1968).
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2. A Profile of the Variables
Table E.E presents the mean, standard deviation and skewness moment
for each variable used in the study. Table E.G. shows the inter¬
relation of the variables revealed by simple correlation coeffi¬
cients.
3. Variants of the Main Results
Tables E.H. to E.K. correspond to Tables E.A. to E.D.: they present
the results of the exercises reported in these earlier tables, but
carried out using alternative measures of pay and size.
4. The Impact of Inflation on the Regression Estimates
a, The Static Model
^Suppose that in two successive years the real values of pay, size
and profitability are unchanged, but inflation of x% takes place in
the interval. Assume that the recorded value of profitability is
unchanged, with both numerator and denominator increasing by the same
proportion, while pay and size both increase by x%. Then, in model 1,
the coefficient relating pay to size will be higher in the second
29 .
year, and the intercept lower. This is because the inflationary
increase in log size would be uniform for all opening sizes, whilst
the inflationary increase in pay would be positively related to open¬
ing size (being a proportion of opening pay which is itself positiv¬
ely associated with size). This prediction is borne out by the
29. Moreover, the dispersion of individual observations about the
average will be greater. For any combination os size and pro¬
fitability there may be a number of companies each with different
levels of directors' pay. On the assumption of uniform propor¬
tionate pay increases the divergence between above and below
average payments will be greater after inflation.
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successively larger coefficients relating pay to sales and to value
added.30
b. The Dynamic Model
Similarly, in estimating model 2 for two situations, one a regime of
rising and the other of constant prices, but both featuring the came
real changes for each company, comparable conclusions emerge. For
the "inflated" data, the constant term vill be not zero but positive
by an amount which expresses the average inflation increment of a
director whose company's real size and performance do not change.
In addition, the slope coefficients, b and c, will be greater. This
reflects the fact that any real increment earned by virtue of inc¬
reased size or profitability will be inflated by a uniform percent¬
age. Finally, the dispersion of individual observations about the
average relationship will again be greater.
Accordingly, for model 2, the change in directors' pay has been
expressed in constant prices for comparability with the constant
31
price static model 1. The change in log size is not adjusted
for inflation, since a uniform rate of inflation across all firms
will imply that the change in log size is increased by a uniform
amount for all firms. In consequence, the slope coefficient, b,
will be free of the effects of inflation, but the constant term will
30. Though this is not so for assets, whose value changes less pre¬
dictably with inflation because of accounting conventions.
This suggests that inflation may also distort the profit rate;
see footnote 32.
31. It is assumed that companies do not suffer from money illusion
and adjust real pay in response to real changes in the explana¬
tory variables.
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be lower than in a constant price system. If the numerator and
denominator of profitability are inflated in equal proportions,
32the change in profitability will be unaffected by inflation.
32. This assumption may be unreasonable since denominator and numer¬
ator are affected differently by inflation. On the one hand,
fixed assets are valued at inflated current prices only when they
are replaced or (occasionally) revalued; on the other hand, pro¬
fits are inflated by the inclusion of stock appreciation and the
charging of depreciation on a (relatively low) historic cost























































































































































Simple Pearsonian correlation coefficients
1 = Highest paid director
2 = Average director's pay
3 = Log total assets
4 «= Log sales
5 = Log value added
6 = Rate of return
7 «= 3 year average rate of return
a. 1969




4 .57 .59 .91
5 .62 .61 .93 .91
6 .07 .15 -.16 -.10







4 .50 .61 .91
5 .64 .62 .93 .91
6 .06 .11 -.09 -.07 -.03
7 .05 .12 -.16 -.11 -.09
2 .75
3 .65 .61
4 .63 .61 .91
5 .65 .62 .92 .91
6 .05 .10 -.06 -.03 .04






4 .15 .19 .57
5 .26 .20 .57 .62
6 .28 .26 .23 .19 .60
Source: As Table E.A.
Note: Number of companies: 1003.




Estimates of model 1 using alternative ceasures of pay and size.
D.. = a + b.log S.. + c.R.. + e..&
ij ij ij
1. i = ith company, j = year
R = rate of return (%)
D = salary of highest paid director
S = total assets (£000)
Year a t b t. c t R
a b c
1969 -25420 -16.8 4216 25.9 129 7.0 .40
1970 -23867 -16.8 4177 26.8 80 4.8 .42
1971 -23329 -16.3 4219 27.1 59 3.6 .42
S «= value added (£000)
1969 -22220 -15.6 4307 25.3 78 4.2 .39
1970 -21675 -16.1 4328 26.7 45* 2.9 .42
1971 -21166 -15.8 4390 27.3 18 1.1 .43
2. D = average director's salary (£)
S = sales (£000)
1969 -10734 -14.9 1812 24.7 70 8.4 .39
1970 -10614 -14.7 1842 24.9 50 6.2 .39
1971 -11200 -14.3 1960 24.6 40 4.7 .38
S = total assets (£000)
1969 -10379 -15.1 1880 25.4 83 9.9 .40
1970 -9911 -14.5 1899 25.4 55 6.9 .40
1971 -10392 -14.0 2014 25.0 46 5.4 .39
S = value added (£000)
1969 -9137 -14.2 1943 25.3 61 7.3 .40
1970 -9017 -14.0 1980 25.6 41 5.2 .40
1971 -9240 -13.2 2081 24.9 26 3.1 .39
3. R = 3 year average rate of return (%)
D = salary of highest paid director
S = sales (£000)
1969 -24492 -14.5 3852 22.9 114 4.8 .34
1970 -24732 -15.5 3914 24.7 101 4.7 .38
1971 -24152 -15.5 4011 25.6 49 2.6 .39
S ■ total assets (£000)
1969 -26588 -16.9 4283 26.1 161 7.1 .40
1970 -25583 -17.4 4264 27.4 131 6.3 .43
1971 -23398 -16.2 4224 27.1 61 3.3 .42
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S « value added (£000)
Year a t b t. c t R*
a b c
1969 -23003 -15.7 4355 25.5 100 4.5 .39
1970 -22843 -16.4 4379 27.1 4.4 .42
1971 -21449 -15.7 4400 27.4 31 1.7 .43
4. D = average director's salary (£)
S = sales (£000)
1965 -11488 -15.6 1847 25.2 94 9.3 .40
1970 -11396 -15.4 1874 25.5 76 7.6 .40
1971 -11501 -14.6 1972 24.8 52 5.4 .39
S = total assets (£000)
1969 -11427 -16.2 1938 26.2 114 11.2 .42
1970 -11033 -15.7 1956 26.3 88 8.9 .42
1971 -10662 -14.3 2024 25.2 57 6.0 .39
S - value added (£000)
1965 -9945 -15.1 1987 26.0 87 8.6 .41
1970 -9857 -14.9 2019 26.3 70 7.1 .42
1971 -9618 -13.6 2095 25.2 43 4.5 .39
Source: As Table E.A.
Note: All the coefficients are significantly different from zero at
the 1% level, with the exception of those marked *.
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TABLE E.I.
The premium on growth and profitability, using alternative measures
of pay, size and profitability
1. Profitability = current, single year rate of return










1969 A 379 1974 169 696
B 1560 3199 1270 2058
1970 A 376 1224 171 841
B 1545 1984 703 1364
1971 A 380 903 181 704
B 1560 1543 745 1141
Growth of Profitability Growth of Profitability
value added value added
1969 A 388 1193 175 933
B 1593 1935 719 1513
1970 A 389 750 178 627
B 1601 1215 733 1017
1971 A 395 275 187 398
B 1624 447 770 645
Growth of Profitability
sales
1969 A 163 1071
B 670 1736
1970 A 166 765
B 681 1240





2. Profitability * average for three years ending in current year
Year Achievement Highest paid director Average director's pay
Performance variable Performance variable
Growth of Profitability Growth of Profitability
total assets total assets
1969 A 385 2463 175 1744
B 1585 3993 717 2827
1970 A 384 2004 176 1346
B 1577 3249 726 2183
1971 A 380 933 180 872
B 1563 1513 740 1414
Growth of Profitability Growth of Profitability
value added value added
1969 A 392 1530 180 1331
B 1611 2480 740 2158
1970 A 394 1377 180 1071
B 1620 2232 740 1736
1971 A 396 474 189 658
B 1628 769 777 1066
Growth of Profitability Growth of Profitability
sales sales
1969 A 347 1744 162 1438
B 1425 2827 666 2331
1970 A 352 1545 171 1163
B 1448 2505 703 1885
1971 A 361 750 180 796
B 1484 1215 740 1289
A: Additional payment (£) for raising the performance variable from
zero to its mean.
B: Additional payment (£) for raising the performance variable from
its mean to two standard deviations above its mean.
Source: As Table E.B.
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TABLE E.J.
Estimates of model 2 using alternative measures of pay and size
AH.. - a + b.Alog S.. + c.AR.. + e..
3-3 3-J
i = ith company
j 51 the period 1969-71
R = rate of return
1. D = salary of highest paid director (£)
S = total assets (£000)
2
at b t, c t R
a b c
-442 -2.8 994 1.8 110 8.8 .08
S = value added (£000)
-652 -3.9 1891 3.6 82 5.4 .09
2. D = average director's salary
S = sales (£000)
-468 -5.1 1316 4.7 50 7.5 .09
S = total assets (£000)
-357 -4.2 1115 3.7 50 7.4 .08
S = value added (£000)
-313 -3.4 575 2.0 46 5.6 .07
Source: As Table E.C.
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TABLE E.K.
The premium on growth and profitability using alternative measures




Highest paid director Average director's pay
Performance variable Performance variable
Growth of Profitability Growth of Profitability
total assets total assets
A 89 1683 99 755
B 3 68 2728 407 1240
Growth of Profitability Growth of Profitability
value added value added
A 170 1255 52 704





A: Additional payment (£) for raising the performance variable from
zero to its mean.
B: Additional payment (£) for raising the performance variable from
its mean to two standard deviations above its mean.
Source: As Table E.D.
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APPENDIX F
The population, the data and detailed definitions of variables used
in the thesis.
a. Introduction
This appendix provides some description of the data bank on which
most. of the thesis is based. It reports the data bank's coverage
and its limitations (and refers to other sources of such information).
In addition it provides a full listing of the quantitative variables
included, grouped within their balancing accounts. Then detailed
definitions of variables drawn from the data bank and used in the
thesis are provided.
k• Scope of the data bank
The population incorporated in the data tank was defined at the
beginning of the period to include all companies engaged primarily
in manufacturing, distributive trades and some other services, and
having stocks and shares quoted on United Kingdom 3tcck exchanges.
From 1948 to 1960 about 2500 companies typically qualified for
inclusion on this criterion (the number varying from year to year as
a result of births and deaths). From 1560, however, the population
was truncated.. Those with net assets of less than £0.5 million
and gross income of less than £50,000 in 1960 or 1964 were excluded
in subsequent years. The total number of companies covered by the
data fell from 2,613 to 2,241 as a result of the exclusions in 1960.
From 1969, companies with net assets of less than £2 million or gross
income of less than £200,000 were excluded: a loss of some 350
companies. Though these excluded companies numbered many, however,
their aggregate size was very small in relation to the total for
quoted companies. Data were incorporated in the data bank for all
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eligible companies for every year from 1948 to 1971; and are inclu¬
ded for some for 1972 as well.
Each 'company-year' of data contains the company's financial accounts,
supplemented by various biographical details. These biographical
details are recorded in 25 'indicative' variables. The financial
accounts comprise a balance sheet, income appropriation account and
sources and uses of funds statement (totalling 67 'quantitative'
variables). For years from 1964, up to a further 83 quantitative
variables are available to augment the basic accounting information.
Ill all then the data bank contains some 6 million items of informa¬
tion. As for the economic significance of this population, in
1970 it accounted for around 75% of the gross trading profits of
all companies in the U.K.; and its operations generated around 25%
of G.N.P.1
c* S°ttces of the data
The published accounts of eligible companies were collected and
arranged in a standard format first by the National Institute of
Economic and Social Research and then by the Board of Trade (now
Department of Industry (D.I.)). Up to 1963 these bodies transferred
the data to punched card; the Department of Applied Economics at
Cambridge subsequently transferred much of the data from punched
cards to magnetic tape (an arduous job v:hen each card contains only
some ten items of information), and the completion of this task in
1. Sources: Department of Industry (1973) and Central Statistical
Office (1972).
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Edinburgh represented part of the work towards this thesis.
The other data processing which formed part of the doctoral research
involved obtaining data from the D.I. for years after 1964 - this
time on magnetic tape; the development of a single format for the
diversely arranged sets of data for different periods; the extrac¬
tion by hand from D.I. records of some 20,000 further items of
information which were necessary either to secure consistency in the
data bank or to permit the planned analysis, and their preparation
2 .
as computer input; and investigation and correction of inaccura¬
cies or omissions revealed by a programme of tests of the data bank.
d. Remaining shortcomings of the data
These may be summarised:
(i) Hon-comnarable data for different years
Firstly, the legal disclosure requirements for companies were changed
in the 1967 Companies Act.^ This caused one or two detailed account
2. These included data on taxation and dividends under the arrange¬
ments for transition to the Corporation Tax System; on investment
grants; on the causes of death of companies with incomplete rec¬
ords; on the identity of the acquirer (for the merger study in
part 2 of the thesis); and company names, as well as the repair of
detailed omissions in the existing computer file (see Department of
Accounting and Business Method (1974) for more detail).
3. This work was carried out under the general supervision of
G. Hhittington, with Mrs. A. G. Harris programming the computer.
Details of tests carried out, etc. are provided in Department of
Accounting and Business Method (1974). A discussion of the pro¬
blems of standardising company accounts is provided by Heaver
(1971).
4. For the disclosure requirements of the Companies Acts, see
Chartered Accountants' Trust for Education and Research (1967).
headings to be non-comparable (see section F.f. below); but generally
produced welcome additional information to supplement that already
required. Secondly, the B.I. has made major changes to the scope
of the information which they included in their standardised accounts -
especially in 1964 and 1969 - which means that some information in
the data bank is available only for later years of the period. Some
of these changes were a response to the changes in company disclosure
requirements (see above); while others (e.g. the additional informa¬
tion provided on takeovers from 1964: see appendix D) were entirely
on the initiative of the D.I. Thirdly, the D.I. made a major
change in valuation methods in 1964 affecting external finance raised
in the course of takeover (see appendix D). Finally, changes in
the definitions of variables were prompted by developments in the
institutional setting - for instance the introduction or abandonment
of differential rates of taxation for dividends and retentions (see
Meeks and Whittington (1975), appendix 3), and the introduction of
the investment grant system (see chanter 3 above and Department of
Accounting and Business Method (1974)).
(ii) Deficiencies of historic cost accounting
These are dealt with at some length in chanter 2 and appendices A,
B and D above.
(iii) Inadequate disclosure by companies
The 1967 Companies Act remedied some of the glaring omissions of data
which are crucial in much economic analysis of company accounts -
for instance of sales data which is so important in chapters 3 and
4 above. But, for instance, the sources and uses of funds state-
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ment is not yet a compulsory component of companies' published
accounts; and those in the data bank are estimates derived from
the other financial statements and other sources apart from compan¬
ies' accounts (see appendix D). Again, the disclosure of the valua¬
tion and accounting treatment of takeovers leaves something to be
desired (see appendix D).
(iv) Differences between companies in accounting practice
Some such differences defy the D.I. analysts' attempts to standard¬
ise companies' accounts. For instance, the interpretation of his¬
toric cost may vary between companies - especially in the valuation
of stocks; companies variously capitalise or treat as current costs
such items as research and development expenditure; and the lease
or rent of fixed assets sometimes takes the place of outright pur¬
chase of such assets.
Many of these shortcomings are dealt with to some extent (and the data
adjusted) where they impinge on the analysis (this is especially
true of items (i) and (ii)). Where they are expected to produce a
bias in the results but no allowance is made explicitly for the bias,
the result is suitably qualified in the text. This brief account
of the shortcomings of accounting information is intended to draw
attention to the many disturbances in its measurement and to warn
against too precise interpretation of the results. Nevertheless,
such data are often used as the basis for national income accounting,
are often the best available to management, and, insofar as they have
been standardised and allowance has been made for specific biasses in
the analysis above, are often better than the raw accounting informa-
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tion on which the shareholder must base his decisions.
e* The indicative data
This section of the data provides classification and biographical
information on a company. Each company has been allocated to a 3
digit industry by the D.I. within which it has a unique serial num¬
ber. Certain other information is culled from the company's accounts,
such as accounting and publication dates; and the company's name
has been written to the computer file (partly by the D.I., and partly
during our extension of the data). The other major items in this
section are data on the cause of death and on partners in takeovers,
which were added to assist the study in part 2 of the thesis. These
were obtained from the D.I.'s handwritten records at Companies' Rouse
(their source for this information is discussed in appendix D).
Full details of the coverage and consistency of the quantitative data
are given in Department of Accounting and Business Method (1974).
f. The quantitative data
The contents of the quantitative section are detailed in Table F.A.,
which also details for which years each item is universally avail¬
able. Certain variables pose special difficulties for inter-year
comparisons, however. These include:
1. Provisions
Some provisions included at T4 up to 1963 are included in reserves,
T3, from 1964 - e.g. pension funds. Pension funds in particular are
separately itemised from 1969, and we include them at T110. Other
5. See Singh and Whittington (1968) for further general discussion








1 Issued capital; ordinary 48-
2 Issued capital: preference 48-
3 Capital and revenue reserves 48-
4 Provisions 48-03
5 Future tax reserves 48-
Meaorandum
6 Contracts for capital expenditure 48-
outstanding
Liabilities
7 Interest of minority shareholders 48-63
in subsidiaries 69-
8 Long-term liabilities 48-
9 Bank overdrafts and loans 48-
10 Trade and other creditors 48-
11 Dividends and interest liabilities 48-
12 Current taxation liabilities 48-
Meiaorandum
13 Total depreciation 48-
Assets
14 Fixed assets; tangible, net of 48-
depreciation
15 Fixed assets: intangible 48-
16 Fixed assets: trade investments 48-
17 Stocks and work in progress 48-
13 Trade and other debtors 43-
19 Marketable securities 48-
20 Tax reserve certificates 48-
21 Cash 48-
Summary
22 Total net assets 48-
Sources of Funds





24 Issue of shares: preference 49-
2.5 Increase in liability to minority 49-63
interests 69-
25 Issue of long-term loans 45-
27 Bank credit received 49-
28 Trade and other credit received 49-
29 Increase in dividend and interest 49-
liabilities
.30 Increase in current tax liabilities 49-
31 Increase in future tax reserves 49-
32 Balance of profit; depreciation 49-
provision
33 Balance of profit: provision for 49-63
amortisation
34 Balance of profit: other provisions 49™ 63
35 Balance of profit: retained in 49-
reserves




37 Expenditure, less receipts, on
fixed assets - tangible
38 Expenditure, less receipts, on
fixed assets - intangible
39 Expenditure, less receipts, on
fixed assets - trade invest¬
ments & subsidiaries
40 Increase in value of stocks and
work in progress
41 Increase in credit given - trade
and other debtors


















47 Change in securities 49-
48 Change in tax reserve certificates 49-
49 Change in cash 49-
50
Appropriation of Income


































Dividends and interest received 49-
(grcss of income tax)
Other income 49-
Interest paid on long-term lia- 49-
bilities gross
Tax on current profit 49-
Dividend, ordinary 49-
Dividend, other 49-
To minority interests in subsid- 49-63
iaries, net of taxation
Prior year adjustments - tax 49-
Prior year adjustments - general 49-
Sumraary
Total capital and reserves
Total liabilities






Total balance of profit
















Number of companies: accounts 64-
analysed
























73 Number of companies 64-
79 Net tangible fixed assets 64-
80 Goodwill, etc. 64-
81 Investments 64-
82 Current assets (excluding invest- 64-
ments)
83 Unidentified assets 64-
84 Less: minority interests 64-
85 deferred tax reserves 64-
86 long-term loans 64-
87 current liabilities 64-
Paymant less Book Valuf2
88 Excess payment 64-
89 Excess book value 64-
Companies Acquired (accounts not
analysed)
90 Book value 64-
91 Number of companies 64-
Payment less Book Value
92 Excess payment 64-
93 Excess book value 64-
UncGnsolld a ted Companies Acquired
94 Assumed book value 64-
95 Number of companies 64-
96 Proceeds from sales of subsidiaries 64-
97 Amount vrritten off subsidiaries 64-
98 Further investment in subsidiaries 64-
99 Upward revaluation of subsidiaries 64-
Investment Grants
100 Increase in investment grant reserve
101 Transfer to profit and loss account
102 Transfer to tax equalisation account
103 Direct credit to profit and loss
104 Amount deducted from fixed assets
105 Other treatments
106 Increase in investment grants due
but unpaid






108 Investment grant reserve 69-
109 Asset replacement reserve 69-
110 Pension fund 69-
111 Tax equalisation reserve 69-
112 Debentures and mortgages 69-
113 Provisions 69-
114 Land and buildings gross of depre- 64-
ciation
115 Plant, etc. gross of depreciation 64-
116 Total gross tangible assets 64-
117 Depreciations land and buildings 64-
118 Depreciation: plant, etc. 64-
119 Cash paid for subsidiaries 64-
120 Quoted investments 69-
121 Market value of quoted investments 69-
122 Income from quoted investments 69-
123 Expenditure on hire of plant 68-
124 Overseas tax on profits of year 69-
125 Transfer to tax equalisation reserve 59-
and other deferred tax




129 Intangible assets: development 68-
and other deferred revenue
expenditure
130 Change in accumulated depreciation 68-
131 Change in deferred tax reserve 68-
132 Change in fixed assets due to 68-
revaluation
133 Change in fixed assets due to 68-
currency devaluation
134 Average number of employees 68-
135 Employees remuneration 68-
136 Total directors' pay 68-
137 Chairman's pay 69-
138 Highest paid director's pay 69-
Directors' in the Following Income
Bands
139 0 - 2500
140 2501 - 5000
141 5001 - 7500
142 7501 - 10000
143 10001 - 20000
144 20001 - 30000
145 30001 - 40000












Schedule F payable 1965
Transitional tax relief: 1966
ordinary dividends
Transitional tax relief: 1966
preference dividends
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provisions included at T4 up to 1963 appear in trade and other credi¬
tors from 1964. General provisions and provisions for exchange rate
changes are itemised in the D.T.I, booklet from 1969, and we record
their joint total at T113.
So T3, T4 and T10 nay not be comparable for the two periods, 1948-63,
and 1964 onwards. But more information on provisions becomes avail¬
able in 1969.
2. Advances on Uncompleted Contracts
Up to 1968 these were deducted from the value of stocks by the D.T.I.
From 1969, if such advances exceeded the value of stocks (as sometimes
happens, for example, in shipbuilding firms), the excess was included
with creditors and accruals, rather than show negative stocks. For
inter-year comparability, we have continued to deduct such excesses
from stocks.
3. Trade Investments
The distinction between 'trade* and 'other' investments was replaced
by the 1967 Companies Act with the distinction between 'quoted' and
'unquoted' investments. The data supplied to us for 1964-8 by the
D.T.I, was standardised on the format used from 1969: hence the
distinction between 'trade' and 'other' investments is lost from 1964.
From then, trade investments will appear with marketable securities
at T19, leaving only investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries at T16.
So T16 and T19, T39 and T47, and the Summaries (fixed assets, T62,
and current assets, T63) will not be directly comparable for the two
periods, 1948-63, and 1964 onwards.
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In fact there was a discrepancy in the data for 1964-8 supplied to
us by the D.T.I., arising from this change in the treatment of
investments. This discrepancy and our correction of it are summar¬
ised in Department of Accounting and Business Method (1974).
4. Minority Interests
Amounts due to minority interests are not separated out in the approp¬
riation account from 1964; they are included with dividends at T55
and T56. The increase in the liability to minority interests in the
sources statement is not separately available from 1964-8, but is
reinstated from 1969.
5. Taxation, Dividends and Investment Grants
1. From 1964, the D.T.I, format includes taxation and dividend pay¬
ments in the uses statement. They represent the current year's
provision (appropriation account) minus the change in the balance
sheet. We rearrange the information, to show, in the sources state¬
ment, the change in the balance sheet as the current year's provi¬
sion less the payment.
2. The definitions of taxation and dividends in the balance sheet,
appropriation account and the sources statement, change as a result
of the change to the Corporation Tax and Investment Grant system.
In addition, the period of transition to Corporation Tax (1965-7)
presents particular problems. Our treatment, and the extra data
provided at T148-T150 are discussed in Department of Accounting and
Business Method (1974).
3. From 1968, only tax equalisation reserves are included at T5: all
other tax liabilities are recorded at T12.
F.15.
6, Amortisation
Amortisation is not shown separately from depreciation from 1964.
7. Retentions
Transfers to tax. equalisation and asset renewal reserves are shown
separately by the D.T.I, from 1969. For comparability with earlier
years, we have included these transfers with retentions at T35.
We retain this separate information at T125 and T126.
8 • Provisions
'Other provisions' at T34 are not separately detailed by the D.T.I,
from 1964. Expenditure out of provisions is included with other
expenditure at T43 from 1964 to 1968, but is separately available
at T42 from 1969.
6* Peta-ibed definitions of variables used in the thesis
Notation
m = last year of period
p = first year of period
o K p minus 1
n «= number of years in the period
j » year indicator
Chapter 3
Table. 3.A.





T46+T47+T48+T49-T27vT28-T29-T30) . tT22. ,
J J-l
(Growth of net assets other than by takeovers which were externally
financed).
Q. = (T32+T33). v 122. ,
J J
(Expenditure on replacement investment).
Q. * (T32+T33). ~ T22. ,
J J J -1
(Depreciation provisions).
Q. - (T31+T35+T36-T43). t T22. _
J J
(Retentions).
Qj =* (123+124+126-168-169-170) . 4- 122^ ^
(Long term external finance, except share for share issues, etc.).
Figures 3.A. to 3.H.
Each variable as defined below is divided by (113+114)to give
the deflated variable reported in the figures.
Age =* T13. ,J-l
Capacity utilisation = T127j times minimum capital-output ratio for
the five year period (i.e. expressing current output-capital ratio
as a proportion cf peak output-capital ratio).
Sales - T127.
J
Change in sales » 127. - T127. ,
J J"!
\
Disposable retentions c 125.+131.+135.+136,-143.-M.
J J J J J J
Where M. = estimate of stock appreciation (see chapter 2) and where
special procedures were adopted to measure 131 when the definition
of 15 was changed in 1968.
Depreciation provisions » (132+133)^
F. 17.
Net liquidity stocks = (T19+T20+T21-T9-T11-T12)^




Expenditure on new subsidiaries K 139^ (aggregated across all compan¬
ies) .
Expenditure on gross new investment "= T37j (again aggregated).
Table 6.P.
The general definition is:
fj>r n
J=p
Where: Q. « (T37-T32-T33). v T22. ,
J J J-l
(Net new investment in fixed assets).
Q. - (T38+T4(HT41+T42+T43+T44+T45+T46+T47+T48+T49-T27-T28-T29-T30). i
J J
T22. ,J-l
(Acquisition of net current assets, etc.).
Q. « T39. r T22. .
J J J-l
(Acquisition of subsidiaries: for cash and by share for share
exchange).
Qi (T7+T8)j - (T7+T8)j 4- T22. .J-l
(Acquisition of subsidiaries: by taking on minority interests and
long term liabilities on acquisition).
Q. » (T32+T33). v T22. .
J J J-l









Table 9.A., 9.B., 9.P., 9.E.





Where Q. - T39. ? T22. ,
J J 3-1
(Rate of growth by takeover).
Q. » 2(T66-T32~T33"T34+T59). ~ (T22. ,+T22.)
3 3 3~1 3
(Pre-tax rate of profit).
Q. « T37. r T22. .
3 J J"1
(Rate of growth by gross new investment).
Q. - (T37-T32-T33) . * T22. ,
3 J 3-1
(Rate of growth by net new investment).
Q. * (((T23+T24+T31+T35+T36-T43). + (T7+T8). + (T1+T2+T3+T5)._1) *3 3 3 3
T22^._1) - 1
(Rate of growth of net assets).
Q. » (68+T69+T70) . T22. ,
3 3 3"!
(Rate of growth by external finance: in exchange for subsidiaries).
Q. ■ (T23+T24+T26-T68-T69-T70). -r T22. .X3 33-1
(Rate of growth by external finance: for cash).
F.19.
Q. - (T31+T35+T36-T43). - T22. ,
J J J-l
.
(Rate of growth by retentions).
Opening size = T22
For goodwill as percentage of net assets, see definitions for appen¬
dix J.
Appendix C
Tables C.B., C.C., C.D., C.E.
For sources and uses of funds expressed as percentages of net assets,
rate of growth of net assets, and rate of return on net assets, the
definitions used in chapter 9 apply. For proportion of pre-tax
income retained, etc. the definitions given for appendix J apply.




Where = 2 (T66-T32-T33-T34+T59-T53-P). ? ((T1+T3+T5+T7) +
(T1+T3+T5+T7)0
and P - net preference dividend appropriately grossed up to include
income tax on preference dividends.
Table C.G.
The weighted average ratios reported in this Table correspond to the
simple averages defined above in the following way:
nh+ I22o
Weighted average = / 1
J T22o
n




The key variables for this appendix, which relates so specifically
to the variables in the data bank are defined in the appendix in
terms of the 'T' sequence of variables.
Appendix E
The following variables were used in the regression analysis:
Salary of highest paid director = T138.
147
Average director's salary = T136. r . ">•_ T. .
3 i=139 1J
Total assets = (T62+T63-T9-T10)^
Total sales = T127.
J
Value added - (T50-T32+T135)^
Rate of return: as defined above for chapter 9.
Appendix H
Table H.B.
The average rate of profit and rate of growth by takeover are as
defined above for chapter 9.
Appendix J
Tables J.C., J.H., J.M., J.R.
The variables in these Tables are mostly defined for chapter 9.




Where: Q. «= (T39-T88-T89-T92-T93). -rT22. ,
J J 3-1
F. 21.
Tables J.D., J.I., J.N. , J.S.














Issues of ordinary shares: in exchange
Issues of ordinary shares: total
ft
Issues of preference shares: for cash
j
Issues of preference shares: in exchange
Issues of preference shares: total
ft
Issues of long-term loans: for cash
T70.
3
Issues of long-term loans: in exchange
Issues of long-term loans: total
Retentions
Depreciation —^Replacement investment
Net fixed investment, tangible
Intangible fixed investment
Investment in subsidiaries, etc.
Increase in stocks
Increase in bank balances, etc.















Other current and sundry
* Not available before 1964.
F.22.
Tables J.E., J.J., J.O., J.T,
The general definition is:
m m
2>. - zx
j=P J j=P J
Where Z. « (T50+T51+T52).














Dividends and interest received
Other income
Interest paid
Minority interests and prior-year
adjustment
Retentions
Hie definitions of taxation and of dividend payments were subject
to special procedures to achieve consistency between tax systems.
These lengthy procedures are detailed in Meeks and Whittington (1975);
they are not repeated here since these particular variables are not
specially emphasised in the analysis.
Tables J.F., J.G., J.K., J.L., J.P., J.Q., J.U., J.V.
The general definition is:
G t T22 (opening balance sheet) G r T22 (closing balance sheet)









T14 Fixed assets: tangible
T15 Fixed assets: intangible
T16 Fixed assets: trade investments
T17 Stocks
(T19+T20+T21-T9) Net liquidity
(T18-T10-T11-T12-T4) Other current and sundry.
APPVND'X G
Table G.A.












33. Non-electrical Eng. 0.393
36. Electrical Engineering 0.380
38. Vehicles 0.343
39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0.373
41. Textiles 0.431
44. Clothing, Footwear 0.303
46. Bricks, etc. 0.378
47. Timber, etc. 0.342
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.375
49. Other Manufacturing 0.340
50. Construction 0.371
81. Wholesale Distribution 0.316
82. Retail Distribution 0.215
































































































33. Non-electrical Eng. 0.826
36. Electrical Engineering 0.786
38. Vehicles 0.799
39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0.780
41. Textiles 0.819
44. Clothing, Footwear 0.820
46. Bricks, etc. 0.820
47. Timber, etc. 0.781
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.832
49. Other Manufacturing 0.838
50. Construction 0.798
81. Wholesale Distribution 0.816
82. Retail Distribution 0.833














































































(pooled) 0.814 0.850 0. 837 0. 844 0.845
Companies with zero values foxosales-were
omitted from the averages for that year.
G. 3
Table G.C
Industry Averages : Sales (deflated)
YEAR 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
INDUSTRY
21. Food 3.460 3. 545 3. 513 3.730 3. 760
23. Drink 1.914 1.789 1.887 1. 766 1.896
26. Chemicals 2,910 3.030 2,835 2,820 2. 724
31. Metal Manufacture 3. 242 3.322 3. 209 3.278 2. 870
33. Non-electrical Eng. 2. 722 2.889 2.991 2.902 2.832
36. Electrical Engineering 2. 936 3.351 3. 213 3.201 3. 225
38. Vehicles 3. 391 3.533 3. 505 3. 627 3. 493
39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. 2.481 2. 548 2, 575 2. 709 2,743
41. Textiles 2.417 2.780 2. 635 2.488 2.377
44. Clothing, Footwear 3.400 3, 749 3.735 3.673 3.803
46. Bricks, etc. 1.S88 2.216 1.939 1.927 1.955
47. Timber, etc. 3.390 3. 684 3.381 3. 336 3. 590
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 1.991 1.913 1.900 1.952 1.941
49. Other Manufacturing 2.637 2. 890 2.836 3.094 2.843
50. Construction 5.573 5. 601 5.458 5. 588 5.710
81. Wholesale Distribution 6. 296 6.486 6. 118 6.002 5.833
82. Retail Distribution 3.789 4.066 3.915 4.015 4.110
88. Misc. Services 2.911 3.168 3. 086 3. 162 3. 292
ALL INDUSTRIES
(pooled) 3. 252 3.416 3.322 3.336 3.315
Companies with zero values for sales were
omitted from the averages for that year.
G. 4
Table G.D












33. Non-electrical Eng. 0.131
36. Electrical Engineering 0,119
38. Vehicles 0. 186
39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. -0.011
41. Textiles 0.036
44. Clothing, Footwear 0. 162
46. Bricks, etc. 0.144
47. Timber, etc. 0.216
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.071
49. Other Manufacturing 0.168
50. Construction 0.288
81. Wholesale Distribution 0.136
82. Retail Distribution 0.228














































































(pooled) 0. 138 0. 252 0. 194 0.210 0.182
Companies with zero values of sales for the
current or previous year were omitted from
the averages for that year.
G. 5
Table G.












33. Non-electrical Eng. 0.064
36. Electrical Engineering 0.078
38. Vehicles 0.093
39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0.060
41. Textiles 0.055
44. Clothing, Footwear 0.067
46. Bricks, etc. 0.066
47. Timber, etc. 0.069
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.066
49. Otoer Manufacturing 0.074
50. Construction 0.091
81. Wholesale Distribution 0.070
82. Retail Distribution 0.058














































































(pooled) 0. 065 0.041 0.031 0.015 0.030
G. 6
Table G.F












33. Non-electrical Eng. 0.064
36. Electrical Engineering 0.074
38. Vehicles 0.071
39. Metal Goods, ne.s. 0.055
41. Textiles 0.057
44. Clothing, Footwear 0.046
46. Bricks, etc. 0.066
47. Timber, etc. 0.058
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.061
49. Other Manufacturing 0.068
50. Construction 0. 100
81. Wholesale Distribution 0.062
82. Retail Distribution 0.042














































































(pooled) 0.060 0.062 0. 061 0.061 0.061
G. 7
Table G.G












33. Non-electrical Eng. -0.116
36. Electrical Engineering -0.122
38. Vehicles -0.179
39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. -0.035
41. Textiles -0.071
44. Clothing, Footwear -0. 182
46. Bricks, etc. -0.057
47. Timber, etc. -0.149
48. Paper, Printing, etc. -0.022
49. Other Manufacturing -0.045
50. Construction -0.190
81. Wholesale Distribution -0.180
82. Retail Distribution -0. 132














































































(pooled) -0.101 -0.085 -0.168 -0.195 -0.199
G. 8
Table G.H












33. Non-electrical Eng. 0. 104
36. Electrical Engineering 0.103
38. Vehicles 0.147
39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0.099
41. Textiles 0.105
44. Clothing, Footwear 0.077
46. Bricks, etc. 0.119
47. Timber, etc. 0.113
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.115
49. Other Manufacturing 0. 132
50. Construction 0. 150
81. Wholesale Distribution 0. 129
82. Retail Distribution 0.095














































































(pooled) 0.109 0.121 0.110 0.098 0.093
G. 9
Table G.I












33. Non-electrical Eng. 0.161
36. Electrical Engineering 0.111
38. Vehicles 0.200
39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0.347
41. Textiles 0.103
44. Clothing, Footwear 0.479
46. Bricks, etc. 0.202
47. Timber, etc. 0.308
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.322
49. Other Manufacturing 0.053
50. Construction -0.108
81. Wholesale Distribution 0.109
82. Retail Distribution 0.226













































































Note: These correlations were performed
with zero values of sales (some 16% of
the population in 1967); so the value of
the correlation coefficient is likely to
be understated for 1967.
G. 10
Table G.J















33. Non-electrical Eng. -0.065 -0.024
36. Electrical Engineering 0.100 -0.097




48. Paper, Printing, etc.
49. Other Manufacturing
50. Construction








81. Wholesale Distribution -0.217* -0.148






39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. -0.060 -0.051 0. 174 0.190
41. Textiles -0.242* -0.402* -0.211* -0.038
0. 147























88. Misc. Services 0. 116 0.097 ■0.132 0.067 -0.002












1967 1968 19 69 1970
0.232 -0.121 0.286* 0.004
0.566* 0.220 0. 227 0.253
33. Non-electrical Eng. 0.155






44. Clothing, Footwear 0.640
46. Bricks, etc. -0.012
47. Timber, etc. 0.262
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.426*
49. Other Manufacturing -0.198
50. Construction 0.371
81. Wholesale Distribution 0.052














0.552* 0.473* -0.169 0.225 -0.045
0. 178














0.157 0.127 0.004 -0.045 0.139
88. Misc. Services 0.088 0.267* 0.070 0. 206 0. 162
* Denotes significant difference from zero
at 5% level.
Companies with zero values for sales were
G. 12
Table G. L




23. Drink 0. 156
26. Chemicals 0.393
31. Metal Manufacture 0. 154
33. Non-electrical Eng. 0.253
36. Electrical Engineering 0.203
38. Vehicles 0.592*
39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0.423*
41. Textiles 0.410*
44. Clothing, Footwear 0.396
46. Bricks, etc. 0.272
47. Timber, etc. -0.062
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.635*






81. Wholesale Distribution 0.074 -0.053
1969 1970
0.432* -0.087 0. 216
0.387* 0.191
0.384* 0.179 0. 183
0. 139 ■0.077
1971
0.436* 0.347* 0.533* -0.251
0.417* 0.499* 0.127
0.025
0.515* 0.446* 0.448* 0.126
0.383* 0.399* 0.233* 0.191*
0.331* -0.029
0.361* 0.318* 0.464* 0.389*
0.380* 0.216* 0.226* 0.058
0.163
0.471* 0.663* 0.383* 0.527*
0.654* 0.432* 0.418* 0.311*
0.397* 0.354* 0.040 -0.225
0.378* 0.492* 0.225* 0.056
0.359* 0.280* 0.580* 0.357*
0.340* 0.228* 0.399*
0.175
0.613* 0.455* 0.400* 0.329* 0.131
88. Misc. Services 0. 162 0.248* 0.071 0.094 -0.038
* Denotes significant difference from zero
at 5% level.
Companies with zero value for sales were
rvrv» i + Kori "F-nrvrn tho rrvrrolntinnQ fnr* thflt VPOr
G. 13
Table G.M
Simple Correlation of Investment with Change in Sales










0.441* -0.087 0. 186
0. 284
33. Non-electrical Eng. 0.125 0.257*
36. Electrical Engineering 0.504* 0.354*




44. Clothing, Footwear 0.127
46. Bricks, etc. 0.289
47. Timber, etc. 0.281
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.555*




C. 082 0. 171
82. Retail Distribution 0. 247
1971







39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0.640* 0.376* 0.457* 0.617* C. 155
0.283* 0.069 0.393* 0.364
0.206 0.483* 0.515* 0.396*
0.413* 0.577* 0.612*
0.611* 0.579* 0.530* 0.522*
0.694* 0.290* 0.414*
0.633* 0.555* 0.484* 0.345*
0.317* 0.390*
81. Wholesale Distribution 0.358* 0.249* 0. 234* 0.217* 0.389*
0.474* 0.469* 0.466* 0.389*
88. Misc. Services 0.296 0.314 0.271* 0.304* 0.067
* Denotes significant difference from zero
at 5% level.
Companies with zero values for sales for the
current or previous year were omitted from
4-I /> .1 4- -i X* V\ v. ♦ l-> rt «■ -V T n
G. 14
Table G.N
Simple Correlation of Investment with
Disposable Retentions











33. Non-electrical Eng. 0. 475* 0.434*
36. Electrical Engineering 0.070 0.406*
38. Vehicles 0.704* 0.660*
39. Metal Goods, n.e.s. 0.439* 0.332*
41. Textiles 0.631* 0.318*
44. Clothing, Footwear 0.540* 0.480*
46. Bricks, etc. 0.768* 0.689*
47. Timber, etc. 0.097 0.712*
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.567* 0.476*
49. Other Manufacturing 0.103 0.352*
50. Construction 0.313* 0.149























88. Misc. S Tvices 0.113 0.023 0.106 0.340* 0.303*




Simple Correlation of Investment with Depreciation






0.642* 0.672* 0.472* 0.157
38. Vehicles 0.705* 0.310* 0.642* 0.168
47. Timber, etc. 0.359*
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.580*
49. Other Manufacturing 0.718*
50. Construction 0.614*
82. Retail Distribution
88. Misc. Services 0.481* 0.498* 0.391* 0.617*
1971
0.606* 0.591* 0.336* 0. 787* -0. 570*
0.407* 0.324* 0.448* 0.571* 0.586*
0. 208
0.719* 0.548* 0.577* 0.472* 0.390*
33. Non-electrical Eng. 0.511* 0.566* 0. 358* 0.346* 0.359*
36. Electrical Engineering 0.433* 0. 508* -0.018 0.342* 0.356*
0.440*
39. Metal Goods, n. e. s. 0.607* 0.607* 0. 602* 0.056 0.544*
41. Textiles 0.698* 0.684* 0.587* 0.235* 0.529*
44. Clothing, Footwear 0. 571* 0.637* 0.791* 0.408* 0.647*
46. Bricks, etc. 0. 268* 0.584* 0.422* 0.486* 0.332*
0.608* 0.528* 0.308* 0.109
0.624* 0.351* 0.490* -0.039
0.709* 0.503* 0.503* 0.415*
0.503* 0.664* 0.259* 0.574*
81. Whole sale Distribution 0.484* 0.388* 0.488* 0.490* 0.515*
0.607* 0.550* 0.496* 0.246* 0.176
0.536*




Simple Correlation of Investment with
Net Liquidity Balances












33. Non-electrical Eng. -0.011 -0.081
36. Electrical Engineering -0.278* 0.021
38. Vehicles 0.419* -0.019
0.069
-0.219










0.312* -0.114 -0.294 -0.085
48. Paper, Printing, etc. 0.245* 0. 106 0.146
49. Other Manufacturing -0.325* -0.303* -0.034




81. Wholesale Distribution -0.217* -0. 222* -0.266* -0.175











44. Clothing, Footwear -0.425* 0.142, -0.391* 0.053 -0.236







88. Misc. Services •0.083 -0.239* -0.119 0.012 0. 165




Multiple Regression Results : 1967
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation + h Liquidity
+ residual
INDUSTRY
Food Drink Chemi- Metal Non-e. Elec.
cals Mfr. Eng. Eng.
G. 197 -0.017 -0.228 -0.. 167 -0.004 0.088
b -0.056 -0.502 0.013 -0.058 -0.101 -0.088
Sv 0.148 0.205 0. 136 0.176 0.100 0.111b
c 0.098 0.097 0.282 0,189 0.002 0.018
S 0.062 0.113 0.090 0.104 0.069 0.087
c
d -0.007 -0.010 0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.004
S, 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007d
e -0.044 -0.024 -0.123 -0.058 0.012 0.094
S 0.057 0.072 0.107 0.064 0.035 0.055
e
f 0.321 -0.421 0.576 0.293 0.363 0.009
S 0.215 0.269 0.252 0.212 0.097 0.130
g 4.203 3.909 1.002 2.575 1.857 0.976
S 1.205 1.666 0.453 1.017 0.680 0.480
g
h -0.002 0.028 -0.124 -0.038 0.028 -0.049
S^ 0.074- 0.042 0.069 0.074 0.049 0.052
n
R2 0. 732 0. 670 0.678 0.736 0.438 0.525
S is the standard deviation of the respective coefficient.
G. 18
Table G.Q (cont.)
Multiple Regression Results: 1967
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase






a -0.053 -0.109 -0.119 0.515 0.214 0. 066
b 0.457
Sw 0.397b
-0.161 0.273 -0.657 -0.314 -0.394




0.077 0.038 -0.521 -0.081 0.090
0.074 0.07G 0.869 0.065 0.116
d -0.002
S, 0.015d
0.01.4 0.013 -0.006 0.022 0.034






0.206 0.022 -1.540 0.134 -0.057
0.073 0.071 0.954 0.061 0.109
-0.338 0.790 3. 575 0.630 -0.830






3.839 -0.348 2.268 -0.379 1.631
1.248 1.276 4.883 0.709 0.763
0.027 -0.191 -0.844 0.100 0.124
0.069 0.099 0.570 0.051 0.049
R 0.863 0. 703 0.521 0. 794 0.758 0.776
S is the standard deviation of the respective coefficient.
G. 19
Table G.Q (cont.)
Multiple Regression Fiesults : 1967
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation + h Liquidity + residual
■nvfrvn ormv Paper, Other Constr- W'sale Retail Misc.IJNIJUolri JL . T\/r_p .. T-S'x t-\ • ietc. Mfg. uction Distn. Distn. Servs.
a 0.013 0.074 -0.375 0.053 -0.048 0.012
b 0.018 0.136 0.279 -0.337 -0.299 -0.195
S, 0.137 0.105 0.371 0.180 0.136 0.127b
c 0.057 -0.121 0.265 -0.008 0.043 0.060
S 0.006 0.099 0.211 0.085 0.071 0.079
c
d 0.050 0.011 0.021 -0.001 0.014 0.003
S, 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.007 0.006 0.005d
e 0.283 0.032 0.149 C.063 -0.014 0.088
S 0.077 0.158 0.131 0.057 0.054 0.075
e
f -0.559 0.498 -0.095 0.369 -0.047 -0.155
Sf 0.219 0.205 0.278 0.213 0.116 0.223
g -0.497 0.299 0.627 2,260 2.950 1.333
S 0.716 1. 527 1.040 0.852 0.756 0.353
g
h 0.177 -0.043 0.143 -0.039 0.018 0.074
S. 0.058 0.070 0. 186 0.066 0.056 0.096
h
R2 0.691 0.839 0.461 0.413 0.547 0. 540
S is the standard deviation of the respective coefficient.
G. 20
Table G.R
Multiple Regression Results : 1868
Investment - a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation + h Liquidity + residual
Food Drink Chemi- Metal Non-e. Elect.
INDUSTRY , „cals Mfr. Eng. Eng.
a -0.202 0.093 -0.251 -0.19? -0.144 -0.105
b -0.117 -0.113 -0.074 0.171 -0.080 -0.430
S^ 0.100 0.123 0.160 0.188 0.090 0.138b
c 0.188 -0.034 0.234 0.158 0.117 0.245
S 0.051 0.061 0. 111 0.104 0.063 0. 101
c
d -0.001 -0.009 0.C06 0.023 0.007 0.002
S. 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.006 0.006
d
e 0.122 0.205 0.081 -0.020 -0.018 0.085
S 0.046 0.109 0.114 0.098 0.037 0.080
e
f 0.595 -0. 196 0. 121 0.504 0. 365 0.246
S 0.198 0.313 0.221 0.193 0.111 0.135
g 2.513 0.924 2.272 0.501 2.575 1.851
S 0.724 0.802 0.479 0.279 0.493 0.407
g
h -0.013 -0.035 0.105 0.011 -0.037 -0.095
S. 0.044 0.044 0.075 0.082 0.042 0.053h
R2 0.817 0.240 0.594 0.565 0.473 0.616
S is the standard deviation of the respective coefficient.
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Table G. R (coat.)
Multiple Regression Results : 1968
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation + h Liquidity + residual
T1„r,_r Vehicles Metal Tex- Clothing, Bricks, Timber,
UNDubiKx _ , , , ,Goods tiles etc. etc. etc.
a 0.277 -0.043 0.173 -0.209 0.143 -0.180
b 0.011 -0.197 -0.359 0.029 -0.404 0.427
S, 0.228 0.092 0.112 0.0S6 0. 146 0. 255b
c -0.255 0.078 -0.040 0.220 0.004 -0.121
S 0.178 0.069 0.061 0.100 0.098 0. 174
c
d -0.010 0.017 0.014 -0.010 0.014 -0.015
SJ 0.021 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.011d
e 0.286 0.014 -0.021 -0.007 -0.040 0. 198
S 0.200 0.049 0.048 0.071 0.080 0.132
e
f 0.547 0.489 0.197 0.177 0.828 1.402
S 0.488 0.102 0.136 0.155 0.207 0.313
g -0.181 1.937 1.865 2.418 1.609 2.395
S 0.855 0. 556 0.440 0.579 0.437 1.090
g
h -0.002 -0.006 0.060 0.139 0.142 -0.185
S 0.130 0.040 0.037 0.048 0.079 0.098
h
R2 0.418 0.659 0.606 0.739 0. 778 0.775
S is the standard deviation of the respective coefficient.
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Table G.R (cont.)
Multiple Regression Results : 1968
Investment E a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation + h Liquidity + residual
INDUSTRY Paper, Other
etc. Mfg.
a 0.021 -0.114 -0.114
Const- W'sale Retail Misc.



































0. 158 0.143 0.223
0.016 0.126 0.317











R 0.269 0.577 0.442 0.270 0.404 0.426
S is the standard deviation of the respective coefficient.
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Table G.S
Multiple Regression Results : 1S39
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation + h Liquidity + residua
STRY
Food Drink Chemi- Metal
cals Mfr.





































f 0.807 0.234 -0.219




















R 0.495 0.362 0.333 0.449 0. 383 0. 144
S is the standard deviation of the respective coefficient.
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Table G. S (cont. )
Multiple Regression Results : 1969
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase



















•0.082 0.095 -0.119 0.018
0.108 0.104 0.107 0.109
0.007 0.103 -0.016 0.019
0.055 0.150 0.057 0.091
0.005 S. 001 0.000 -0.003
0.005 0.008 0.010 0.007
e 0.230 0.097 -0.072 0.102 -0.092 0.021
S 0.078 0.047 0.039 0.057 0.059 0.050
e
f 0.898 0.493 0.462 0.306 1.471 0.488






2.395 2.744 0.768 2.159 2.274
0.565 0.470 0.331 0. 563 0.556
0.071 0.036 -0.095 -0.007 -0.101
0.047 0.048 0.053 0.059 0.057
R 0.774 0. 584 0.482 0.783 0.717 0.726
S is the standard deviation of the respective coefficient.
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Table G. S (cont.)
Multiple Regression Results : 1969
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation + h Liquidity + residual
♦
Paper, Other Constr- W'sale Retail Misc.
etc. Mfg. uction Distn. Distn. Servs.
a -0.010 -0.072 0.011 0.066 -0.096 0.066
b -0.071 0.043 -0.164 -0.117 0.038 -0.357
S, 0. 110 0. 149 0.125 0.093 0.116 0. 126b
c 0.002 0.006 0.030 -0.027 0.070 0.056
S 0.059 0.078 0.065 0.064 0.076 0.083
c
d 0.009 -0.016 0.007 0.002 0.007 -0.005
S, 0.014 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.007d
e 0.236 0.192 -0.035 0.035 0.140 0.145
S 0.078 0.069 0.032 0.029 0.060 0.097
e
f 0.614 0.193 0.369 0.122 -0.181 0.126
S 0.176 0.140 0.167 0.099 0.110 0.233
g 0.998 2.908 1.642 1.538 1.229 1.505
S 0.465 0.988 0.327 0.374 0.523 0.430
g
h -0.069 0.006 0.075 -0.047 -0.048 0.044
S, 0.052 0.076 0.059 0.034 0.050 0.088h
R2 0. 638 0.523 0.626 0.338 0.389 0.336




Multiple Regression Results : 1970
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation •+• h Liquidity + residual
Food Drink Chemi- Metal Non-e Elect.
cals Mfr. Eng. Eng.
a 0.172 -0.023 -0.265 0.020 0.030 -0.111
b -0.010 -0.148 0.416 -0.189 -0.160 0.014
0.079 0.063 0.200 0.153 0.079 0.090
b
c -0.159 0.037 0.151 0.053 0.062 0.141
S 0.114 0.029 0.099 0.060 0.051 0.059
0
d 0.002 0.013 0.014 0.020 0.007 0.010
S_, 0.005 0.004 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.005d
e 0.132 -0.021 -0.050 0.049 -0.048 -0.085
S 0.058 0.026 0.091 0.041 0.030 0.059
e
f 0.689 0.128 0.657 0.175 0.211 0. 281
Sf 0.187 0.122 0.166 0.145 0.099 0.084
g 0.733 2.055 0.617 1.205 1.044 0.864
S 0.437 0.473 0.820 0.577 0.287 0.177
g
h 0.164 0.064 -0.050 0.189 0.015 -0.077
SL 0.050 0.028 0.109 0.057 0.034 0.043h
R2 0.860 0. 533 0.497 0.590 0.234 0.455
S is the standard deviation of the respective regression coefficient.
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Table G. T (cont.)
Multiple Regression Results : 1970
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation + h Liquidity residual
Vehicles Metal Tex- Clothing, Bricks, Timber,
Goods tiles etc. etc. etc.
a -0.009 -0.089 0.002 -0.115 -0.091 -0.131
b -0.066 0.109 -0.064 0.051 -0.027 -0.460
S, 0.223 0.096 0.142 0. 190 0. 166 0.180b
c 0.063 0.049 0.046 0.077 0.026 0.233
S 0.163 0,050 0.059 0.152 0.079 0.131
c
d 0.014 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.031 0.008
S, 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.014 0.016 0.012d
e 0.011 0.198 0.035 0.126 0.164 0.076
S 0.114 0.056 0.042 0.090 0.085 0.077
e
f 0.387 0.318 0.351 0.180 0.213 0.344
Sf 0.174 0.113 0.112 0.259 0.263 0.179
g 1.182 0.123 0.993 1.690 1.620 2.941
S 0.738 0.501 0.329 1.221 0.666 1.023
g
h 0.052 -0.043 0.048 0.151 -0.198 -0.010
S, 0.108 0.045 0.059 0.108 0.096 0.110h
R2 0.409 0.481 0.354 0.417 0.519 0. 595
S is the standard deviation of the respective regression coefficient.
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Table G.T (coat.)
Multiple Regression Results : 1970
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation + h Liquidity + residual
^ Paper, Other Constr- Wsale Retail Misc.
etc. Mfg. uction Distn. Distn. Servs.
a -0.120 -0.060 0.044 -0.142 0.045 0.011
b -0.118 -0.337 -0.343 0.026 0.134- -0.109
S^ 0.123 0.183 0.146 0.135 0.083 0.091b
c 0.159 0.136 0.112 0. 132 -0.074 0.047
S 0.064 0.145 0.074 0.070 0.081 0.074
c
d -0.016 0.021 0.007 -0.004 0.004 -0.006
S, 0.020 0.013 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006d
e 0.106 0.0S2 -0.003 0.043 0.140 0.067
S 0.102 0.111 0.040 0.039 0.035 0.061
e
f 0.457 0. 187 0.302 0.272 0. 141 0.299
Sf 0. 114 0. 117 0.090 0. 129 0.088 0.175
g 1.924 1.470 1.087 2.213 0.355 1.349
S 0.587 0.775 0.366 0.613 0.293 0.281
s
h 0.009 0.034 -0.036 -0.031 0.034 0.022
S. 0.066 0. 105 0.047 0.046 0.041 0.073
h
R2 0.492 0. 545 0.391 0.396 0.375 0.494
S is the standard deviation of the respective regression coefficient.
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Table G. U
Multiple Regression Results ; 1971
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation + h Liquidity + residual
Food Drink Chemi- Metal Non-e Elect.
INDUSTRY cajs Mfr. Eng. Eng.
a 0.290 -0.117 G.065 0.099 -0.073 -0.110
b -0.084 -0.401 -0.193 -0.149 0.140 0.076
SL 0.170 0.132 0.182 0.204 0.086 0.128b
c -0,118 0.139 0.008 -0.029 -0.008 0.104
S 0.171 0.069 0.075 0.066 0.051 0.078
c
d -0.005 0.007 -0.015 0.012 0.009 -0.011
S, 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.007d
e 0.148 -0.039 0.093 0.002 0.055 0.087
S 0.126 0.087 0.064 0.056 0.033 0.070
e
f -0.044 0.140 0.311 0.267 0.116 0.254
S 0.273 0.145 0.125 0.146 0.077 0. 116
g -1.738 4.375 1.789 1.164 1.368 0.896
S 1.100 0.792 0.713 0.824 0.387 0.411
g
h -0.016 0.041 -0.082 0.084 0.053 -0.119
0.092 0.058 0.087 0.070 0.040 0.061
h
R2 0.408 0.565 0.308 0.263 0.255 0.368
S is the standard deviation of the respective regression coefficient.
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Table G. U (cont.)
Multiple Regression Results : 1971
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase
+ f Retentions + g Depreciation + h Liquidity + residual
Vehicles Metal Tex- Clothing, Bricks, Timber,llNJJUblxti .
Gds. tiles etc. etc. etc.
a -0,001 -0.056 -0.083 0.057 0.072 0.292
b -0.200 0.035 0.161 -0.031 -0.080 -0.265
0.237 0.081 0.096 0. 109 0.122 0. 209
b
c -0.048 -0.032 0.020 -0.085 -0.046 -0.211
S 0.167 0.043 0.031 0.074 0.050 0.151
c
f
d 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 -0.018
SJ 0.014 0.007 0,004 0.003 0.011 0.012d
e -0.111 -0.035 0.028 0.013 0.127 0.246
S 0.097 0.034 0.024 0.066 0.057 0.081
e
f 0.323 0.409 0.270 0.139 0.333 0.284
Sf 0.155 0.102 0.087 0.161 0.193 0.317
g 2.892 2.739 1.061 1.526 0.585 1.879
S 1.055 0.493 0.364 0.549 0.446 1.187
g
h -0.077 0.076 -0.040 0.003 -0.056 0.177
S. 0.149 0.038 0.034 0.078 0.060 0.112
h
R2 0.437 0.484 0.421 0.555 0.491 0.575
S is the standard deviation of the respective regression coefficient.
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Table G. U (cont.)
Multiple Regression Results : 1971
Investment = a + b Age + c Utilisation + d Sales + e Sales Increase














0.083 -0.159 0.201 -0.322




0.067 -0.239 -0.047 -0.025 0.037




0.023 0.008 0.004 -0.009 -0.004




-0.036 0.143 0.022 0.117 -0.055
0.088 0.061 0.036 0.043 0.078
f 0.354
Sf 0.128
0.310 0.107 0.376 0.461 0.223

































The standardised profitability of amalgamations; before and after
nerger
All cases Extremes Removed













y-3 1.208 3.198 233 1.057 0.263 1.057 0.263 213
y-2 1.340 6.717 233 1.119 0.267 1.119 0.267 213
y—i 1.165 0.542 233 1.138 0.219 1.138 0.219 213
y 1.276 1.143 233 1.218 0.295 1.252 0.322 213
y+l 1.088 0.603 211 1.055 0.312 1.094 0.343 192
y+2 0.738 10.42.2 191 1.064 0.268 1.088 0.287 174
y+3 0.877 1.868 161 1.042 0.340 1.053 0.347 146
y+4 1.095 3.854 113 0.994 0.327 0.995 0.323 103
y+5 0.781 1.175 73 0.928 0.314 0.927 0.312 67
y+6 0.823 0.551 50 0.959 0.313 0.961 0.315 44
y+7 0.966 0.451 23 0.999 0.457 0.998 0.458 21
Notes:
See chapter 7, section c. for full definitions.
R is raw profitability as a proportion of profitability for the
industry-year.
F is adjusted profitability as a proportion of profitability for the
industry-year.
S is the standard deviation.




The average rate of growth by acquisition of subsidiaries and the
average rate of profit: by industry, 1964-71.
% per annum
Industry Number of Rate of growth Rate of
companies by acquisition profit
10 Mixed Activities 1 6.6 10.3
21 Food 30 7.1 16.2
23 Drink 47 2.5 15.1
24 Tobacco 4 3.4 17.3
26 Chemicals 48 6.2 19.0
31 Metal Manufacture 42 4.0 18.4
33 Non-electrical
Engineering 110 3.9 15.7
36 Electrical
Engineering 50 5.8 18.8
37 Shipbuilding 7 2.1 6.8
38 Vehicles 27 4.7 19.4
39 Metal Goods, n.e.s. 68 4.1 19.1
41 Textiles 69 4.0 14.9
43 Leather, etc. 7 7.3 17.1
44 Clothing and Foot¬
wear 31 5.8 18.2
46 Bricks, Pottery,
etc. 40 7.1 16.8
47 Timber, etc. 31 2.9 19.5
48 Paper, Printing etc. 55 4.4 15.1
49 Other Manufacturing 38 4.4 19.3
50 Construction 49 7.7 20.1
70 Transport 16 3.7 16.0
81 Wholesale Distribu¬
tion 71 5.0 19.2
82 Retail Distribution 79 3.1 19.6
88 Miscellaneous
Services 46 9.0 16.1
All companies 966 4.9 17.5
Notes:
For detailed definitions see appendix F.
Only companies which continued in independent existence within the
population are included.
H.3.
Survey of earlier work on the impact of merger on company performance.
Of the three earlier studies which incorporate profitability as a
success criterion, Singh's (1571) is closest in method to that repor¬
ted here (the method used was in part modelled on his). He asks what
proportion of his sample of 77 acquiring companies performed less well
after the merger than did the two participants prior to the merger.
In fact a majority showed a decline in profitability. The chief
drawbacks of the work are that it considers records for only 2 years
after merger; that it gives no estimate of the typical decline in
profitability; and that the results are now becoming rather old
(they relate to the nineteen-fifties: see Table H.C. for a summary
of the coverage and results of earlier studies). Its results do,
however, closely resemble those produced in chapter 7 for more
recent years; moreover, the pattern he found for the immediate post-
merger years is found to persist over longer periods.
A study for the United States (Lev and Mandelker, 1972) and one for
Britain (Utton, 1974) both match acquisitive (active in takeover)
with non-acquisitive companies of similar size and (in the former case
only) from the same industry. The former study finds little differ¬
ence in the profitability records of the two groups; while Utton
reports that the merging companies were markedly inferior on this
criterion. That neither study made allowance for the accounting
bias discussed in appendix D represents a serious objection to these
conclusions. In addition, Utton himself points out that he made no
allowance for the influence of industry on his samples of acquiring
and non-acquiring firms: this casts some further doubt on his conclu¬
sions, given the small size of his sample (39 companies), and the
H.4.
TABLE B.C.
Summary of earlier work on the relationship between merger and perform¬
ance .
The performance variable relates to the acquiring company except where






















Rate of return on
net assets.
Kelly 1946-60 22 Matched sample
(with respect to
size and industry)
Kogarty 1953-64 43 Industry average.
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change in share Negative
price;
change in earnings Negative
per unit of open¬
ing assets;
change in earnings Negative
per unit of open¬
ing sales.
H.5.
si.zeable differences which exist in industry rates of profit and in
the average rate of expansion by takeover in different industries
Lev and Mandelker also compared the two groups' performance in terras
of dividends plus the appreciation in their share price. By con¬
trast with the results for profitability the acquirers achieved
superiority according to this criterion. A second study which revea¬
led divergent movements in earnings and in the share price was that
of Kelly (1967); he compared the records of 22 merging companies
with those of 22 non-merging companies which had been matched with
the acquirers on the basis of industry and size. The two groups'
share price performed equally well, though the merging companies
enjoyed a greater improvement in their price-earnings ratio; necess¬
arily, therefore, the merging companies performed less well in terms
of the change in earnings per share. Thus in both these studies it
appears that the advantage displayed by the acquirers stemmed from
shareholders' bidding up their share price to an extent that was not
justified by their current performance.
Three other studies concentrate on a stock market indicator of merg¬
ing companies' performance. Hogarty (1970) used a common measure
of shareholder gains to assess the success of merger, comparing the
dividends plus share price appreciation of 43 merging companies with
the industry average of the same measure. Only 3 merging companies
achieved clear success on this criterion, whilst 21 failed (the rest
1. Simple averages of rates of profit and of growth by acquisition
for the companies within each of 23 2 digit industries are given
in Table H.B.
H.6.
falling in the twilight). A second comparison,, using the improve¬
ment in earnings per share as the success measure, was quite incon¬
clusive. Lorie and Halpern (1970) examined the capital record of
shareholders in a specific set of victim companies: those where the
shareholders were paid in "funny money" - e.g. convertible preferred
stock, etc. (not cash, common stock and ordinary bonds). They found
that capital appreciation for those holders typically outpaced the
2
market index. ' Finally, Ryden (1972) related the improvement in
share price to the acquisition rate for 54 Swedish companies. On
one measure of the acquisition rate, he found a positive association,
whilst, on another, the association disappeared.
*
Two difficulties hinder the use of studies which measure success in
terms of share price movements in a discussion of the efficiency
consequences of merger. Firstly, there is the possibility suggested
by the work of Lev and Mandelker and of Kelly that acquiring companies
could be valued more highly than their performance would seem to
justify - perhaps as the result of some irrational stock market fash¬
ion. Secondly, all the studies reviewed here focus on the experience
of one partner in the takeover bargain, failing to distinguish the
general gains in profitability brought about by the merger from gains
or losses associated with the exchange terms between the acquirer's
and the victim's shares. In fact, in a particular merger, if the
capital market is imperfect, the acquirer's shareholders might lose
3
(as Reid (1968) found), and the victim's gain (as Lorie and Halpern
2. Jones, Tweedie and VJhittington (1975) also found that the share¬
holders of takeover victims enjoyed above average returns in terms
of dividends plus capital appreciation.
3. Reid was concerned with the role of merger in the growth-
profitability/
H.7.
found), whilst the rate of profit on total capital employed was
unchanged (as Lev and Mandelker found). Utton's (1974) survey of
these papers is therefore misleading in lending equal weight to all
the diverse results as if each measure were an equally valid, unambi¬
guous proxy for the profitability, let alone the efficiency, conse¬
quences of merger. The three studies which select the rate of pro¬
fit on total capital are the really useful ones for the issue raised
in chapter 7;^ and these provide support for the finding of chapter 7
3. Contd.
profitability trade-off hypothesised by the managerial theorists
of the firm (and discussed in chapters 8 and 9 of the thesis).
He related various growth and earnings measures to the frequency
of merger. On the earnings side he measured the proportionate
increase in the share price and in profits that could be attri¬
buted to the original shareholders. Whether the observations were
pooled or segregated by industry, he found a negative association
between merger-intensity and these performance measures. At
first sight these tests seem to resemble those in part 2 of the
thesis, in relating the change in profit to the rate of growth
by acquisition; but in fact they too suffer from the problems of
those studies using share prices as indeces of performance. For
Reid's device for allocating the change in profit to the orginal
shareholders means that an unfavourable change in profit on his
measurement could be the result not of poor profitability perform¬
ance but of unfavourable share exchange terras for the acquirer's
shareholders (a situation consistent with the evidence of Lorie
and Halpern and of Jones, Tweedie and Whittington).
4. This is not to say that the others are not appropriate to other
issues - such as the attitude of the stock market to mergers.
The aim here is only to suggest that they do not necessarily
support the interpretation put on them by Utton.
H.8.
that merger did not typically result in improvements in profitability.
Three other studies of a different type have reached sceptical con¬
clusions on the efficiency consequences of mergers. Two (Kitching
(1967) and Newbould (1970)) are based on interviews with the managers
of acquiring companies. Managers typically admitted that negligible
gains or else actual losses in efficiency followed many mergers; and
Newbould concluded that "managers are the only consistent gainers
from mergers" (p. 192).'' Finally, the case study treatment of mer¬
gers in particular markets by Hart, Utton and Walshe (1973) also
revealed evidence of managerial diseconomies following merger (p.101).
5. See section 10.b. above on the gains to managers from merger.
APPENDIX I.
TABLE I.A.
The standardised profitability of amalgamations, before and after
merger: unadjusted profitability (diversification study).
Year Same 3 digit Other 3 digit Other 2 digit
R S n R S n R S n
z rz z rz z rz
y-3 0.982 0.300 102 1.119 0.244 30 1.128 0.241 81
y~2 1.043 0.265 102 1.128 0.303 30 1.211 0.245 81
y-i 1.062 0.203 102 1.172 0.185 30 1.220 0.2,42 81
y 1.190 0.295 102 1.153 0.367 30 1.279 0.274 81
y+l 0.982 0.246 92 1.073 0.542 26 1.139 0.310 74
y+2 1.002 0.235 82 0.984 0.309 25 1.169 0.283 67
y+3 0.985 0.291 64 0.S24 0.512 22. 1.182 0.301 60
y+4 1.004 0.276 48 0.707 0.288 13 1.071 0.380 42
y+5 0.940 0.293 32 0.576 0.231 8 1.018 0.339 27
y+6 0.855 0.302 22 1.036 0.314 21
y+7 1.055 0.342 10 0.953 0.665 10
Notes:
See chapter 7, section c. for full definitions.
R is raw profitability as a proportion of profitability for the
industry-year.
S is the standard deviation
n is the number of companies surviving to that year, and incorporated
in the averages,
y is the year of merger.
TABLE I.B.
The standardised profitability of amalgamations, before and after
merger: adjusted profitability (dTversification study).
Year Same 3 dig it Other 3 digit Other 2 digit
F n F n F s. n
z fz z fz z fz
y-3 O.S82 0.300 102 1.119 0.244 30 1.128 0.241 81
y-2 1.043 0.265 102 1.128 0.308 30 1.211 0.245 81
y-i 1.062 0.203 102 1.172 0.185 30 1.220 C.242 81
y 1.229 0.330 102 1.207 0.407 30 1.298 0.284 81
y+l 1.026 0.282 92 1.140 0.599 26 1.162 0.330 74
y+2 1.024 0.258 82 1.032 0.329 25 1.187 0.300 67
y+3 0.999 0.306 64 0.835 0.514 22 1.190 0.302 60
y+4 0.997 0.265 48 0.715 0.292 13 1.078 0.382 42
y+5 0.936 0.287 32 0.580 0.232 8 1.020 0.341 27
y+6 0.855 0.303 22 1.039 0.316 21
y+7 1.055 0.343 10 0.952 0.667 10
Notes:
See chapter 7, section c. for full definitions.
F is adjusted profitability as a proportion of profitability for the
industry-year.
S is the standard deviation.
n is the number of companies surviving to that year, and incorporated
in the averages,
y is the year of merger.
TABLE I.C.
The standardised profitability of amalgamations, before and after
merger; unadjusted profitability (quartiles by xTT
Year Quartile A Quartile B Quartile C Quartile D
R S n R 8 n R S n R S n
z rz z rz z rz z rz
y-3 1.007 0.221 54 1.055 0.337 53 1.117 0.227 53 1.043 0.277 53
y-2 1.037 0.196 54 1.106 0.356 53 1.204 0.295 53 1.081 0.226 53
y-i 1.077 0.257 54 1.165 0.232 53 1.243 0.194 53 1.066 0.185 53
y 1.340 0.371 54 1.206 0.376 53 1.247 0.225 53 1.078 0.191 53
y+1 0.994 0.252 47 1.056 0.432 48 1.147 0.317 50 1.017 0.250 47
y+2 1.088 0.256 41 1.016 0.257 43 1.214 0.292 48 0.916 0.230 42
y+3 1.014 0.384 34 0.964 0.442 32 1.182 0.334 44 0.966 0.208 36
y+4 0.945 0.342 23 0.949 0.304 21 1.154 0.438 27 0.923 0.238 32
y+5 0.856 0.333 13 0.913 0.306 13 1.061 0.343 17 0.880 0.306 24
y+6 0.746 0.288 8 0.822 0.050 7 1.286 0.291 11 0.908 0.384 13
y+7 0.443 0.335 5 0.82.0 0.121 3 1.290 0.374 6 1.222 0.530 7
Notes:
See chapter 7, section c. for full definitions.
R is raw profitability as a proportion of profitability for the industry-
year .
S is the standard deviation.
n is the number of companies surviving to that year, and incorporated
in the averages,
y is the year of merger.
1.4.
TABLE I.D.
The standardised profitability of amalgamations, before and after
merger: adjusted profitability (quartiles by X).











y-3 1.007 0.221 54 1.055 0.337 53 1.117 0.227 53 1.048 0.277
CMI 1.087 0.196 54 1.106 0.356 53 1.204 0.295 53 1.081 0.226
y i 1.077 0.257 54 1.165 0.232 53 1.243 0.194 53 1.066 0.185
y 1.396 0.398 54 1.248 0.427 53 1.270 0.232 53 1.092 0.199
y+1 1.062 0.293 47 1.095 0.480 48 1.175 0.337 50 1.039 0.270
y+2 1.132 0.299 41 1.035 0.263 43 1.232 0.301 48 0.935 0.252
y+3 1.043 0.409 34 0.964 0.440 32 1.187 0.334 44 0.977 0.215
y+4 0.944 0.342 23 0.949 0.293 21 1.148 0.428 27 0.932 0.243
y+5 0.855 0.337 13 0.917 0.303 13 1.051 0.340 17 0.885 0.309
y+6 0.744 0.288 8 0.827 0.051 7 1.284 0.294 11 0.912 0.387
y+7 0.442 0.335 5 0.820 0.121 3 1.290 0.374 6 1.221 0.533
Notes:
See chapter 7, section c. for full definitions.
F is adjusted profitability as a proportion of profitability for the
industry-year.
S is the standard deviation.
n is the number of companies surviving to that year, and incorporated
in the averages,
































21 Pood 0.191 0.368 -0.146 30
23 Drink 0.412 0.412 0.117 49
26 Chemicals 0.531 0.453 0.222 49
31 Metal Mfr. 0.525 0.509 0.096 43
33 Non-elect. Eng. 0.513 0.364 0.003 117
36 Electrical Eng. 0.220 0.205 -0.170 54
38 Vehicles 0;599 0.498 0.260 31
39 Metal Goods, nes. 0.268 0.240 0.008 70
41 Textiles 0.541 0.480 0.081 71
44 Clothing, footwear 0.812 0.726 0.569 33
46 Bricks, pottery etc. 0.619 0.603 0.600 40
47 Timber, etc, 0.490 0.410 0.034 32
48 Paper, Printing etc. 0.614 0.547 -0.021 57
49 Other Mfg. 0.450 0.173 0.186 39
50 Construction 0.503 0.312 0.184 57
81 V/holesale Distn. 0.608 0.560 0.226 78
82 Retail Distn. 0.639 0.430 0.278 82
88 Misc. Services 0.364 0.169 0.183 49
All Industries Pooled: 0.483 0.368 0.156 1020
Notes: Each of the variables is the arithmetic average of
the corresponding ratio for each of the seven years,
1965-71 (1964 is the base year for the ratios).
See Appendix P for full definitions.
The sum of observations for the individual industries
falls short (by 39) of the total pooled observations:
correlation coefficients were not estimated for
industries with very few observations.
TABLE J.B
Frequency Distributions : Rates of Growth by New
Investment in Fixed Assets (Gross) and by
Acquisition of New Subsidiaries:
The Top 100 by each Variable : 1948-64- and 1964-71 »
% p.a. Growth by 1948-1964 1964-1971
the Respective
form of Top 100 by Top 100 by Top 100 by Top 100 by
Expansion Investment Acquisition Investment Acquisition
than 10 49 1
10 - 20 73 36 19 48
20 - 30 19 9 62 22
30 - 40 4 4 13 13
40 - 50 2 1 5 6
50 - 60 1 2
60 - 70 1 2
70 - 80 1 1
80 - 90 1
90 -100 *> 1 4
Notes: a: A company recording the threshold value of a
particular growth rate was included in the band
below that value.
b: The value of any growth rate was constrained
not to exceed 100# p.a. Such growth rates will





Analysis by Expenditure on
Acquisitions
1948-1964 1964-1971
% p.a. Zero Low High Zero Low High
Growth:
Of Net Assets'* 6.4 6.9 12.0 6.3 7.5 18.9
By Gross fixed investment"* 6.3 6.9 8.6 7.9 9.2 11.6
By Net fixed investment"* 2.9 3.1 4.5 3.5 3.8 5.5
By Takeover"*": Total 0 0.1 4.9 0 0.3 11.7
For cash NA NA NA 0 0.1 4.2
By issue NA NA NA 0 0.2 7.7
Book value NA NA NA 0 0.1 8.4
By retention"* 5.3 5.2 5.9 5.3 4.6 5.8
By external finance"*: Total 0.8 1.1 5.1 0.7 2.0 11.4
:Exchange NA NA NA 0 0.2 7.7
2
Pre-tax rate of profit 18.6 17.6 18.0 19.2 16.1 18.1
Opening size £million 0 .754 2.935 2.859 5.181 15.201 12.73'
Number of companies 202 524 524 188 388 390
Notes: 1. Percent of opening net assets.
2. Percent of average net assets.
See Appendix F for fuller definitions.
\
TABLE J.D
„ _ , Analysis by Expenditure on
Sources and Uses of Funds
Acquisitions
1948-64 1964-1971
•Zero Low High Zero Low High
Sources of Funds (%)
Issues of Ordinary Shares:
For cash 1.2 3.7 5.6
In exchange 0 1.5 18.4
Total: 3.8 6.1 20.3 1.2 5.2 24.0
Issues of Preference shares :
For cash -2.4 -0.5 -0.5
In exchange 0 0.1 0.5
Total: -0.4 0.2 1.5 -2.4 -0.4 0
Issues of Long-term loans:
For cash 6.0 7.9 8.2
In exchange 0 0.4 6.4
Total: 1.5 3.3 6.8 6.0 8.3 14.6
Internal Sources:
Retentions 53.1 48.9 38.2 50.8 35.3 25.4
Depreciation"'" 41.9 41.3 33.1 44.3 51.6 35.8
Total Sources: 99.9 99.8 99.9 99.9 100.0 99.8
Uses of Funds (%)
Fixed Assets:
Tangible: "Replacement" 41.9 41.3 33.1 44.3 51.6 35.8
Net 29.5 30.3 29.0 31.0 27.6 24.1
Intangible ©.8 0.9 1.3 0.5 1.2 1.1
Subsidiaries and
Trade Investments 0 2.8 35.7 0 2.5 47.4
Stocks 21.0 26.5 29.3 27.2 27.2 26.3
Bank and Cash Balances -1.1 -8.0 -15.1 1.5 -5.9 -13.4
Net Trade credit given 10.8 10.4 9.2 7.7 1.6 -0.2
Other current assets, pro¬
visions and sundry items -2.9 -4.5 -22.7 -12.3 -5.9 -21.2
Total Uses: !100.0 99.7 99.8 99.9 100.0 99.9
Notes: 1. Total sources Total uses.
2. Fuller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F.




Analysis by Expenditure on
Acquisitions
1948-196^ 1961-1971
Zero Low High Zero Low High
Income (%)
Depreciation 16.9 19.4 19.4 20.2 26.2 26.9
Operating profit 80.0 77.4 77.1 76.1 69.7 69.2
Dividends and
Interest received 2.1 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.5 3.4
Other income 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3
Total: 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.9 99.8 99.8
Appropriations
Depreciation 16.9 19.4 19.4 20.2 26.2 26.9
Interest paid (gross) 1.4 1.5 2.2 2.1 4.2 5.7
Taxation 42.6 40.2 39.7 41.2 36.9 37.2
Dividends: Ordinary (net) 16 .8 15.3 15.9 15.4 14.6 14.4
Pref. (net) 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.2 1.1 0.7
Minority interests and
prior-year adjustmts. -0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Retained profits 19.5 20.8 19.8 19.9 16.8 15.1
Total: 99.8 99.8 99.6 99.9 99.7 99.7
Cost of dividends
($ of total income):
Ordinary 19.7 17.9 18.3 25.0 23.6 23.4
Preference 3.3 2.8 2.6 1.9 1.8 1.2
Notes; 1. Income s. Appropriations.
2. Puller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix P.
























Analysis by Expenditure on
Acquisitions: Period 1.
1948 1964
Zero Low High Zero Low High
45.8 41.3 42.1 54.8 51.9 54.0
3.5 5.2 6.2 1.0 1.7 5.1
0.2 2.9 2.7 0 0.1 0.5
49.5 49.4 51.0 55.8 53.7 59.6
40.5 43.1 42.3 34.2 40.0 41.3
20.6 19.5 18.1 8.7 4.1 -2.5
■10.7 -12.1 -11.6 1.1 2.0 1.5
99.9 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.9
32.6 28.8 30.3 37.8 35.9 35.0
37.9 40.6 38.9 44.5 45.1 42.1
70.5 69.4 69.2 82.3 CD H1 • O 77.1
18.0 17.2 16.9 8.5 7.8 6.8
3.0 3.6 3.6 3.6 5.0 8.7
7.7 7.9 8.0 5.3 5.0 5.1
0.5 1.7 2.1 0.1 1.1 2.1
99.7 99.8 99.3 99.8 99.9 99.8
Notes: 1. Assets se Financing.
2. Fuller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F.
























Analysis by Expenditure on
Acquisitions: Period 2.
1964 1971
Zero Low High Zero Low High
57.2 54.6 52.8 60.3 59.7 60.3
1.8 3.4 5.0 1.2 2.5 7.8
0 0.2 0.5 0 0.2 0.5
59.0 58.2 58.3 61.5 62.4 60.6
36.9 42.3 41.7 39.4 45.9 48.5
7.8 -0.3 -0.6 6.5 -2.8 -9.3
-3.8 -0.4 0.5 -7.5 -5.7 -8.1
99.9 99.8 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.7
37.3 36.3 37.3 32.8 31.5 30.4
42.6 40.9 40.6 56.2 50.7 47.5
79.9 77.2 77.9 89.0 82.2 77.9
8.0 6.5 5.3 4.8 4.3 2.8
4.2 7.7 7.4 5.7 11.1 16.1
7.7 6.4 7.1 0.3 0.5 0.6
0.1 1.9 2.1 0.1 1.8 2.4
99.9 99.7 99.8 99.9 99.9 99.8
Notes: 1. Assets Financing.
2. Fuller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F.




Growth, Financing Analysis by Gross Investment
Ratios, etc. in Fixed Assets
1948-1964 1964-1971
% p.a. Low Middle High Low Middle High
Growth:
Of Net Assets 5.5 8.0 13.3 7.4 9.6 18.5
By Gross fixed investment"1 3.0 b. 6 12.9 4.0 8.5 17.3
By Net fixed investment"1 0.9 3.1 7.0 0.6 3.6 9.1
By Takeover : Total 1.1 1.6 3.5 3.0 3.6 8.0
For cash NA NA NA 1.4 1.6 2,9
By issue NA NA NA 1.7 2.1 5.1
Book value NA NA NA 2.1 2.8 5.4
By Retention"1" 3.9 5.5 7.2 3.3 4.6 7.8
By external finance'1':
Total 1.0 1.9 5.4 3.1
'
4.0 9.5
Exchange NA NA NA 2.1 2.3 5.2
2
Pre-tax rate of profit 15.8 18.1 19.9 14.8 17.7 20.1
Opening size £million 2.142 2.902 2.607 12.738 13.645 10.385
Number of companies 415 417 418 322 322 322
Rotes: 1. Percent of opening net assets.
2. Percent of average net assets.
See Appendix F for fuller definitions.
J.9
TABLE J.I
Sources and Uses Analysis by Gross Investment
of Funds in Fixed Assets
1948-1964 1964-1971
Low Middle High Low Middle
Sources of Funds ($)
Issues of Ordinary shares:
For cash 2.9 2.9 6.0
In exchange 7.1 7.3 9.6
Total: 7.5 10.3 17.2 10.0 10.2 15.6
Issues of Preference shares :
For cash -1.9 -0.5 -0.2
In exchange 0.3 0.2 0.2
To tal: -0.4 .1.1 1.2 -1.6 -0.3 0
Issues of Long-term loans;
For cash 5.8 7.6 9.6
In exchange 3.6 2,2 2.4
Total: 2.0 3.8 7.6 9.4 9.8 12.0
Internal sources:
Retentions 52.9 46.8 35.6 36.8 35.8 30.4
Depreciation 37.9 37.8 38.3 45.2 44.5 41.7
Total Sources: 99.9 99.8 99.9 99.8 100.0 99.7
Uses of Funds (%)
Fixed Assets:
Tangible:"Replacement" 37.9 37.8 38.3 45.2 44.5 41.7
Net 13.9 33.4 41.4 6.7 31.9 42.0
Intangible 1.3 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.9
Subsidiaries and
Trade Investments 17.1 14.7 16.7 19.5 18.6 22.2
Stocks 31.0 27.7 21.6 25.7 26.6 28.2
Bank and cash balances -13.6 -9.2 -6.7 -1.6 -10.7 -10.0
Net trade credit given 18.3 7.3 4.5 8.3 2.7 -4.8
Other current assets, pre¬
visions and sundry items -6.0 -12.7 -16.7 -4.9 -14.7 -20.4
Total Uses: 99.9 100.0 99.9 99.9 100.0 99.8
Notes; 1. Total sources st Total uses.
2. Fuller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F.




Analysis by Gross Investment




Low Middle High Low Middle High
Income ($•)
Depreciation 14.1 18.4 24.4 22.1 23.6 30.2
Operating profit 81.4 78.4 73.4 72.3 72.6 67.4
Dividends and
Interests received 3.6 2.6 1.7 4.9 3.1 2.0
Other income 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3
Total: 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.7 99.9
Appropriations (%)
Depreciation 14.1 18.4 24.4 22.1 23.6 30.2
Interest paid (gross) 1.8 1.5 2.1 5.2 3.7 4.2
Taxation 44.4 41.0 35.9 40.7 39.0 34.0
Dividends: Ordinary (net) 17.3 15.4 14.7 16.6 15.2 12.3
Pref. (net) 3.3 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.6
Minority interests and
prior year adjustments 0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.3 0
Retained profits 18.5 20.9 21.0 14.0 17.4 18.6
Total: 99.8 99.7 99.8 99.7 99.6 99.9
Cost of dividends
($ of total income):
Ordinary 20.4 17.9 16.8 26.7 24.6 20.0
Preference 4.1 2.6 1.7 2.2 1.6 1.0
Notes: 1. Income = Appropriations
2. Puller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix P.
























Analysis by Gross Investment
in Fixed Assets: Period 1
1948 1964
Low Kiddle High Low Middle High
37.2 39.9 49.8 42.1 52.8 64.9
6.3 4.4 5.4 3.0 2.3 3.6
2.7 2.1 2.4 0.2 0.4 0.2
46.2 46.4 57.6 45.3 55.5 68.7
44.4 43.8 38.8 43.6 40.9 34.4
19.3 20.8 17.2 3.9 2.8 -0.4
•10.1 -11.1 -13.8 7.0 0.7 -2.8
99.8 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.9 99.9
29.4 28.3 32.4 35.2 36.2 35.9
38.0 41.9 38.5 44.7 44.3 >2.1
67.4 70.2 70.9 79.9 80.5 78.0
18.9 16.4 16.3 9.6 7.4 5.5
4.2 3.3 3.1 4.1 5.2 9.6
7.4 8.3 8.1 4.8 5.2 5.3
1.8 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.5
99.7 99.8 99.9 99.7 99.6 99.9
Notes: 1. Assets^ Financing.
2. Fuller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F.




Analysis by Gross Investment




Low Middle Sigh Low Middle
Assets ($)
Fixed Assets:
Tangible (net) 49.1 52.1 61.9 49.7 o•COLA 72.6
Intangible 3.6 2.8 4.9 4.0 4.0 5.2
Subsidiaries and
Trade Investments 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3
53.2 55.1 67.0 54.1 62.2 78.1
Current Assets:
Stocks 41.0 39.3 42.6 45.0 44.1 48.0
Net liquidity 1.8 4.7 -3.1 0.4 -2,4 -8.8
Other current assets 3.9 0.7 -6.7 0.4 -4.0 -17.4
To tal: 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.9 99.9 99.9
Financing (%)
Equity interests:
Ordinary shares 35.4 37.5 37.7 32.4 32.0 29.5
Reserves 41.9 41.1 40.3 49.7 50.7 51.0
77.3 78.6 78.0 82.1 82.7 60.5
Preference shares 7.0 6.4 5.5 4.5 3.9 2.9
Long-term loans 7.7 6.1 7.0 11.4 11.1 13.8
Future tax reserves 6.0 7.2 7.7 0.4 0.5 0.6
Minority interests 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.6 2.1
To tal: 99.7 99.8 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.9
Notes: 1. Assets st Financing.
2. Puller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix P.







Analysis by Expenditure on
Acquisitions
1948-1964 1964-1971
Rest Top 100 Rest Top 100
Growth:
Of net assets"1" 7.9 21.0 8.9 37.2
By gross fixed investment"1' 7.2 11.8 9.4 14.6
By net fixed investment"1" 3.3 7.4 4.0 7.8
By Takeover"1":
Total 1.0 14.3 2.1 28.6
For cash NA NA 1.3 7.9
By issue NA NA 0.8 21.5
Book value NA NA 1.6 19.6
By retention"1" 5.4 7.0 5.0 7.7
By external finance"1":
Total 1.9 12.3 3.1 26.6
Exchange NA NA 1.1 21.6
2
Pre-tax rate of profit 17.9 18.4 17.1 21.2
Opening size £million 2.683 1.029 12.869 6.944
Number of companies 1150 100 866 100
Notes: 1. Percent of opening net assets.
2. Percent of average net assets.
See Appendix F for fuller definitions.
J. 14
TA3LE J.N
Sources and Uses Analysis by Expenditure on
of Funds Acquisitions
1948-1964 1964-1971
Rest Top 100 Rest Top 100
Sources of Funds ($)
Issues of Ordinary shares:
For cash 3.7 6.0
In exchange 4.8 35.6
Total: 9.5 36.5 8.5 41.6
Issues of Preference shares:
For cash -1.0 0.4
In exchange 0.1 1.1
Total: 0.4 3.0 -0.9 1.5
Issues of Long-term loans:
For cash 7.9 5.0
In exchange 1.7 12.0
To tal: 3.9 11.1 9.6 17.0
Internal sources:
Retentions 46.8 24.9 36.2 18.0
Depreciation 39.2 24.4 46.4 21.7
Total Sources: 99.8 99.9 99.8 99.8
Uses of Funds (%)
Fixed Assets:
Tangible: "Replacement" 39.2 24.4 46.4 21.7
Net 29.5 30.7 27.6 20.4
Intangible 1.0 1.7 1.1 0.5
Subsidiaries and
Trade Investments 11.6 68.4 14.6 68.0
Stocks 26.9 25.1 27.5 21.0
Bank and cash balances -9.2 -17.1 -6.7 -14.0
Net trade credit given 10.4 4.7 2.5 - 2.2
Other current assets, pro¬
visions and sundry items -9.6 -38.1 -13.1 -15.5
Total Uses: 99.8 99.8 99.9 99.9
ITotes: 1. Total sources Total uses.
2. Fuller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F.


























Analysis by Expenditure on
Acquisitions
1948-1964 1964-1971
Rest Top 100 Rest Top 100
19.0 19.2 25.3 25.0
77.7 77.9 70.7 71.4
2.7 2.4 3.4 3.2
0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2
99.9 99.9 99.8 99.8
19.0 19.2 25.3 25.0
1.7 2.6 4.1 6.9
40.5 39.2 37.9 37.8
15.6 17.6 14.8 13.6
2.3 1.9 1.0 0.7
0.3 0.9 -0.2 0.1
20.3 18.3 16.8 15.6
99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7
18.2 19.6 23.9 22.4
2.8 2.2 1.6 1.1
Notes: 1. Income s= Appropriations
2. Puller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F.




Analysis by Expenditure on
Balance Sheets Acquisitions: Period 1
1948 1964
Rest Top 100 Rest Top 100
Assets ($)
Fixed Assets:
Tangible (net) 42.5 41.0 52.8 58.4
Interi gible 4.9 10.5 2.3 11.0
Subsidiaries and
Trade Investments 2.4 2.3 0.2 0.9
49.8 53.8 55.3 70.3
Current Assets:
Stocks 42.8 37.1 39.6 39.6
Net liquidity 18.7 24.0 2.9 —7.0
Other current assets -11.4 -15.0 2.0 -3.0
To tal: 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.9
Financing
Equity interests:
Ordinary shares 29.3 38.4 36.0 33.5
Reserves 39.8 35.2 44.1 39.4
69.1 73.6 80.1 72.9
Preference shares 17.4 14.7 7.6 5.8
Long-term loans 3.6 2.2 5.8 11.9
Future tax reserves 7.9 8.1 5.1 5.7
Minority interests 1.7 1.2 1.2 3.4
Total: 99.7 99.8 99.8 99.7
Notes: 1. Assets ar Financing,
2. Fuller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F,

























Analysis by Expenditure on
Acquisitions: Period 2
1964 1971
Rest Top 100 Rest Top 100
55.0 48.6 60.3 58.5
3.4 7.0 3.4 13.4
0.2 0.8 0.2 0.7
53.6 56.4 63.9 72.6
40.0 49.7 44.7 54.2
2.0 -6.3 -2.1 -16.4
-0.8 0 -6.6 -10.5
99.8 99.8 99.9 99.9
36.9 36.5 31.9 26.3
41.3 39.0 51.0 46.3
78.2 75.5 82.9 72.6
6.5 4.9 3.9 2.7
6.7 8.7 i—1«i—1i—1 20.8
6.8 8.3 0.5 0.5
1.6 2.4 1.6 3.1
99.8 99.8 100.0 99.7
Notes: 1. Assets = Financing.
2. Fuller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F.
















net assets 8.1 18.6 10.1 27.3
By gross fixed investment"'" 6.4 20.0 8.1 26.0
By net fixed investment 3.0 11.3 3.3 14.5
By Takeover"'":
Total 1.8 5.6 3.9 13.5
For cash NA NA 1.7 4.8
By issue NA NA 2.3 8.8
Book value NA NA 2.8 8.8
By retention"1" 5.3 8.7 4.6 10.6
By external finance"1":
Total 2.2 9.3 4.4 15.2
Exchange NA NA 2.5 8.9
2
Pre-tax rate of profit 17.7 20.0 17.0 22.1
Opening size £million 2.562 2.420 12.974 6.042
Number of companies 1149 101 866 100
Rotes: 1, Percent of opening net assets.
2. Percent of average net assets.





Analysis by Gross Investment
in Fixed Assets
1948--1964 1964 -1971
Rest Top 100 Rest Top 1C
Sources of Funds ($)
Issues of Ordinary shares:
For cash 3.5 8.2
In exchange 7.6 11.5
Total: 10.9 20.6 11.1 19.7
Issues of Preference shares:
For cash -1.0 0
In exchange 0.2 0.2
Total: 0.6 1.6 -0.8 0.2
Issues of long-term loan:
For cash 7.6 8.2
In exchange 2.7 3.1
Total_: 4.1 8.5 10.3 11.3
Internal sources:
Retentions 46.5 29.1 35.3 26.1
Depreciation 37.8 40.1 44.0 42.5
Total Sources: 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.8
Uses of Funds ($)
Fixed Assets:
Tangible: "Replacement" 37.8 40.1 44.0 42.5
Net 2e.3 45.0 24.4 48.3
Intangible 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.7
Subsidiaries and
Trade Investments 16.1 16.7 19.4 26.3
Stocks 27.3 20.4 26.8 27.4
Bank and cash balances ■10.2 -6.4 -6.9 -11.9
Ket trade credit given 11.0 -1.0 3.6 -11.2
Other current assets, pro¬
visions and sundry items ■11.5 -15.8 -12.3 -22.2
Total Uses: 99.9 99.8 100.0 99.9
Rotes: 1. Total sources s-" Total uses •
2. Fuller definitions






fail to sum to 100$
J.20
TABLE J t T
Analysis by Gross Investment
Appropriation of Income in Fixed Assets
1948-1964 1964-1971
Rest Top 100 Rest Top 100
Income ($)
Depreciation 18.0 30.3 23.9 37.2
Operating profit 78.6 67.8 72.0 60.3
Dividends and
Interest received 2.7 1.5 3.5 1.8
Other income 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6
Total: 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.9
Appropriations (%)
Depreciation 18.0 30.3 23.9 37.2
Interest paid (gross) 1.7 2.4 4.4 3.8
Taxation 41.2 31.0 38.8 30.3
Dividends: Ordinary (net) 16.0 13.7 15.1 10.7
Pref. (net) 2.4 1.1 1.0 0.4
Minority interests and
prior-year adjustments 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.2
Retained profits 20.1 20.9 3.6.6 17.5
Total: 99.7 99.7 99.6 99.7
Cost of dividends











Notes: 1. Income Appropriations
2. Fuller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F.




Analysis by Gross Investment
Balance Sheets in Fixed Assets: Period 1
1948 1964
Rest Top 100 Rest Top 100
Assets ($)
Fixed Assets:
Tangible (net) 41.0 57.1 51.6 72.5
Intangible 5.2 6.5 CO•CM 5.7
Subsidiaries and
Trade Investments 2.4 2.2 0.3 0.4
48.6 65.8 54.7 78.6
Current assets:
Stocks 42.7 38.7 40.1 34.7
Net liquidity 19.2 17.7 2.5 -3.2
Other current assets -10.7 -22.4 2.6 -10.1
Total: 99.8 99.8 99.9 100.0
Financing ($■)
Equity interest:
Ordinary shares 29.7 34.0 36.0 33.8
Reserves 39.5 38.6 43.8 43.0
69.2 72.6 79.8 76.8
Preference shares 17.6 12.9 7.8 4.3
Long-term loans 3.4 4.2 5.8 12.1
Future tax reserves 7.9 8.1 5.1 4.9
Minority interests 1.7 2.0 1.4 1.7
Total: 99.8 99.8 99.9 99.9
Assets is Financing.
Fuller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F.







Analysis by Gross Investment
Balance Sheets in Fixed Assets: Period 2
1%-r 1971
Rest Top 100 Rest Top 100
Assets (%)
Fixed Assets:
Tangible (net) 52.8 68.0 57.1 85.8
Intangible 3.5 6.1 4.2 6.3
Subsidiaries and
Trade Investments 0.3 0.1 0.3
56.6 74.2 61.6 92.6
Current assets:
Stocks 40.3 47.5 44.9 52.8
Ret liquidity 2.2 -8.0 -2.3 -14.9
Other current assets 0.8 -13.8 -4.3 -30.8
Total: 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.7
Financing (%)
Equity interest:
Ordinary shares 36.8 37.2 31.6 28.6
Reserves 41.3 39.2 50.3 52.1
78.1 76.4 81.9 80.7
Preference shares 6.5 5.0 3.9 2.2
Long-term loans 6.8 8.1 11.9 13.9
Future tax reserves 6.8 8.5 0.4 0.9
Minority interests 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.1
Total: 99.8 99.7 99.8 99.8
Rotes: 1. Assets .— Financing
2. Fuller definitions of the variables are
given in Appendix F.





The Relation of the Population of Acquirers Studied
in Chapters 7 and S v/ith the Population Studied
in Chapter 9




zero values of A





























from 1964 to 1971 45 0
Companies excluded from




Total: 213 100.0 966 100.0
Top 100 by A of
continuing companies
with non-zero values
of A 38 22.9 100 12.9
Notes: a: Their takeover occurred in 1972 after
the close of the period studied in
Chapter 9.
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Are profits being squeezed? Drawing data from the same basic source, two sets
of observers reach quite opposite conclusions. On the one hand, Glyn and Sutcliffe
(1971) and (1972) maintain that the sixties witnessed a severe decline in profitability;
whilst, on the other, Panid and Close (1973) object that 'after 1960 there is simply
no evidence of a significant decline in the pre-tax profitability of UK industry',
and that 'the inclusion of investment grants would probably eliminate completely
the downward trend in post-tax profitability between 1961 and 1969'. More
recent work shows that such contradictory opinions result from different profit
measures. It is the aim of this paper to pursue this theme, suggesting that different
measures of profit may be appropriate for different issues. It is argued that a
single measure, giving a clear answer, is appropriate for one of the issues with which
both sides were much concerned: whether companies' ability to finance investment
from internal sources has been curtailed.
1. The Framework
To demonstrate the way in which the choice of measure can so drastically affect
the apparent record, and to argue for a measure appropriate to questions of internal
finance, requires some discussion of accounting conventions. As a framework for
this discussion, companies' gross income, the difference between their sales and all
their purchases except fixed assets, may be analysed in terms of the following com¬
ponents, each of which will subsequently be more closely defined and evaluated:
D: companies' historic cost depreciation provision
T: taxation payable on the year's profits
C: dividends and interest
A: stock appreciation
Z: (K—D) where K is capital consumption, at current prices
R: net retentions, after deducting stock appreciation and
capital consumption
A+ Z+R: conventional retentions as recorded by companies
P=T + C+A+Z-|-R: pre-tax profits, after deducting depreciation, as conven¬
tionally recorded by companies
It is on the basis of movements in a net profit measure (R) that Glyn and Sutcliffe
argue the existence of a severe profits squeeze in the sixties.1 By contrast, Panid
*This paper is a product of a research project financed by the Esmee Fairbairn Charitable
Trust. Helpful comments on an earlier draft were received from Len Gill, Anne Harris, Colin
Jones, Tom Lee, Gay Meeks, Tom Robertson, David Tweedie, Geoffrey Whittington and the
Editors of the Bulletin. An earlier version of the paper was submitted to the Sandilands
Committee on Inflation Accounting in April 1974.
1 In these conclusions profits appear variously as a proportion of companies' capital, or as a
share in national income.
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and Close's contention that profits have more or less been maintained rests on the
path of the conventional measure (P). Two subsequent analyses (National Institute
Economic Review, 1973, p. 20; Burgess and Webb, 1974) have confirmed these
relative movements in R and P. Clearly, the divergence between them must be
accounted for by an increase in one or more of the other components of P. In
order to identify the main contributors to this divergence, the role of each compo¬
nent is examined in turn (sections 2 to 4) before their joint effect on the company
sector's internal finance is assessed (section 5).
2. Transfers to the Government and to Shareholders
The shares of conventional profit (P) set aside for dividends plus interest and
for taxation are considered first, and it emerges that neither rose over the period.2
Table 1 shows C and T as percentages of P. The 'dividend' figure represents loan
Table 1
The Share of Conventional Profit Transferred to the














1962 43.5 30.6 74.1
1963 42.9 30.0 72.9
1964 42.8 29.5 72.3
1965 33.2" 30.0 63.2
1966 48.4 31.9 80.3
1967 40.5 31.7 72.2
1968 43.3 29.1 72.4
1969 44.6 29.8 74.4
1970 39.6 31.4 71.0
1971 40.8 30.8 71.6
1972 37.6 26.2 63.8
Averages:
1961-66 42.4 30.0 72.4
1967-72 41.1 29.8 70.9
T =Taxes on profits + Schedule F income tax on dividends—investment grants.
C =Dividends (net of income tax) + loan interest.
a The unusually low figure for 1965 and the high figure for 1966 are caused by the transition
between tax systems, and tend to offset one another.
Source: Derived from aggregates for U.K. quoted companies (see Department of Trade and
Industry).
interest plus the net dividend receivable by the shareholder for the year: under the
corporation tax system, Schedule F income tax on dividends has been included in
3 The basic data used throughout the paper are the aggregate accounts of UK quoted com¬
panies engaged in manufacturing, distribution, etc., compiled by the Department of Trade and
Industry. These figures suffer from two weaknesses. Firstly, they exclude certain small
quoted companies as well as all non-quoted companies—and so account for only about three-
quarters of total company profits as recorded in the Blue Book. Secondly, the population of
companies changes in three years of the period (1964, 1969, 1971) so, for these years, two values
are reported in the diagrams, one comparable with the previous year, one with the subsequent
year. These figures are preferred to others available, for instance those in Financial Statistics,
since they include information which is necessary at several stages in the argument below (such
as companies' own depreciation provisions, and analysis of the figures by industry). As both
Panic and Close and Glyn and Sutcliffe use the same data, the results in this paper may be
directly compared with those of the main protagonists in the debate.
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taxation.3 Taxation then includes all the tax payable by the company on behalf
of its shareholders (that is income tax plus profits tax in the early sixties, and
corporation tax plus income tax under the later system); and it also takes account
of the variety of investment incentives offered by the government during the
period. In the earlier years, investment allowances and accelerated depreciation
for tax purposes made the effective average tax rate (shown here) lower than the
nominal rate; whilst from 1967 investment grants have (in my figures) been offset
against the companies' tax liability to leave the net figure payable to the govern¬
ment. Comparing averages for the second half of the period with those for the
first half shows that, with these definitions, the share of dividends and interest
and that of net taxation are both slightly lower in the later period. Transfers to
government and shareholders do not, then, appear to contribute to the decline in
net retentions (R) in relation to conventional profit (P).
3. The Impact of Stock Appreciation
By contrast with taxation and dividends, stock appreciation is not a simple
transfer of income, and is not recorded in companies' conventional accounts.
Accordingly, a more detailed treatment is required of the way it impinges on com¬
panies' ability to finance investment.
The conventional accounting profit on a unit of output consists of its sale price
less the recorded costs of the actual inputs required to produce that output. In the
context of rising input prices, it is convenient to separate out one component of
profit from the rest in the following way:
(a) the difference between the sale price of the output and the then current
price of the inputs necessary to produce the good (T+ C + Z + R per unit);
(b) the difference between the current price of these inputs and the actual price
paid for them earlier (A, stock appreciation, per unit).4
If the physical volume of stocks is to be maintained, part (b) of profit will be
absorbed immediately in the purchase of new inputs (replacement stocks) at the
new higher prices.5 A monetary gain is realized, and recorded in conventional
profit, but then pre-empted to maintain stocks: part (b), stock appreciation, does
not augment the funds available to the company for distribution, taxation or in¬
vestment. But this is not the end of the story, since in the traditional system
this 'gain' is liable to taxation along with other profit.6 This means that stock ap¬
preciation exacts a net cost in terms of funds available to the company. Moreover,
3 This treatment of income tax on dividends is not crucial, since an alternative treatment
would leave unchanged the joint proportion of P accounted for by C and T: the main argument
would be unaffected. King (1973) includes this income tax on dividends in his post-tax
measure of profit to which he appeals in support of his contention that the effective tax rate has
fallen and companies' liquidity has not been squeezed. This paper disputes not King's figures
as such but his argument that such a measure properly reflects companies' flow of internal
finance.
4 This is just a heuristic simplification; for instance, it abstracts from problems involved in
the depreciation of fixed assets, which are considered below.
5 Speculative stockholding is left out of account.
6 The consequences for saving of the taxation of stock appreciation were recognised long
ago by Keeling and MacPherson (1952).
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a proportion of the stock appreciation element in total recorded profit may well
actually be distributed to shareholders.7 Thus the tax and dividends payable on
part (b) pre-empt some of part (a).8 Looking at the same process slightly different¬
ly, T and C are based on P, even though only (P — A) is available for these transfers.
This argument may be restated and developed using these symbols:
P: conventional profits, as above
S: opening value of stocks
i: rate of inflation of stock values
t: rate of tax on profits (P)
c: proportion of profits (P) distributed to shareholders
Assuming that the physical volume of stocks is maintained, stock appreciation
(A) is:
i-S (1)
This represents the conventional profit which has to be paid out simply to maintain
the physical volume of stocks. But tax and dividends are paid on the stock
appreciation included in conventional profit: this additional burden equals:
(t+ c) -i-S (2)
Combining (1) and (2) gives M, the total cash pre-empted from conventional profit,
which may be attributed to the traditional inclusion of stock appreciation in
profit:
M = (1 +t + c) - i-S (3)
The proportion of conventional profit pre-empted by this mechanism is shown by
dividing by P:
M
, . . S ...
p-= (1 + t+ c)-l-p (4)
This gives a multiplier, (1 +t + c) • (S/P), relating the proportion of profit pre¬
empted to the rate of inflation. A typical value for this multiplier for the quoted





7 This approach to dividends stems from concern with the single issue of managements'
ability to finance investment: dividends are considered a'cost' as in the managerial theories of
the firm (e.g. Penrose, 1959, p. 28). Such treatment would be clearly inappropriate to, say, a
discussion of wealth holders' income.
8 A comparison may be made with the situation affecting a house-owner when the nominal
value of his house rises with inflation. If he moves to a similar house the holding gain resulting
from inflation is realised, but immediately pre-empted; in contrast with the firm, however, he
does not have to record the apparent gain as income, and consequently does not pay tax on it.
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Thus,
(M/P) = (1 + 0.4 + 0.3) x 2.5 x i
i.e. just 1% inflation in stock values would pre-empt 4.25% of conventional
profit.9
This analysis of the relationship between inflation and stock appreciation is
supported by Table 2 which presents estimates of actual (M/P) for 1961-72,
Table 2
The Rate of Inflation of Stock Values, and the Proportion of Conventional Profit Pre-Empted
Directly and Indirectly by Stock Appreciation























Rate of price increase = percentage rise in consumer price index from average date of pur¬
chase of opening stocks to average date of purchase of closing stocks (Central Statistical
Office).
M= (l+t + c) x estimate of A (direct effect of stock appreciation)
t= nominal tax rate on company profit
c= average dividend payout rate gross of Schedule F income tax
Source and coverage: as Table 1.
dropping the assumption introduced for simplicity above, that physical stocks are
always maintained.10 There is an enormous range in the share of profit pre-
9 In contrast with the earlier discussion, which emphasized the ex post shares of income
transferred to government and to shareholders, here, and in subsequent calculations. I use the
nominal corporation tax rate and the average dividend payout rate gross of income tax;
interest is excluded because it does not vary with profit. These definitions of c and t seem
appropriate because different degrees of certainty attach to these charges on income here:
companies may take stock appreciation into account in their dividend decision (and thus also
reduce their income tax liability) while they cannot avoid corporation tax on stock appreciation.
It might be questioned whether this average value for c is appropriate: some lower marginal
payout rate might be preferable in years of rising profits (see the discussion of observed dividend
behaviour in Lintner (1956)). But, using a marginal rate would not substantially alter the
orders of magnitude: even if c were equal to zero, the tax rate, combined with the ratio of stock
to profit, would still ensure a multiplier of 3.5 here.
10 The method of the Central Statistical Office (1968) was used, except that a single general
price index (the consumer price index) was applied to stocks, whereas the C.S.O. use specific
price indices for individual industries, and for each component of stock. The information
necessary to emulate the C.S.O. in these respects is not available for this population of com¬
panies (different from the C.S.O.'s). However, I did try to compare my estimates with those of
the C.S.O. Unfortunately, the data are not readily comparable for individual years, but a
comparison is possible for the whole 12 year period; and scaled down appropriately, the C.S.O.'s
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empted by stock appreciation: taking the extreme values, it is over a third in 1970
compared with less than 5% in 1962. The rise in the rate of price increase during
the period has caused a striking increase in the absolute value of M (documented
in section 5); and the average value of (M/P) is over 10 percentage points higher in
the second half than in the first half of the period.11 Inflation, via the stock
appreciation mechanism, clearly made a major contribution to the divergence of P
and R.12
4. Depreciation Provisions and Replacement Costs
On the face of it, fixed asset replacement poses a problem similar to that for
stock appreciation. It might be supposed that because of rising fixed asset prices
depreciation provisions based on historic cost would be inadequate to finance fixed
asset replacement; part of conventional profit would then be preempted for asset
replacement; and this pre-empted profit would nonetheless incur tax and divi¬
dends. So 'disposable' profit would again be eroded.
The C.S.O.'s response to this problem is, in effect, to re-express companies'
depreciation provisions in terms of current prices (giving capital consumption).
The procedure is illustrated in case A of Table 3. There it is assumed, for sim¬
plicity, that a company's assets yield a constant flow of services for five years, and
then die; that real investment is constant; that fixed asset prices are rising at 5%
p.a.; and that depreciation is provided on a straight line basis. Because investment
is constant, the sum of capital consumption in year 5 precisely equals the cost of
replacing, at year 5 prices, those assets purchased in year 0 which now expire.
But the sum of year 5's depreciation provisions, the figure set aside in companies'
accounts, is inadequate to finance these replacement assets: the purchase of replace¬
ment assets pre-empts 17.12 units of year 5's conventional profit. In such a case
the argument is indeed analogous with that for stock appreciation.
However, this result can change crucially if real investment is growing. This
is illustrated in case B of Table 3, which is in all respects similar to case A, except
that real investment is growing at 8% p.a. The cost, in year 5, of replacing year
0's investment is the same (127.63); the excess of capital consumption over com¬
panies' depreciation is slightly greater than in case A of Table 3; but year 5's total
historic cost depreciation provision is now more than enough to finance the replace¬
ment of year 0's investment: in fact 1.98 units of depreciation are left over.
More generally, if investment is on the increase, the cost of replacing those
assets which expire in the current period will differ not only from the current
total estimate of stock appreciation for 1961-72 was within 1 per cent of my total estimate.
So i doubt whether my crude use of the single index significantly distorts the general picture for
the aggregates.
11 The relationship between (M/P) and i does change between years, so that for instance, a
rise in i in 1972 is accompanied by a fall in (M/P). The absolute value of M has varied closely
with i, but changes in P (particularly in response to changes in the level of activity in the
economy) sometimes offset these changes in M.
12 M here includes part of T and C considered in section 2, to illustrate the interaction of
inflation and the conventions used in assessing tax liabilities and setting dividend payments.
While section 2 concluded that T and C had not risen as a proportion of P, since, however, A has
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where Yt= 0.2xG, 110.51 129.61
Current cost depreciation
For year 5 ( = capital
A
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o
where = 0.2 x G, x NB/Nt 127.63 148.65
Replacement cost
In year 5 of fixed assets
purchased in year 0
(I) =G„ x N5/N0 127.63 127.63
(5)
year's depreciation provisions, but also from the year's capital consumption in
current prices. Moreover, total current depreciation provisions can be more than
adequate to finance current replacement investment, even though the depreciation
provisions made over any asset's lifetime may never be adequate to replace that
particular asset when it dies.13 Despite inflation, no profit need be pre-empted.
A paper by Domar (1953) specifies this relationship between replacement invest¬
ment and depreciation provisions algebraically.14 Domar obtains the general
formula:
I
_ m(u+ i)(l +i)m
D= [l + (u+ i)]m-l
where I: replacement cost of those assets now due for retirement
D: depreciation provisions (historic cost)
m: lifetime of fixed assets
u: annual rate of growth of real gross fixed investment
i: annual rate of fixed asset prices
13 Depreciation may be even greater in relation to immediate replacement costs to the extent
that companies adopt a reducing balance method of depreciating assets, which gives greater
weight to recent purchases. This practice is not uncommon (see Chartered Accountants' Trust
for Education and Research, 1972, p. 30).
14 An earlier version of this paper relied upon specific examples to support the argument
that follows. I am grateful to Mr. E. F. Jackson for referring me to Domar's more general
work.
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This expresses the ratio of replacement costs to depreciation as a function of the
lifetime of fixed assets, the rate of growth of investment and the rate of price
increase,15 with (I/D) varying inversely with u, but directly with i. This is exactly
the relationship illustrated with the numerical example in Table 3, and it yields the
same specific results as Table 3. The formula can be used to estimate on the one
hand the level and, on the other, the trend in (I/D) for the UK quoted company
sector.
Substitution in (5) of typical values of m, u, and i shows the order of magnitude
of (I/D) for the sector. A value of 30 years for m was suggested by Domar, and
more recent work does not make this appear unreasonable (see Dean, 1964,
p. 330).18 The average rate of growth of real investment (gross domestic fixed
capital formation at constant prices) between 1948 and 1972 was in the region
of 4.5% p.a.; whilst the C.S.O.'s fixed asset price index has on average risen by
roughly 4% p.a. during the period.17 Substituting these estimates in Domar's
formula (5) yields a value of somewhat below 80% for (I/D): the rate of growth of
real investment has in the event been sufficient to raise depreciation above replace¬
ment costs. According to these estimates, then, fixed asset replacement has not
functioned in the same way as stock appreciation: far from pre-empting part of
conventional profit, asset replacement costs have typically fallen short of com¬
panies' (historic cost) depreciation provisions, and part of depreciation has in fact
been available for net investment.18
However, though historic cost depreciation provisions have typically aug¬
mented disposable profit during the period, rising asset prices will have contributed,
along with the stock appreciation mechanism, to the downward trend in the ratio
of disposable to conventional profit. Because of the positive relation between
(I/D) and i, with the acceleration in the rate of fixed asset price increase from
around 1969, (I/D) will, other things equal, have been rising, and the surplus of
depreciation provisions declining. It seems unlikely that the increase in i has in
fact been offset by changes in u and m: the growth of real investment (u) has ac¬
tually slackened recently (see addendum). To some extent, changes in i and u may
be expected to reinforce each other: a vicious circle can be envisaged whereby a rise
in i increases (I/D) and the consequent squeeze on internal finance depresses u—a
15 The principal assumptions on which the formula rests are parallel with Table 3: straight
line depreciation; constant asset lifetime (m); and smooth and steady rates of growth of real
investment (u) and of price increase (i).
16 Even were the shorter lifetimes reported by Shonfield (1965, p. 42) for I.C.I, more com¬
mon than this estimate of m assumes, the chief conclusion of this section would still hold.
With m halved to 15 years, replacement still typically falls short of depreciation.
17 These approximations of i and u were derived from Table 16 and 55 respectively of Central
Statistical Office (1972, and earlier years).
18 With depreciation equivalent to about 35 per cent of conventional pre-tax profits at
this time, that fifth of depreciation left over after replacement corresponds to about 7 per cent
of profit. Merrett and Sykes' (1974) advocacy of current cost depreciation (capital consump¬
tion) in arriving at a profit measure appropriate for analysis and as a tax base entirely ignores
the fact that historic cost depreciation probably still comfortably exceeds replacement costs;
and that the' free' depreciation currently allowed for tax purposes will typically exceed replace¬
ment costs by an even greater margin.
Glyn and Sutcliffe (1971) and (1972) also deducted capital consumption from profit; again,
the figures they report (R) understate the level of effective savings available to companies for
immediate investment.
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process which itself further raises (II'D). Even were u to remain stable at past
levels, however, if the rate of inflation continues at the present double figure levels,
(I/D) can be expected to rise above unity.19,20
It would be interesting to go beyond estimates of the order of magnitude and
direction of change of (I/D) for the period by providing estimates for individual
years. However, there would be problems in doing so; for the considerable
fluctuations in gross investment which have actually occurred in the post-war
period complicate the estimate of (I/D) for individual years. (I/D) becomes par¬
ticularly sensitive to the choice of m, as the fluctuations in gross investment are
echoed by replacement fluctuations m years later. Yet m itself is hard to estimate
satisfactorily: separate estimates would be required for individual years, since the
age structure of the assets to be replaced will vary from year to year simply in
response to investment fluctuations in the past. These estimation difficulties
could only be overcome if very detailed data on lifetimes and fluctuations were
available. In any case, even the estimates of replacement costs already presented
are subject to a major qualification. They rely on the assumption, as do the
C.S.O.'s estimates of capital consumption, that fixed assets will be replaced with
technically similar assets. By contrast, many treatments of asset replacement
emphasize the role of technical progress (e.g. Salter, 1969, p. 72; Shonfield, 1965,
p. 42); the incentive to replace comes not from the physical decay of old equipment,
but from the superior efficiency of new; and consequently the distinction between
new and replacement investment is blurred. Because of these objections to esti¬
mating replacement costs, the subsequent discussion of the level of companies' dis¬
posable income focusses on the funds available for new and replacement invest¬
ment taken together.21
5. Quoted Companies' Aggregate Saving
The foregoing discussion in terms of profit shares has identified inflation,
operating through stock appreciation and rising fixed asset replacement costs, as
the cause of the increasing difference between conventional and disposable profit.
Now, in Fig. 1, the courses of the various components of profit are charted in
absolute terms.
From the first part of the diagram it can be seen that pre-tax conventional
profits in money terms (P) have risen in most years of the period, though they
suffered slight setbacks in 1962, 1966 and 1970. However, with the acceleration of
19 Domar (1953, p. 11) shows that where m is 30 and u is 4.5 per cent p.a., a value for i of
less than 10 per cent p.a. (over the asset's whole lifetime of course) is necessary to equalize
replacement costs and depreciation.
20 This whole treatment, in line with the paper's central concern with disposable funds,
concentrates on the cost of replacing the current year's retirements, emphasizing companies'
actual cash flows, whereas the standard approach (capital consumption) estimates the part of
assets of all vintages consumed during the year. This is not to say that capital consumption
may not be the appropriate concept for some issues, such as, for instance, the estimation of
wealth holders' income after capital has been kept intact.
21 In Coddington's (1970) terms, such annual figures as could be provided here would be
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Fig. 1. The components of profit: quoted companies, 1961-72.
1. Conventional profits and the impact of stock appreciation: current prices.
2. Profits after full adjustment for stock appreciation, other tax, and other dividends: current
prices.
3. Gross saving at current prices: disposable retentions and depreciation provisions.
4. Gross saving at 1963 prices.
Source: as Table 1.
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inflation in the late sixties, profits adjusted for the full effects of stock appreciation
(P—M) show a rather different picture. For instance, between 1967 and 1968, a
rise in P of over £400 million was accompanied by a rise of only £6 million in
(P—M), thanks largely to an increase in the inflation rate.22 Again, a rise in the
inflation rate in 1970 aggravated the fall in profit: a £70 million decline in P was
converted into a £400 million decline in (P—M).
The second part of the diagram shows the impact of 'other tax' (T') and 'other
dividends' (C') on (P—M). These items are defined as in section 2, except that they
exclude the tax and dividends already counted as indirect costs of stock apprecia¬
tion and included in M (see section 3). The resultant retentions figure (R + Z)
fluctuates somewhat, especially on the change in the tax system in 1965-66; but,
even in current prices, it is typically lower in the second half of the period than in
the first half. In view of the argument in section 2 that the shares of tax and divi¬
dends did not rise over the period, it might seem odd that a slight upward move¬
ment in (P—M) is associated with a downward movement in (P —M—T'— C').
This is explained by the facts that loan interest accounted for an increasing pro¬
portion of C over the period, and that since interest does not varywith profit, it was
not included in M as a secondary effect of stock appreciation. So the 'dividend'
component of M falls and 'other dividends' (C'), which include interest, rise over
the period.
In the third part of the diagram, companies' depreciation provisions (D) are
added back to (R + Z), to give a figure for gross savings at current prices available
for new and replacement investment. In contrast with (R+ Z), D rose in every
year of the period. Indeed, because of the general rise in real investment expen¬
diture (see section 4), even at 1963 prices (not shown) depreciation provisions
increased in every year but two of the period, and by 1971 were more than 50%
higher than in 1961. However, because of the decline in (R + Z) (accentuated in
1963 prices), when the joint total (R + Z+D) is expressed in 1963 prices
((R +Z+D)* in part 4 of the diagram), such buoyancy is no longer apparent. The
total for 1971 is only 20% higher than that for 1961, and is lower than the typical
figure for the mid-sixties. Finally, the full impact of inflation becomes evident if
this real gross savings figure, (R+Z+D)*, is compared with nominal conventional
profit (P) in part 1 of the diagram: the increases in P in 1967-69 are converted into
decreases in (R+Z+D)* (which represents the inflation-adjusted inflow of internal
funds available for the replacement of fixed assets and for expansion); while the
considerable rise in P in 1971 and 1972 is accompanied by relatively tiny increases
in (R + Z+D)*. Moreover, it is likely that an even sharper contrast would result
if only net savings were considered (although, for the reasons given above, a precise
estimate is elusive), for it has been argued in section 4 that, because of the general
expansion of investment in the post-war period, the real costs of replacing fixed
assets will surely have been rising; and so the squeeze on net savings will have been
even more severe than that demonstrated for gross.
Evidently, the contention that the late sixties did not witness a serious decline
22 Of course, (P—M) is only an approximate estimate and the figures mentioned should not
be interpreted too precisely: but they do illustrate orders of magnitude.
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in companies' internal funds available for investment does not hold; and if Panic
and Close or King maintain the opposite they are suffering from profit illusion. The
seeming buoyancy of conventional profit was illusory: the savings squeeze was a
reality in the late sixties, and in assessments of any recovery in savings in the early
seventies, the upturn of conventional profit should be heavily discounted.
As to why profits were such that net savings did decline as inflation rose, a ten¬
tative suggestion might be made here. When increases in the general level of
activity are only sluggish, there is evidence that conventionally-measured profit
margins stagnate or fall as managers maintain prices in the face of rising unit costs
(Neild, 1963). Again, in times of inflation, if managers are susceptible to profit
illusion, as some observers seem to have been, then they may fail to recoup the
rising replacement costs of inputs through pricing policies, because conventionally
recorded profit (based on the historic cost of inputs) appears satisfactory. These
two influences, acting together in the 'stagflation' years at the end of the sixties,
may be sufficient to explain the aggregate saving squeeze, presenting a challenge
(or perhaps a complement) to other accounts, which, for instance, emphasize the
role of increased international competition (Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1971 and 1972).
But this is only speculation.23
6. The Uneven Impact of Inflation on Different Industries' Disposable
Profits
So far, attention has been focused, as has the debate in the literature, on the
aggregate record of the company sector. However, particularly striking results
emerge from an extension of the analysis to compare the experience of different
industries.
To consider first the impact of stock appreciation across industries: equation (4)
of section 3 above provided a multiplier relating the proportion of conventional
profit pre-empted by stock appreciation to the rate of inflation:
M „ , , S .
p"—(l+t+ c)-p-i
(M/P) has been calculated for each of the 22 broad industrial groups represented in
the aggregates for 1970, the most recent year for which suitable data were avail¬
able; as well as one which experienced an inflation rate typical of the early seven¬
ties. A single price index for stocks was used for want of specific indexes for indi¬
vidual industries. The estimates thus isolate influences on (M/P) other than
different industry rates of stock price inflation.24 Otherwise actual values were
used. On this basis, the variation in the multiplier across industries arose chiefly
from different ratios of stock to profit, rather than from different tax or dividend
23 If managers do indeed suffer from profit illusion, this would, of course influence their
incentive, as opposed to ability, to invest.
24 It seems unlikely that different rates of inflation would systematically compensate for
variation in multiplier values, and so significantly alter the range of the results; though indi¬
vidual industries may well have experienced rather different rates from the average used, so no
great reliance should be placed on individual values. The aim is, again, simply to suggest
hkely orders of magnitude.
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Bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc.
Miscellaneous services
Transport and communication
Fig. 2. Stock appreciation plus tax and dividends payable on stock appreciation (M) as a
percentage of conventional profits (P): 1970.
Source: as Table 1.
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payment rates. The term (1+t+ c) exhibited relatively little variation across
industries: t is uniform, and c, the average payout rate varied only between 0.28
and 0.40 for 20 of the industries25: for these industries the lowest value for
(1+t + c) was 93% of the highest. However, for the same 20 industries, (S/P)
varied between 0.5 and 4.8: here the lowest value was only 10% of the highest.
Section 3 above showed the typical order ofmagnitude of the stock appreciation
multiplier and its impact on aggregate effective profits. Figure 2 illustrates the
effects of the considerable variety in the multiplier's value between industries: it
shows (M/P), the proportion of conventional profit pre-empted by the stock
appreciation mechanism. The range is huge: from 5% to 72% (ignoring ship¬
building and vehicles for which M exceeded P—see above). In addition, for 12 of
the 22 industries the 'cost' appears as 40% or more of P. In a sense, the stock
appreciation mechanism amounts to a 'levy' on stockholdings which reduces
liquidity, discriminating severely against those industries which carry large stocks
in relation to their profits.
Of course, this is not the whole picture. In particular, in view of the discussion
of aggregate experience, one naturally asks how the relationship between replace¬
ment costs and depreciation will have varied between industries. However, it
does not seem feasible to present even suggestive estimates in this case, because of
the lack of detailed information. For the relationship will depend here on industry
rates of growth of annual investment, rates of price increase, and lifetimes of
fixed assets: but whilst industry rates of price increase are not available—the prob¬
lem already encountered for stock appreciation—neither in this case are the life¬
times of fixed assets for different industries. Moreover, the general problem with
such estimates, of distinguishing new and replacement investment, will surely be
acute in comparisons of different industries with different rates of technical pro¬
gress. Hence any estimates might be grosslymisleading, and this question remains
unanswered.
7. Summary and Conclusions
Are profits being squeezed? No, on one measure, conventional accounting
profit; yes, on another, the funds retained by the firm and available for investment.
This paper shows how, in times of inflation, conventionally measured profit will
belie companies' ability to invest from internal funds: inflation, working through
stock appreciation and rising fixed asset replacement costs, rather than increasing
shares of tax and dividends in conventional profit,28 is identified as the main con¬
tributor to the divergence between conventional and disposable profit in recent
years.
The effect of stock appreciation is dramatic. If managements wish to maintain
their companies' purchasing power, it is not enough that nominal earnings keep
pace with the rise in prices, as it is for wage or dividend recipients. In addition,
25 The remaining two industries, shipbuilding and vehicles, aberrated on account of negative
and tiny profits, respectively.
26 Though of course, as a share of profit less stock appreciation, tax and dividends rose over
the period.
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increases in conventional profits have to match stock appreciation; and since stocks
are, on average, two or three times earnings, earnings must rise by a multiple of the
inflation rate, if disposable profits are to be maintained. Moreover, paradoxically,
continued use of the inflated conventional profit measure that includes stock
appreciation actually itself reduces the ratio of effective to conventional profit: for
so long as conventional profit is still used as a tax base and, one presumes, in the
determination of dividends, the effect of the stock appreciation mechanism on the
internal funds available for investment is aggravated.
What is more, in recent years the impact of stock appreciation has not only been
drastic for aggregate disposable profits but has also discriminated severely between
industries. This means that the effective tax rate on profits after stock appreciation
varies a good deal from one industry to another. If it is believed that this dis¬
crimination restrains the investment of certain industries in an undesirable way,
there is perhaps a case for reducing the tax bill of industries with much stock
appreciation at the expense of those with low stocks in relation to profits; that is,
for relieving stock appreciation of tax and (assuming that aggregate tax revenue is
to be unchanged) raising the standard rate.27
Returning to the aggregate picture, the downward trend in real disposable
funds already brought about by stock appreciation was almost certainly reinforced
because, during the period, historic cost depreciation provisions probably declined
in relation to the cost of replacing current retirements. However, these replacement
costs probably never exceeded depreciation provisions and actually pre-empted
conventional profit.
Thus, in spite of an apparently satisfactory record in the late sixties in terms of
traditional profit, the real saving of the quoted company sector declined from 1967
to 1970; and the recovery in real saving in the early seventies is much less vigorous
than the movement of conventional profit might suggest.
University of Edinburgh
Addendum
Has the Savings Squeeze Restrained Investment?
Investigating the consequences of companies' diminished ability to finance
investment internally would require a paper to itself.28 For a satisfactory inter¬
pretation, some notion would be required of the investment which would have been
undertaken, in the absence of the savings squeeze, in response to the various
27 Whether conventional profit is a desirable tax base is one of the topics to be investigated
by the Sandilands Committee on Inflation Accounting. Against the objection that this would
imply a radical change in the tax system, I would cite the argument of Parker and HaTcourt
(1969, p. 27) that the change would only restore the basis which obtained in times of mild
inflation.
28 Concern with the internal finance of investment stems from the returns on investment
projects being uncertain. Management's ability to survive the failure of an investment project
is reckoned to fall as the investment-saving ratio rises. This argument is presented in Kalecki
(1937) and is used extensively by the' managerial' theorists of the firm (e.g. Marris, 1964, p. 8
p. 204).
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incentives to invest, such as pressure on capacity and expected profits. But,
lacking this, a few generalizations may still be advanced about the level of invest¬
ment and the way in which it was financed, on the basis of movements in the aggre¬
gate figures. Figure 3 presents the quoted companies' gross investment expressed
-
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year
Fig. 3. Quoted companies' gross investment in fixed assets: 1963 prices.
The unbroken line represents gross investment. The broken line represents gross saving at
1963 prices (as in Fig. 1).
Source: as Fig. 1.
in constant prices, for comparison with the real gross savings aggregates provided
earlier (and drawn in here too). Though it rose between 1967 and 1969, real
investment scarcely increased in 1970, and it declined in 1971 and 1972. If invest¬
ment was restrained by the savings squeeze (which had begun to operate by 1968),
the restraint only took effect after a lag of a couple of years. Such a lag is not
unreasonable: some time may elapse before a savings squeeze is recognized,
especially when conventional profits appear healthy (the situation in 1968: see
Fig. 1); and considerable delays are known to occur, especially for large projects,
between the investment decision and the flow of investment expenditure.29
An alternative view would deny such a long lag and give less weight to the
'ability' constraint; it would relate actual investment chiefly to factors on the
'incentive' side, and maintain that investment would proceed despite falls in
current savings provided that incentives, such as profit expectations and sales,
were favourable. According to this account, the shortfall between saving and
investment from 1968 to 1971 demonstrates companies' indifference between inter¬
nal and external finance: shortages of saving would be offset by new issues. Table
4 traces companies' financing pattern: it is a simplified statement of the sources and
uses of funds for the quoted company sector. The saving-investment ratio (column
1) certainly suffered a fall between 1967 and 1970; but the discrepancy was not
made up by new external long-term finance: on the contrary, new issues declined
with saving (column 2). The breach was apparently filled by reducing cash and
bank balances (column 3), and by restraining the increase in working capital
(column 6): procedures which might be interpreted as short-run expedients to
finance commitments already undertaken.
29 The Royal Institute of British Architects reported an average lag of 20 months from the
architect's first instructions to the start of work (cited in Reddaway (1964)).
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In summary, investment did decline some time after saving. Though this
decline might be attributed wholly to changes on the incentive side (not explored
here), the pattern of financing in the period when saving flagged but investment
was maintained does not suggest that companies readily resorted to outside finance
when internal sources failed: new long term external finance did not compensate
for the shortage of savings. The contention that investment is restrained by
saving is at least consistent with the evidence.
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